From planned intervention to negotiated development : the struggle of bureaucrats, farmers and traders in the Mahaweli irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka by Siriwardena, S.S.A.L.
From planned intervention 
to negotiated development 
The struggle of bureaucrats, 
farmers and traders in the Mahaweli 
irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka 
S.S.A.L. Siriwardena 
Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift 'From planned intervention to 
negotiated development', door S.S.A.L. Siriwardena. 
1. The interrelations of theoretical notions and policy models 
have been under-researched. Therefore many development 
problems of irrigation settlement projects have been 
identified and explained in terms of the weaknesses of 
project implementation and not as a failure of the 
development models themselves. 
2. When government policies are implemented through local 
officials, the top-down authority structure gets tilted, 
because of the manipulation of down-upward communication 
flows by the local agents. 
3. If social change and development is simply viewed from the 
perspective of implementing agencies or that of policy 
models, then one will find it difficult to understand who 
creates development problems, and who needs solutions. 
4. Fanners are not passive participants within official 
development programmes but strategic actors who use their 
knowledge and capabilities to pursue their own interests. 
5. The commoditization process, which follows the logic of the 
market, is blocked by counter-tendencies that emerge from 
farmers' livelihood strategies aimed at market avoidance. 
6. Policy discourse and the procedures of development 
intervention acquire legitimacy within bureaucratic 
settings, but lose their social meaning in local arenas of 
development. 
7. When confronted with the struggles, negotiations and 
strategic actions of farmers, local officials are forced to 
alter the policies and procedures of planned intervention in 
order for themselves to survive within local arenas. 
8. Bather than bringing water to people, the Mahaweli Scheme 
(Sri Lanka) has brought people to water. 
9. The participation concept has been misused for management 
purposes. 
10. High-protein animal food shipped in from third world 
countries to Holland sustains Dutch agricultural 
development. Thereafter, animal waste, accumulated in 
groundwater manifests the underdeveloped nature of Dutch 
agriculture. 
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ABSTRACT 
i 
This thesis examines the ways in which farmers, local 
officials and traders reshape the planned programme of 
development initiated from "above" by the Mahaweli 
Settlement Authority in Sri Lanka. This process of 
reshaping involves both individual and collective 
struggles aimed at realizing the goals of the three 
different actors at the point where planned intervention 
actually takes place. It therefore entails both a contest 
of interpretation and social interest. The dynamic and 
emergent character of these "struggles from below" is 
analyzed, taking into account the interlinkages and 
interactions of the three groups of actors as they deal 
with the new circumstances they face as a result of the 
introduction of new forms of development intervention. 
A detailed analysis of the reality of ongoing local 
processes in Mahaweli settlements reveals that many of 
the assumptions made about the nature of agrarian social 
change, as viewed from the perspective of the 
intervention of public authority or powerful outside 
organizations, are non-valid or empirically unfounded. It 
is found, for example, that: a) at critical points of 
l i n k a g e , producers apply government policies in 
accordance with their own practical needs and transform 
them by attributing to them social meanings that were not 
set out in the original policy statements; b) local 
o f f i c i a l s , w h e n confronted with the struggles, 
negotiations and strategic actions of farmers, are forced 
to alter the policies and procedures of planned 
intervention in order for themselves to survive within 
these local arenas or "battle grounds" with farmers; and 
c) the logic of markets cannot be used to explain the 
interdependency and types of personalized social 
! 
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relations that emerge between local traders and farmers. 
Hence, both 'frontline' government officials and local 
traders are knitted into the fabric of local life, 
establishing and adjusting their goals in accordance with 
the exigencies of local pressures and interests. 
These various complex processes of adaptation have meant 
that, in many ways, commoditization in the Mahaweli case 
has reinforced processes of peasantization rather than 
depeasantization. Farmers use their knowledge and social 
experience to devise their own livelihood strategies. In 
this way, the so-called "market-led" commodity economy, 
promoted by the penetration of merchant capital, has been 
re-shaped into a "farmer-led" economy, whereby farmers 
have incorporated traders and officials and their 
activities into their own livelihood strategies. 
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PLANNED INTERVENTION AND ACTOR STRATEGIES IN IRRIGATION 
DEVELOPMENT: BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL APPROACH. 
INTRODUCTION 
The settlement of populations in large-scale irrigation 
schemes, under the technical and administrative control 
of state agencies, constitutes a complex process of 
rural "incorporation" and "modernization" leading to 
complicated social problems and sometimes farmer 
resistance. The first part of this introductory chapter 
outlines the social conditions of such schemes and 
provides a broad description of the size, scale and 
dilemmas of the Mahaweli Irrigation Project in Sri Lanka. 
This is followed by an examination of the socio-economic 
problems of the Mahaweli settlement and of the ways in 
which researchers have interpreted and analyzed these 
problems. Finally, I elaborate the methodological and 
conceptual weaknesses of existing theoretical models for 
understanding problems of agrarian development and argue 
the usefulness of an alternative approach for analyzing 
planned intervention and farmer strategies in Mahaweli 
settlements. 
During the last two decades most Third World countries 
have experienced a new phase of agricultural development, 
whereby new efforts have been made to introduce modern 
forms of technology in subsistence-oriented agriculture. 
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Some countries, such as Sri Lanka, have undergone 
dramatic changes in their agriculture as a result of the 
re - structuring of their rural economies projects 
i n v o l v i n g b o t h l a n d development and population 
settlement. According to the World Bank, the Asian 
continent constitutes more than 80 percent of the world's 
irrigated area, which has been the single most important 
factor in increasing rice yield (1). 
Various funding agencies and local institutions with a 
commitment to these projects have attempted to 
d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r s u c c e s s by q u a n t i f y i n g the 
infrastructural and physical aspects of irrigation and 
agricultural development. Official documents frequently 
highlight the most concrete aspects, namely, investment 
resources and equipment required for implementation and 
expected results in terms of production, employment and 
income. More specifically, the expected results include 
capital formation of land, since land, which would 
otherwise be unproductive, is converted into productive 
agricultural areas. Land (usually rain forest or marginal 
subsistence farming areas) brought under irrigation is 
expected to provide the basis for employment and income 
generation for the households involved in commercial 
production, as well as for the nation as a whole, through 
the types of high-value products grown. These effects, 
which we might label quantitative and economic, are 
fairly easy to measure or estimate and they are usually 
presented as the rationale behind such undertakings. 
While available statistics show overall progress for 
irrigation schemes, many recent accounts of global 
irrigation paint a gloomy picture of the adverse social, 
economic and ecological impact of such projects. 
Although 'big dam' schemes promise much, they have 
frequently failed to deliver. Today the developing world 
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is full of such dam schemes that have not fully lived up 
to expectations (Madeley, 1983:8). 
During the last decade almost every such irrigation 
project has been affected by social and environmental 
problems.(2) The socio-economic effects of irrigation are 
often more serious than other aspects of resettlement 
farming since irrigation systems frequently have negative 
implications for certain social groups. Furthermore, 
irrigation projects often portray a picture of massive 
ecological destruction, social misery, and increasing 
ill-health and impoverishment for those very people for 
whom such projects were intended most to benefit 
(Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1986:50-78). Moreover, it cannot 
be doubted that irrigation is a technique of great 
complexity with a vast appetite for finance and 
sensitive to errors in planning and construction. From 
the beginning of the seventies, many modern irrigation 
projects have been dogged with problems relating to 
technical malfunctioning and to deleterious economic and 
social consequences for water-users (Hazlewood and 
Livingstone, 1982:20-39). 
Thus, despite official estimates and progress reports 
detailing the achievements of large-scale irrigation 
projects in developing countries, empirical evidence 
suggests that such schemes display major shortcomings. 
Goldsmith and Hildyard (1985) highlight the following 
problems in selected irrigation projects of the Third 
World: 
They require a great number of development personnel 
and demand an intensive utilization of chemicals 
(fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides), the use of 
which farmers have yet to master. Unless a programme of 
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closely supervised aid is introduced, the farmers may 
suddenly find themselves immersed in the cash economy and 
face financial burdens which bear no comparison with 
their current expenses, or they are compelled to become 
salaried agricultural workers. 
Irrigation projects are gradually integrated into the 
local political economy. Some farmers and local groups 
continue to refuse to co-operate with these projects. 
Others establish special relations with project staff in 
order to obtain access to water and other services on the 
most favourable terms possible. Project officers are 
thus placed in a position of handing out patronage which 
brings benefits to themselves. Often investment is lost 
and peasant benefits are only maintained through state 
subsidies. 
Self interest of many officials working in irrigation 
projects increases because they fear that they will be 
without work once existing projects are completed. 
Projects are immensely profitable and prestigious to 
them. Yet the process embarked upon is not sustainable 
ecologically, and is often socio-culturally destructive 
(Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1985:28-82). 
The Mahaweli Irrigation Settlement Project in Sri Lanka 
Arising from the desperate search for a large-scale 
technological solution to Sri Lanka's increasing food and 
employment requirements, the government, in 1 977, 
embarked upon a multi-million dollar project: the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project. This was a huge 
undertaking which aimed at building self-sustained 
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family farms, considered of major importance to the 
entire nation. 
The Master Plan 
The Mahaweli Ganga basin covers a total area of about 
4,000 sq. miles of the country's 25,000 sq. miles and 
has been estimated to discharge nearly 6.4 million 
acre-feet of water into the sea. This volume of water 
represents approximately one fifth of the total 
discharge of all the island's rivers into the sea. In 
order to plan the utilization of 'the water resources of 
the Mahaweli in an effective manner, an UNDP-PAO team, 
together with Sri Lankan engineers and scientists, 
carried out investigations during a four-year period 
between 1 964 to 1968, and formulated a 'Master Plan' 
which proposed to utilize 4.3 millon acre-feet of the 
flow of the Mahaweli Ganga in an area of 900,000 acres in 
the dry zone of the country, and to use the 0.9 million 
acre-feet of water already available in these areas. The 
total area of irrigation and settlement development 
covered 365,000 hectares (901,500 acres) of new land 
under irrigation, of which 100,000 hectares (247,000 
acres) consisted of already developed land but which was 
now . designated for the construction of a series of 
reservoirs on the Mahaweli Ganga and its tributaries. 
It was originally intended not merely to irrigate about 
900,000 acres of land but also to develop 15 
multi-purpose projects, 4 trans-basin diversion canals, 
several power stations with a total capacity of 500 
megawatts, and to settle over half a million people who 
would earn their livelihood in the area, all at a cost 
of Rs.27 billion (1977 prices). 
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Accelerated Programme 
After 1 977 there was heavy pressure to speed up 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of this project. A step-by-step 
implementation of the originally proposed Mahaweli 
Development Programme would have lasted 30 
years from 1 975. So in July 1 977, the new government 
decided to accelerate implementation of a truncated 
programme and to complete the project within its term of 
office of 6 years. The decision was taken for 
'acceleration' or immediate implementation of certain key 
projects of the Programme, based on the recommendations 
in the Mahaweli Master Plan that had been formulated in 
1968 by the UNDP and FAO, with the assistance of 
relevant Departments of the government of Sri Lanka. What 
was meant by 'accelerated' was that a number of projects 
would be undertaken simultaneously which, under normal 
conditions, would have been carried out sequentially (see 
Map 1 ) . 
After the decision was taken to 'accelerate' the Mahaweli 
Development Programme, the responsibility for its 
implementation was vested in the newly established 
Ministry of Mahaweli Development. As an umbrella 
o r g a n i z a t i o n for planning and implementing the 
programme, the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka was 
established in 1979. 
A Multiple-Purpose Project 
The Accelerated Mahaweli Programme envisaged the 
MAP I 
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DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME' 
(The original 30 year programme) 
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hydro-electricity plants and the development of a large 
area of land in the downstream areas with irrigation 
facilities. The establishment of this new programme 
required about 320.000 acres (compared to the original 
9 0 0 . 0 0 0 acres) for irrigation, agricultural and 
infrastructural purposes. It would also increase the 
hydro-electric generating capacity of the island by 400 
megawatts through the construction of six major 
reservoirs and five power stations. It was hoped at that 
stage, that these major works would be completed within 
six years, beginning in 1978, at an estimated cost of 
Rs.11 billion, the major part of this investment being 
for equipment and materials. 
The government decided to take up the construction of 
f o u r reservoirs, which included the Randenigala 
reservoir, and three others recommended by the 
Netherlands Engineering Consultancy (NEDECO). 
Irrigation and Drainage Systems 
The Accelerated Programme was expected to supply water to 
an extensive region along the course of the river, mainly 
to the Mahaweli plain stretching from Mahiyangana to 
Trincomalee. This region is described in the Mahaweli 
Development Plan as Systems A,B,C and D (see Map 11). 
Initially Systems B and C were to receive water. 
The huge irrigation engineering works, comprising five 
major dams and related works, were expected to supply 
Mahaweli water to 320,000 acres of new land and 90,000 
acres of existing paddy land within this region. An 
approximate breakdown of the area of new land to be 
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The government's views on the importance of this project 
are summed up in the following statement by the Minister 
irrigated under the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme was 
as follows: 
System A - 36,000 ha. ( 89,000 acres) 
System B - 48,000 ha. (118,000 acres) 
System C - 24,000 ha. { 59,000 acres) 
System D - 19,000 ha. ( 47,000 acres) 
System E - 2,800 ha. ( 7,000 acres) 
Total 126,000 ha. (312,000 acres) 
(Projects and Programme, 1985, M.E.A.) 
Additionally, the ongoing work of System H was also to 
be brought under the Accelerated Programme. In itself, 
the Accelerated Programme was a project of immense 
magnitude when considered in the light of the demands it 
would make on the country's resources, but there was 
also now the added factors of the tight time target set 
for implementation and the necessity of undertaking many 
Other action programmes before work could actually 
commence on these projects. 
The decision to accelerate the Mahaweli Programme 
required speedy action to establish the feasibility of 
the key projects recommended in general terms in the 
Master Plan: they had to be studied and appraised in 
detail before being accepted for implementation and for 
foreign funding. To this end, the services of a number of 
foreign agencies were obtained (see Appendix 111). 
Several studies, carried out with advice from the Central 
Engineering Consultancy Bureau, were financed by various 
donor countries. Based on these feasibility studies, a 
development programme and implementation strategies were 
prepared. 
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of Finance in an address to prospective foreign investors 
visiting Sri Lanka in September 1980: 
"The Mahaweli will not only provide much needed cheap 
power and save on expensive oil imports, but will also 
provide insurance to the farmer against unpredictable 
rains, in achieving higher agricultural output. We cannot 
develop agriculturally unless we get effective control 
over water. Contrary to popular belief, it is not a 
long-term project in a conventional sense. It is a 
c o n g l o m e r a t i o n of short-term projects of dams, 
reservoirs, water channels, and farmer settlement - each 
of which can produce results within 3 to 4 years and 
result in increasing availability of land, food, 
employment and power. Moreover, it is such an 
imaginative project that it is capable of generating 
popular appreciation of the need to maintain current 
welfare, thereby inducing a transfer of resources from 
consumption to investment. It is the vision of the future 
that we wish to build. Thus, our whole economic strategy 
could flounder, without Mahaweli "(Economic Review, 
1985:5). 
Downstream Irrigation Development 
Water from the Maduru Oya reservoir would irrigate areas 
in System B through its Left and Right Bank. Work on the 
Left Bank main canal commenced after work was completed 
on the main dams and reservoirs. All the canals on the 
Left Bank were to be concrete lined. The total cost of 
these canals was estimated at nearly US$ 100 million. 
The headworks programme was able to keep within the 
schedule after initial problems were cleared and 
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adjustments made and this has helped considerably in the 
power supply programme of the overall project. But the 
irrigation aspect fell behind expectations. It was 
always accepted that downstream projects, particularly 
irrigation, agriculture and settlement, were as important 
as the headworks, since the increase of food production 
and the saving of foreign exchange expenditure and 
employment generation could not be achieved without the 
full development of the downstream projects. Yet the 
late start and delays in construction at different 
stages of the project have resulted in accumulated 
delays in the downstream works. 
Since 1977, only 6.02 percent of land under the targeted 
areas have been fully developed with irrigation water 
and only about 13 per cent of the targeted 140,000 
families have been settled. On the other hand, Systems C 
and B are the major areas of settlement development 
under the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme. However, only 
23.58 percent and 3.54 percent of land respectively, were 
fully developed with irrigation water in those two 
systems. System C comprises about 66,000 ha. and here 
only Zones 1,2 and 3 have been developed. 
A General Understanding of Socio-Economic Problems in 
Mahaweli Irrigation Settlements 
The Accelerated Mahaweli Programme, begun in 1978, was 
due for completion within a period of six years; yet 
several factors, such as faulty rock formations, 
engineering difficulties, management problems, funding 
and administrative delays, and the fact that a project 
of this magnitude had never been attempted in Sri Lanka 
before, held up work. Plans therefore had to be altered 
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and the original six-year deadline was ultimately 
stretched to cover a possible further five years; thus 
the goals of the AMP (Accelerated Mahaweli Programme) 
could not achieved. 
In the process of irrigation construction and settlement 
numerous problems and weaknesses were identified. Most of 
these problems were related to cultural disruption, 
social alienation and commoditization of the agricultural 
production of small-scale family farms. An executive of 
the Mahaweli Authority explained the contradiction 
between the technocratic approach:and planned settlement 
development of the Mahaweli Settlement as follows: 
"At the planning stage necessary consideration was given 
to issues connected with the irrigation system and 
subsequent social development. But at the level of 
implementation those plans fell by the wayside and could 
not be fully translated into reality due to the gap 
between technical possibility and social consideration. 
H e n c e p r o b l e m s w i t h regards to the downstream 
development often lead to social issues at the settlement 
stage. The dichotomy of construction and operation/ 
maintenance was limited to the immediate establishment 
of an infrastructure. Therefore we find a very 
uncomfortable polarization between the construction 
group and operation and the maintenance group working 
under pressure from farmers" (Bandaragoda, 1986:22). 
A multi-purpose project such as the Mahaweli Scheme is 
difficult to assess satisfactorily. Its main objective 
of constructing the four main reservoirs and generating 
hydro - electric power has been completed on time. 
Therefore, as a hydro - electrical, power-generating 
project, the Mahaweli could be considered a success. But 
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with regard to the settlements, it is essential to 
evaluate the actual performance during the crucial phase 
of implementation in order to assess the positive, 
negative and even unintended consequences of settlement 
development. 
Various attempts have been made to identify the problems 
of Mahaweli settlements. Most of these exercises are 
either ad-hoc types of studies or limited only to 
specific aspects of the settlement process (see Appendix 
IV) . A basic difficulty, of course, with studies of this 
kind is to find points of comparison, since their 
methodological approaches and objectives are likely to 
be different. Moreover, critical observations are often 
kept at a distance from project officials. One of the 
m o s t common observations, however, concerns the 
emergence of patterns of social differentiation and 
inequality among various settler groups. This tendency 
is highlighted in order to demonstrate the failure in 
establishing an unified and self-sustaining family 
farming system, one of the main objectives of the 
Mahaweli Settlement strategy. 
According to Runhild Lund, a forein researcher, 
(1 983:12- 1 8) : 
" Family farm settlers have responded differently to 
change depending on the physical, economic and social 
pre-conditions in the area. Only a few settlers 
correspond to the hoped for ideal settlers, namely 
ambitious local farmers who achieve good production 
results. The successful settler is one who knows how to 
make use of the resources provided and who has received 
workable land and a proper water supply. Knowledge about 
Dry Zone cultivation is also an important asset. 
Economically, these farmers may choose between one or 
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m o r e promising production and marketing options 
depending on family skills, education level, number of 
household members and contacts with politicians and 
bureaucrats. Socially, the settler is also largely 
dependent on the outside world. Equally important, 
however, is the background of the settler: does he have 
close ties to the traditional local society of the area? 
Caste, class and religious groups are important cultural 
dimensions, which may structure social networks, labour 
co-operation and labour obligations." 
According to her estimate, only 10% of the settlers 
worked mainly for wages. Other farmers had various 
supplementary sources of income for their families (Lund 
1 983:12- 18). The wage work of some settlers, is not a 
sufficient indicator for considering them fully-fledged 
proletarians since they are are playing the role of 
owners who rent or lease out their lands to tenant 
cultivators for a limited period. The state, on the other 
hand, protects the sales of owner cultivators' land by 
legal means. Thus social differentiation is not a process 
which develops independently of the support or actions 
of the state. 
Thomas Krimmel (1982), who carried out an in-depth study 
on social disparities of settlers in System 'H', has 
attempted to analyze emerging social differentiation. He 
maintains that contrary to what is documented in the 
settlement planning strategy, inequalities within the 
Mahaweli Settlement tend to emerge as a consequence of 
the current design of such schemes. Uneven resource 
endowment of the settlers and differentiation continue 
inspite of the formal commitment to equalization. 
Empirical evidence produced in Thomas Krimmel's study 
strongly suggests that the Supposed equality and 
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egalitarianisra of settlers in the Mahaweli Settlement is 
of a "transitory nature" (Krimmel, 1982:25-56). 
Dr. Walter Abeygunasekera, former General Manager, 
Mahaweli Development Board and Agricultural Consultant, 
Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, gave his views on the 
equitable distribution of project benefits through 
settlement on 2.5 acres of farms as follows: 
"Significant assumptions of the development model, 
envisioned the equitable distribution of project 
resources and benefits through uniform settlement on 2.5 
a c r e f a r m s . The soil d r a i n a g e and f e r t i l i t y 
characteristics of System 'H' are highly variable within 
each farm, irrigation turnout or block. The upland or 
well drained soils are poor in organic matter, soil, 
fertility, and are highly permeable in contrast to 
poorly drained soils in the valley bottom which require 
adequate drainage to prevent impediments such as 
salinization and accumulation of toxic chemicals. There 
is also considerable variability in the distribution of 
upland, well drained soils in the different irrigation 
blocks, the largest extent being in the Kalawewa Service 
area, more specifically in H4 and H5. Thus the 
variability in the soil and drainage region influences 
productivity per unit of land. Similarly, inequitable 
distribution of irrigation to each farm, turnout or block 
has an influence on production. There is ample evidence 
[for this] in Sri Lanka in major irrigation schemes where 
agricultural production, economic well-being, incomes 
etc, are very uneven between head- and tail-ends of a 
channel providing irrigation water. For instance, the 
farmers at the head of a main branch distributory or even 
field canal are generally more assured of reliable and 
adequate irrigation supply than those at the tailend, 
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thus, the high variability of the most important 
resources, land and water, challenges the planning 
assumption of equitable distribution of project benefits 
and i n c o m e by s e t t l e m e n t on 2.5 acre farms" 
(Abegunewardena, 1985: 8-10). 
Most of the planners and project officials, however, tend 
to believe that the above types of economic and social 
differentiation are not significant so long as the 
settlers are able to manage without social conflict or 
food shortages. But an important question is how the 
social and economic consequences of such differentiation 
processes are measured and explained? 
Kapila Wimaladharma, a former Additional General Manager 
(Settlement and Operation) presented a strong image of 
future Mahaweli society: 
"With the progress of time, Mahaweli settlements are 
expected to advance from traditional to modern society, 
from s u b s i s t e n c e to c o m m e r c i a l f a r m i n g , f r o m 
bureaucratic to participatory management. The Mahaweli 
Settlement policy aims at an elimination of economic 
disparities through an egalitarian land tenure and an 
uniform ownership pattern. Mahaweli Settlers are aided 
by the state to become affluent farmers relative to 
their fellowmen elsewhere in the Island" (Wimaladharma, 
1979:38-49) . 
But, in 1985, a joint study conducted by him and Prof. T. 
Scudder revealed that many of the assumptions concerning 
the success of small-scale family farms were incorrect. 
The economic viability of a small farm does not depend 
so much on its size but rather on the improvement of its 
adaptability, capability, training, extension, community 
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development and the delivery of other inputs. However, in 
observing the new settlements and the economic changes 
taking place, they made the following remarks: 
"The major conclusion of our present assessment, is that 
net incomes of the large majority of settler households, 
in even the oldest Mahaweli Settlement areas, have not 
yet moved beyond the subsistence level. Indeed, in a 
significant number of cases in both System "H" and Zone 
II of System "C", living standards actually appear to 
have dropped, at the very time in the settlement process 
that they should be going up, if the settlement 
component is to catalyze development ..." 
Less than 20 percent of the settlers in the project have 
been able to complete the construction of their 
permanent dwellings. Many farmers defaulted on low 
interest government loans primarily due to crop failures 
in successive drought years, making them ineligible for 
future loans" (Scudder and Wimaladharma, 1985:12-20). 
The above types of problems in the Mahaweli Settlements 
are due not only to social and economic inequality among 
settlers but also to the organizational problems of 
irrigation water management. Top-enders generally 
receive adequate water during the entire period of water 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , whereas tail-enders receive small, 
unreliable and untimely deliveries. Moreover, irrigation 
water often becomes a point of conflict between the 
management staff and settlers, as well as between the 
top-enders and lower reaches. 
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Theoretical Problems of Understanding Development 
Tendencies and Social Change in Mahaweli Settlements 
As Long suggests, research should be addressed to 
understanding the complex relationship between types of 
intervention and types of outcome. Yet we still find it 
immensely difficult to formulate sound generalizations 
about this relationship (Long, 1989:2). 
Disparities between households and groups of settlers 
have been observed from the very early stages of the 
Mahaweli Settlement. Even after more than seven years of 
family farming, income disparities among settler 
households still remain a consistent feature. If such 
social differentiation followed a capitalist logic of 
transformation, then Mahaweli farmers would have 
developed a contradictory relation to capital and wage 
labour. One might expect (following a Leninist argument) 
to find one group of farmers who had lost their means of 
production, and as a consequence, now worked increasingly 
for wages, whilst a second group would consist of a few 
wealthy families who controlled more of the project's 
resources (such as land and water) and provided wage 
labour opportunities. But up to now it is clear that 
Mahaweli settlers have survived as farmers without any 
significant change in their livelihood strategies. 
Therefore precisely what this social differentiation 
means, is a complex issue yet to be explained. 
Although social differentiation h&s been identified as a 
dominant tendency, hardly any study provides sufficient 
e v i d e n c e of the d e v e l o p m e n t of a significant 
contradiction between capital and wage labour. So how do 
farmers actually manage to solve their livelihood 
problems under these changing circumstances? According 
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to settlement policy, the owner cultivators cannot rent 
or lease out their lands. Therefore how does social 
differentiation develop as an illegal or underground 
process of consolidating operational holdings? Also, 
with more and more political commitment to the poor 
majority of in the country, can the state allow this 
pattern of development, which runs counter to the 
policies of the Mahaweli Settlement Programme? 
Where I Failed 
I have pursued many schools of thought in the search for 
an appropriate conceptual framework with which to deal 
with the above types of questions. I went from the 
modernization approach to the dependency approach, from 
the mode of production debate to the commoditization 
debate, from the logic of capital approach to the 
institutional incorporation model, and so on. Finally, I 
was left with a confusion of views about the operation of 
macro-structures in the process of social transformation 
and little understanding about what actually took place 
in practice at the local level. 
Most accounts of peasant societies have focused on 
changes in the forces of production based on the kind of 
theoretical approaches noted above. When I started my 
research in the Mahaweli Irrigation Scheme in 19 84, I 
also adopted a broad theoretical framework in which I 
considered social differentiation to be the most 
important factor to be studied in this uniform family 
f a r m i n g settlement. My first research monograph 
published in 1981, was an outcome of this research 
orientation. Nevertheless, though there was sufficient 
empirical evidence to prove income disparities, the 
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process of change did not appear to follow the basic laws 
of capitalist transformation as theoretically assumed. 
Moreover, my explanation of changes in the production 
process was weak, due to the application of too abstract 
a theoretical model for the analysis of my empirical 
data. I was led, therefore, to re-examine the development 
problems in the settlement scheme in order to find out 
where I had failed analytically. 
During the second stage of my field research (1985-1986) 
I realized that 1 had concentrated more on socio-economic 
indicators than on the complex forms of interlinkage and 
interaction among farmers, and between the management 
bureaucracy and settler families. Also, my single-minded 
concentration upon highly visible state intervention had, 
I concluded, severely distorted my understanding of the 
social changes taking place. This was particularly 
critical for analyzing state - sponsored irrigation 
schemes, such as the Mahaweli Project, where extensive 
development interventions are the norm. 
The Nature of Planned Intervention 
A dominant strategy of state intervention has, it seems, 
emerged in many Third World contexts which entails the 
establishment of a new institutional structure aimed at 
organizing and closely supervising a system of small-
scale production units based on a new type of family 
farming. This has frequently required the setting up of 
programmes of settlement development with a large number 
of bureaucratic agencies and massive injection of 
foreign aid and technical assistance, leading to the 
increasing encapsulation of the family farmer and to the 
erosion of his independent decision-making in the field 
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of agricultural production. The form that this process 
of encapsulation takes varies somewhat from situation to 
situation, but frequently we find that the government 
sets up a special settlement authority to coordinate the 
system of services (e.g. credit, seed, fertilizers, and 
marketing) and to control access to basic resources (e.g. 
land and water). 
A major consequence of this development strategy is that 
the state assumes greater direct control over both the 
type and level of production and over the livelihood and 
socio-economic decisions of the settler households. 
Administrative staff in the settlement have to be 
strengthened, so that any settler who goes against 
outside interests can be detected and reprimanded. In 
this way also, it is hoped that political mobilization 
amongst the poorer group of settlerswill be limited. A 
central feature of this new encapsulation strategy is 
that it is important, because of the very high capital 
investment and overhead costs incurred, for the state to 
achieve a satisfactory economic return. Thus, even if, as 
is often the case, the goals of the programme are 
described in terms of the ideals of equity and 
participation, the primary motivation must remain that of 
securing a sufficiently high level of production for the 
m a r k e t to o f f s e t the high infrastructural and 
administrative costs, and to meet conditions imposed by 
external lending agencies such as the World Bank. In 
order to attain this, it is necessary to develop various 
organizational means to stimulate the commoditization of 
p r o d u c t i o n . This process entails the increasing 
dependence of the farmer and his family upon external 
a g e n c i e s , i n c l u d i n g b o t h g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c i n g 
institutions that handle such questions as agricultural 
extension, water management and various technical inputs. 
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as well as private interests involved in trading and 
money-lending. 
Orthodox Intervention Models and Their Limitations 
During the last decade, policy niakers and implementing 
agencies have given attention to the formulation of 
'rational' policy models for developing the Mahaweli 
irrigation settlement. Consequently, many development 
problems have been identified and explained in terms of 
the weaknesses of project implementation and not as a 
failure of the development model itself. In addition, to 
make policies more effective, the problems of the 
settlement programme have been monitored and evaluations 
carried out. Yet the programme still produces "failures" 
and the actual socio-economic problems remain complicated 
and unclear. The lack of understanding or sheer 
misunderstanding of the social reality of the Mahaweli 
and similar schemes is due, it seems, to the limitations 
of the theoretical approaches upon which development 
models have been based. For example, attention is often 
given to elucidating the broader constraints to 
development intervention, to the analysis of policy 
implementation aimed at promoting planned development, 
rather than to the carrying out of systematic research on 
intervention practices in relation to the livelihood 
strategies (which often fall ' outside the formal 
parameters of the development project) decided by the 
farmers themselves. Also, since the interrelations 
between theoretical notions and policy models have been 
under-researched or not studied, these development 
models, I believe, do not provide the theoretical 
instruments for understanding the consequences of massive 
development intervention, such as the Mahaweli Scheme. 
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A major difficulty of understanding development problems 
t h e r e f o r e r e l a t e s to m i s l e a d i n g or d i s t o r t e d 
conceptualizations of the relationship between farmers 
and external institutions. Distorting the social reality 
in this way not only isolates theories from people's 
reality but also creates a dichotomy of planned 
intervention discourse and the analysis of intervention 
practices. Moreover mechanistic approaches to the 
problems of irrigation settlement have failed to address 
how humans influence the process. As Ubels puts it: 
'Within a wide body of topics a variety of approaches 
have been applied. Not wishing to neglect the many 
differences between them, after more than 15 years of 
research and discussions on irrigation water management, 
one conclusion has become very clear: the problems 
relate, not so much to the handling of water itself, but 
to the way in which people act and interact in response 
to the issues posed by the particular irrigation 
system.' (Ubels, 1989:185). 
Development models of planned intervention give the 
i m p r e s s i o n that local processes are 'minor' or 
' i n s i g n i f i c a n t ' t e n d e n c i e s of p r e - d e t e r m i n e d 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s , generated by external 
structures. Hence, the complexities of development 
problems and local structures are often conceptualized 
simplistically as social and cultural constraints to 
planned development, which with the right measures can be 
overcome. Linked to this line of argument is the 
assumption that rural producers are 'backward', 'poor' 
and 'incapable'. Therefore planned intervention is a 
necessary and effective instrument for breaking barriers 
to rural poverty. Thus development programmes consist of 
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the necessary expertise, organizational structure and 
better controls for directing the poor towards project 
goals. The broader tendencies of development, therefore, 
are not considered important; and there is a stress on 
the active role of intervening parties and the passive 
role of beneficiaries in the process. Under such 
theoretical notions, intervening parties, such as 
development officers, are accorded a dominant position in 
respect to the relationship of external organizations and 
farmers. The role of development institutions is to 
formulate strategies and implement them on a package 
basis in order to achieve policy goals. This tendency to 
isolate policy and implementation from the consequences 
of development practice is one of the main weaknesses in 
the theorization of development models, since each set of 
operations is considered to be directed or controlled by 
outside forces. The actual actors involved in the 
process, their role and influence on externalization or 
vertical integration are more or less left out. 
As Long and Van der Ploeg argue: "this type of dominant 
theoretical paradigm of planned intervention espoused a 
rather mechanical model of the relationship between 
"policy", "implementation" and "outcomes". A tendency in 
many studies was to conceptualize the process as 
essentially lineal in nature, implying some kind of 
step-by-step progression whereby policy was formulated, 
implemented and the results followed, after which one 
could make an ex-post evaluation to establish how far the 
original objectives had been achieved. Yet, as any 
experienced planner or development worker will readily 
appreciate, this separation of 'policy' 'implementation' 
and 'outcomes' is a gross over-simplification of a much 
more complicated set of processes which involves the 
reinterpretation or transformation of policy during the 
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implementation process, such that there is no straight 
line from policy to outcome. Also outcomes often result 
from factors which may not be directly linked to the 
implementation of a particular development programme" 
(Long and Van der Ploeg, 1989:2). 
Serious doubt arises concerning the capacity of 
development organizations to achieve desired results. 
Their role is increasingly regarded as ambiguous, 
uncertain and problematic; and development organizations 
themselves are beginning to raise the question of 
effectiveness (Van Ufford, 1987:9). Yet, most of the 
discussions and debates are centered around the subject 
of 'corrective measures' with a view to promoting further 
planned intervention to overcome such failures. For 
example, the organizational problems and failures of 
planned intervention in the Mahaweli settlement are well 
known. However, this crisis situation contributes to an 
expansion of branches and sub-branches of the development 
programme, which at local level often involve a de-
socialization of the social life of people. As one farmer 
puts it, "not only the agricultural production of the 
family farmer, but also his toilet, children and pregnant 
wife, and daily food and drink have become part of the 
project". And also farmers' own perceptions and problems 
are gradually transformed into a project language, using 
the more complicated development terminologies that 
belong to the international vernacular of development 
professionals. Essentially then, intervention aims to 
bring the dynamic of local initiative into line with the 
interests and perspectives of public authorities, and to 
reproduce the image of the state as being the key to 
development. This intention to increase outside control 
may, of cause, affect the effectiveness of and meaning 
accorded local development activities (Long and Van der 
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Ploeg, 1989:13). Development projects create a 'cycle' of 
development (from initial projects to failures, from 
failures to corrective measures and from corrective 
measures to projects) with the assumption that effective 
organizational structures are essential for development. 
These assumptions of orthodox intervention models are 
also based upon a narrow conceptualization of the role of 
state. Marxist theory views the state as an alliance of 
political control that reflects forms of coercive 
domination (see, e.g. de Janvry, JI981; Poulantzas, 1 973; 
and critical review by Shanin, 1 9812) . Many writers within 
this school of thought have tended! to treat the notion of 
the state in a rather abstract and reified manner, 
sometimes suggesting the image of a unitary structure 
geared to the needs of capitalist expansion (Long, 
1988:113). On the other hand, functionalist approaches 
see state structure as consisting of an enduring 
executive and administrative apparatus that makes 
authoritative decisions and exercises control over a 
given territory and people. In a critical analysis of 
the state, Skocpol stresses the autonomy of the state and 
the internal contradiction that exists between dominant 
and subordinate classes. According to her, the state's 
own fundamental interest in maintaining physical order 
and political peace may lead it - especially in period of 
crisis - to make concessions to the demands of 
subordinate classes. These concessions may be at the 
expense of the interests of the dominant class (Skocpol, 
1979:24-29). This point has the jgeneral methodological 
value of bringing into focus the significance of the 
state's internal organizational and social contradictions 
when understanding processes of state policy-making and 
intervention (Arce, 1986:3-15). Such contradictions are 
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reflected in the organizational crisis of planned 
intervention in the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme. 
Theorizations of the state, then, have often not given 
sufficient attention to the autonomous role played by 
government institutions. Neither do they take into 
account problems of state structure involving inter-
agency conflicts, misuse of power by local agents, and 
the state's incapacity to deal with counter-tendencies 
(i.e. the issue of governability). Thus organizational 
crisis in the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme is mainly an 
unintended consequence of the operation of the state 
structure in the local setting. 
The supposed power and effectiveness of a centralized 
organizational structure is based on various assumptions 
d e r i v e d from subjectively simplified theoretical 
explanations concerning the complexity of development 
problems and local processes. For example, planned 
intervention is often conceived of as a 'package deal' 
which involves a discrete set of activities that take 
place within a defined programme of implementation 
(delivering inputs and services to already-identified 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s ) . State institutions and officials 
therefore are supposed to institutionalize power by way 
of rules and procedures of the system of resource 
distribution. Hence intervention models, based upon 
package delivery systems and a technocratic approach to 
development, frequently become strategic weapons for 
attempting to assert control over farming households. 
This type of development intervention also seeks to 
influence rural producers to go beyond what are seen as 
their limited capabilities, and to acquire new 
organizational skills and technical know-how. In so 
doing, attempts are made to convince farmers that. 
29 
without access to outside institutions and resources, 
they cannot solve their own problems or improve their 
l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s . In the Mahaweli settlement, 
d e v e l o p m e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n g e n e r a l l y implies the 
re - structuring of existing social arrangements to 
confront to externally-managed institutional structures, 
and the introduction of new elements, technical concepts 
and new meanings to farming practices and to farmers' own 
"livelihood projects". Validation of this normative and 
technical elements is "sustained by a process of 
labelling which functions to promote or impose certain 
interpretative schema concerned With the diagnosis and 
solution of so-called "development problems" (Long and 
Van der Ploeg, 1987:7). 
An Actor-oriented and Interface Perspective on Rural 
Development: An Alternative Approach 
Due to the above types of theoretical problems, 
misconceptions of the reality of intervention practices, 
and inadequate analytical tools 1 for the analysis of 
development problems and change, a more flexible 
approach becomes indispensible. After several years of 
field research in the Mahaweli settlements, I came to 
realize the importance and practical usefulness of an 
actor-oriented and 'interface' approach for analyzing 
problems in Mahaweli settlements. Based upon the 
writings of several authors who have contributed to the 
interface perspective of rural development (see Long, 
1977, 1984, 1988:127-129, 1989; Arce, 1986, 1987, 1989; 
Giddens 1981, 1984) and on my own field experience, I 
have developed a methodology for analyzing the three-fold 
linkages and relationships between farmers, officials 
and traders. Social interface, (3) as Long argues, is not 
30 
only a methodological device for studying the con-
frontation between different lifeworlds, but is also a 
means of understanding the social meanings of trans-
formations that are not set out in original project 
goals (Long, 1989:2-6). 
An interface approach emphasizes the importance of: 
a) analyzing the dynamic and emergent character of 
interactions taking place between intervening parties and 
other actors such as traders and family farmers; 
b) explaining how the goals, perceptions, interests and 
relationships of various parties are reshaped as a result 
of their interactions; and 
c) exploring how these interactions are affected by and, 
in turn, themselves influence the situation itself. 
An interface approach, therefore, provides methodological 
tools for the study of linkage structures. For example, 
it aims to explore how different types of households and 
groups of farmers develop strategies for dealing with the 
new circumstances they face due to the introduction of 
new development inputs. Looking at interface situations 
is also useful for understanding relationships between 
implementing agencies and local groups and actors. These 
relationships refer to the ways in which different 
actors interpret and confront new situations in an 
attempt to create space for organizing their own 
livelihood strategies. 
A l t h o u g h i n t e r f a c e f o c u s e s m o r e a t t e n t i o n 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y on the understanding of social 
phenomena through the study of everyday situations and 
interactional processes, it can also offer a way of 
analyzing, in vivo, capital-state-peasant relationships 
in particular regions and localities, and thus indirectly 
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The Methodology and Focus of the Research 
As the foregoing account shows, the Mahaweli Settlement 
Scheme has entailed massive state intervention involving 
planning and design activities, water and settlement 
facilitates a fuller understanding of the character and 
significance of specific state formations. 
The notion of "human agency" - an important component of 
actor-oriented approaches - draws attention to unexplored 
issues concerning knowledgeability and power. In the 
implementation of the Mahaweli development programme the 
top-down flow of power was assumed to be the only strong 
and significant element of development, whereas the 
notion of human agency stresses the fact that all actors 
exercise some kind of power, leven those in highly 
subordinated positions. As Giddeds argues, all forms of 
dependency offer some resources whereby those who are 
subordinated can influence the activities of their 
superiors (Giddens, 1984:16). 
The present study, then, adopts an actor perspective for 
analyzing the ways in which external institutions and 
farming households confront each other in an effort to 
realize their different individual and collective goals. 
I focus upon the analysis of: a) the strategies used by 
various actors in the settlement, namely, bureaucrats, 
traders and family farm settlers; b) the interplay of 
external and local-level processes; and c) the ways in 
which family farmers influence the development of social 
relations and interactions between them and other groups 
of actors, such as traders and local officials, at the 
intermediate level. 
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management, inputs and service deliveries, and the 
organization of production and marketing systems. All 
these activities are planned, developed into models, and 
divided into systems of operation and time schedules of 
tasks. One important aspect of the research was to study 
the role, behavior, and interests of people who actually 
p r a c t i c e d , or w e r e affected by, these planned 
interventions and not simply to focus upon the formal 
models or systems of the Settlement Scheme. The study 
included not only local-level officials but also traders 
and contractors who also obtained benefits from 
irrigation development. The achievement of the goals of 
the scheme also depended substantially on the large 
number of family farmers, who exhibited their own 
strategies, behavior and responses. A second component of 
the research then focused on farmer strategies. The 
concept of 'farmer strategies' was used to cover not only 
face-to-face confrontations and negotiations with 
officials and merchants but also other less visible forms 
of farmers' struggles, such as 'passive' resistance, 
indirect sabotage, non-participation etc., that were used 
by various groups in an attempt to realize their own 
goals. It was assumed that an analysis of the patterns of 
relationships and interactions between bureaucrats, 
farmers and merchants, and the interplay of external and 
internal elements and conflicting social interests in the 
local arena, were crucially important for understanding 
the outcomes of planned intervention. Thus interface 
problems within the Mahaweli settlement became a central 
issue to be addressed. 
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Problems of Field Research In the Mahaweli Scheme and the 
Methods Used 
According to a recent Mahaweli bibliography, there are 
more than 500 studies and publications on various aspects 
of the Mahaweli Project. Many of them are feasibility 
reports, technical assessments and other ad-hoc types of 
studies on specific subjects (see Appendix 1V) . Most 
v i e w the Mahaweli Development Programme from a 
macroscopic angle (Wanasundera, 1986), and there is 
hardly any sociological analysis of the actual operation 
of the management system and sjettler administration, 
particularly at the settlement unit level of management. 
A main criticism of existing Mahaweli research is that 
settlers have been extensively investigated but not 
adequately researched (Wimaladharma, 1986:25). This is in 
part due to the various limitations placed upon 
independent researchers wishing to carry out research in 
the Mahaweli settlements. Moreover, the executive 
officials of the Settlement Authority prefer larger 
sample surveys that cover many settlement units and they 
often request 'terms of reference' in order to limit 
research only to what they specify and agree upon. 
Officials do not seem to feel the need for research 
knowledge, while researchers find it difficult to rely 
confidently upon official information, since it has 
often proved to be misleading. 
Krimmel (1982:12-18) stress that, "Information obtained 
from official sources has to be interpreted very 
carefully for various reasons. Such information is 
subject to political censorship arid always tends to hide 
problems. Statistical data are highly susceptible to data 
manipulation by the local bureaucracy because the 
motivation for gathering correct data is generally low. 
34 
Project employees obviously regard the project from a 
rather subjective viewpoint because of their being 
personally involved in working there". It is also 
important to consider the changing attitudes of the 
settlers towards official surveys and investigations. It 
is now difficult to use questionnaire or direct 
interviewing methods for collecting information since 
settlers have grown accustomed to offering "conditioned" 
responses. They often give answers to suit the 
investigators in the hope that they might get some 
assistance in return. Most of the settlers are aware of 
the fact that the Mahaweli Project is being implemented 
with the aid of the World Bank and other foreign agencies 
and governments. They are often visited by World Bank and 
other foreign personnel, towards whom they adopt a 
mendicant attitude. The result is that settlers conceal 
the real situation as part of their own survival 
strategies. Their responses are generally governed by 
immediate needs and when, for instance, asked a question 
regarding the operation of the water supply they normally 
answer with the hope that they can obtain a better 
supply themselves. Interviewers, therefore, generally 
gain insight only into an artificial situation created by 
the settlers and in this way they are diverted from the 
real issues. 
Since many settlers fail to follow official instructions 
on cultivation (e.g. defaulting loans, sharecropping, 
illegal water tapping etc) there is a fear that if they 
tell the truth, then they will be penalized. For this 
reason they are evasive when investigations are held. The 
settlers have become skilled respondents. They already 
know the most "suitable" answers to the questions asked 
by investigators. 
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In order to avoid these types of problems, it. was 
necessary to devote a considerable time to developing 
good relationships with settlers. This involved living 
with them, participating in cultivation meetings, 
marketing and water management situations, their day-to-
day economic and social activities, listening to their 
group and family discussions about issues which they 
decided to raise, and helping therrj to get their own tasks 
done. I tried to identify myself! with the interests of 
farmers and to be committed to jpeople and not to the 
project. This was necessary in order to enter their 
lifeworlds so as to monitor and document everyday 
events, actions, reflections and reactions of farming 
households. My field research included a community study 
and case studies in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of the complex sets of social relationships 
involved. 
It was equally important to study how the management and 
administration of settlers worked out at grassroots level 
because settlers' attitudes and behavior were in part a 
reflection of the actions or coercion of the settlement 
bureaucracy. Therefore participant observation methods 
were extended to cover the behavior of the local 
bureaucracy in the settlement as well. This entailed 
d e v e l o p i n g a close relationship with management 
officials, living with them, participating in evening 
parties, and in informal discussions. The methodology 
adopted enabled me to gather much useful quantitative as 
well as qualitative data. 
The field study extended over a period of about two years 
and was divided into three intervals, namely, Maha 
(wet)season, 1984, Yala (dry)season, 1984/85; and Maha 
(wet)season, 1986. The selection Of the settlement units 
36 
for the study was based on preliminary observations 
carried out prior to the field research commenced. 
Three settlement units (consisting of about 250 settler 
families in each) from Zone 11 of System C were selected 
for field research. Zone 11 was considered as most 
suitable for the study because it is an area consisting 
of the earliest batch of settlers who had completed the 
'transitional' period of settlement. They had cultivated 
for about ten cultivation seasons during the last five 
years. The selection of settlement units was based on 
several criteria: (see Map 111 for the location) 
a) I wished to have both "top enders" and "tail-enders" 
of the irrigation channel structure represented; 
b) I wanted to study three categories of settlers, 
namely evacuees, selected settlers, and those 
resettled from traditional villages; and 
c) I wished to cover both so-called "progressive" and 
"marginalized" groups of settlers. 
During the final stage of the field study, randomly 
selected settler families were interviewed in order to 
collect quantitative information. The sample settlers in 
each unit consisted of about 20 percent of the total 
number of settlers. 
Organization and Contents of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter has provided a general 
overview of the problems of irrigation development and a 
broad description of the size, scale and main features of 
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the Mahaweli Irrigation Scheme of Sri Lanka. After 
explaining the magnitude of state intervention entailed, 
I then explained the ways in which researchers have 
attempted to understand the socio-economic problems of 
Mahaweli settlements. Orthodox intervention models and 
planned intervention in the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme 
were also examined in this chapter. In the last section, 
my reasons for selecting an actor-oriented and interface 
approach for analyzing intervention practices and 
processes of change were explained. 
Chapter two provides an historical account of state 
intervention in irrigation settlement in Sri Lanka. 
Sinhalese civilization was heavily dependent upon 
irrigation communities. But after colonial reforms the 
pattern of state intervention began to change. The 
intentions of various governments concerning irrigation 
settlement since the 1930s up to the Mahaweli Scheme are 
analyzed in this chapter. 
Chapter three analyses the diversity and complex problems 
of selected settlement units. The main focus is on the 
practical difficulties of implementing a uniform family 
farming system due to emerging differences over location, 
w a t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c 
characteristics of these settlement units. The emergence 
of key social groups and their relations with intervening 
parties, under different local situations, are analyzed. 
Although each settlement unit operates within the 
framework of the main development project, local 
d i f f e r e n c e s in settlement units generate "local 
projects" based upon the negotiations and struggles that 
take place between intervening parties and farmers. This 
chapter explains the different situations under which 
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contrasting responses, interactions and strategies 
develop. 
Chapter four provides a more detailed analysis of the 
organizational problems faced by local officials as a 
result of farmers' reactions, resistance and strategies. 
The main focus is on the role of Unit Managers (local 
officials) and their management problems and strategies 
for internalizing planned intervention at settlement unit 
level. Although they are provided! with statutory powers 
and other organizational means for controlling farmers at 
l o c a l l e v e l , they find themselves coming into 
contradiction with farmers' interests. Consequently 
their powers and authority are modified and negotiated 
in accordance with specific local circumstances. 
Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of the various 
struggles, forms of resistance and opposing strategies of 
farming families and groups in the face of planned 
intervention. Here I discuss the ways in which 
individuals and groups of farmers process their 
knowledge according to their own experience and describe 
the strategic actions they take. The main concern of this 
comparative analysis of farmer behaviour and struggle is 
to show how the intervention practices of local officials 
are reshaped according to the strategic actions of local 
actors. The attempt to establish intensive control and 
supervision by a large number of officials was designed 
to limit farmers' freedom and decision making. But the 
chapter shows how farmers carefully analyze the 
weaknesses and defects in the formal organizational 
structure and the position of the intervening parties, 
thus formulating their own programmes and constructing 
their own projects, and blocking implementation of the 
main project. The analysis deals with the development of 
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local processes in each settlement unit within the 
context of everyday social encounters. 
Chapter six is a detailed analysis of the role and 
behaviour of traders looked at from below. The material 
derives from detailed observations of trader-farmer 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . C o m p e t i t i o n among traders, their 
s t r a t e g i e s for s u r v i v a l u n d e r a situation of 
interdependency and the social relations of trading 
contribute to the emergence of an intermediate structure. 
It is argued that merchant capital cannot simply be 
wielded as a powerful strategic weapon for attacking 
farmers' lifeworlds and for traders to maximize profit. 
In fact, traders are forced to reformulate their 
business strategies in accordance with the responses and 
market behaviour of farmers. Theoretically the chapter 
raises issues concerning the role of traders, which has 
often been inadequately interpreted simply in terms of 
the strong market dependency of farmers. The chapter 
challenges therefore the common assumption that traders 
and moneylenders control the terms of exchange and bind 




(1) The agricultural benefits of irrigation are clearly 
apparent and fall into the following categories: high 
yield per unit of land, high yield per unit of water, 
longer growing seasons, protection against drought, 
reliability of water supply, erosion control, improved 
agricultural management (seeds, timing, fertilizer, 
pesticide, machinery), obtention of foreign exchange 
through export crops, stabilization of the agricultural 
system, and modernization of the rural economy (World 
Bank, 1982:xi,8). 
(2) Among the many disadvantages of irrigation projects 
are the following: low quality of life, polluted 
environment, low income, genetic erosion, loss of 
self-reliance, tightly controlled economic and political 
l i f e , e r o s i o n of i n d i g e n o u s a n i m a l power and 
non-commoditized means of production, high-cost use of 
chemical fertilizer and machinery, erosion of the quality 
and sources of food, massive ecological destruction, and 
increased waterborne diseases (Goldsmith & Hildyard, 
1985, 1 986; Alexis, 1 984; Onate, 1:986). 
(3) Long (1989:1-2) defines "social interface" as a 
critical point of intersection or linkage between 
different social systems, fields or levels of social 
order where structural discontinuities, based upon 
differences of normative values and social interest, are 
most likely to be found." See Arce and Long (1978) where 
i n t e r f a c e s are conceptualized as the points of 
intersection between different bodies of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO GOVERNMENT SPONSORED 
SETTLEMENT IN SRI LANKA 
This chapter surveys the literature on the history of 
peasant re-settlement in Sri Lanka in order to document 
the impact of various socio-historical circumstances on 
the transformation of the peasantry. The intention here 
is not to provide a complete account of state-peasant 
relations but to trace out the background to government-
sponsored irrigation settlement in the Dry Zone of Sri 
Lanka (see the Map IV for the demarcation of the Wet and 
Dry Zone). 
Colonial administration in Sri Lanka, which came to an 
end in 1948, had a considerable effect on post-colonial 
state intervention in agriculture, particularly in the 
development of irrigation. Post-colonial development, 
building upon the colonial heritage, involved the 
establishment of centralized government institutions for 
e x e r c i s i n g a u t h o r i t y t h r o u g h ' r a t i o n a l ' policy 
implementation. Planned intervention is a modern form of 
such p u r p o s i v e d e v e l o p m e n t which also involves 
institutionalizing power by way of organizing structures, 
rules and procedures. It is in this context that the 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the historical roots of state 
intervention is important. 
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Any study of agrarian change in Sri Lanka, or any other 
part of the Third World, has likewise to be located 
within its historical context. Also contemporary Third 
World peasantries cannot be understood as a closed 
system. One must analyze the character of outside forces 
and their influence on the changing configuration of 
social forces within the nation. Particularly in a 
country like Sri Lanka, the historical understanding of 
social reality is important, since state intervention in 
the peasant sector, through the introduction of planned 
legal and institutional frameworks, dates back to the 
colonial reforms of the 1840s. Subsequently, from the 
beginning of this century, vast areas of land were 
transferred to smallholders in the form of state-
sponsored irrigation settlements. However, because of the 
adoption of somewhat contradictory state policies which 
led to the development of a dual economy encompassing 
b o t h export plantation and domestic subsistence 
agriculture, state intervention in irrigation settlements 
evolved as a kind of trial-and-error process as much 
shaped by the differential reactions of rural producers 
as by the political and social conflicts inherent in 
development intervention itself. 
Intention and Intervention of the Colonial Government 
Until the first quarter of the 19th century, Sri Lankan 
peasants had sufficient land for all forms of 
cultivation and for the production of use-values1. This 
type of traditional village peasantry had a degree of 
autonomy which was sustained by an amalgam of self-
interest motivated social values and some allegiance to 
the authority of the elders (Hewavitharana, 1973). Then, 
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in 1815, after the conquest of the last Sinhalese 
kingdom, British colonial administration extended its 
influence to include the traditional irrigation villages 
of the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese peasants, who 
for many generations had managed to survive with their 
own organization of production and social life under 
village irrigation tanks, were subjected to, and to a 
degree maltreated by the imposition of colonial rule. 
However, during both the colonial and post-colonial 
periods, the way of life of peasants was shaped as much 
by interaction and struggles betWeen communities' local 
state representatives, who attempted to manipulate local 
circumstances to their own political and private 
advantage, as it was by the more remote presence of 
central authority. 
Dry Zone Village Communities 
In order to understand the ways in which these 
differentiated reactions and the negotiated local social 
order emerged in response to colonial policies, 
especially those concerning land use, it is necessary to 
explain the pre-colonial social structure of traditional 
irrigation organization. Dry Zone village communities 
were based on a combination of irrigation and shifting 
cultivation (chena), a strategy well adapted to the 
unpredictable climate of the Zone. Just as families that 
comprised village society were knitted together by a 
common language and religion, comijnon cultural traditions 
and agricultural and other pursuits, so also each family 
was united by a high sense of family obligations. The 
family income was used not only for the support of the 
household, but also to maintain social and cultural 
relationships between families. State aid, in the sense 
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in which it is now understood, was not available and, 
indeed, was unnecessary in a society in which every 
member of the family was entitled to maintenance from 
the joint family property (see Moore, 1985:244). This was 
a c o n s e q u e n c e of the s t r o n g i n - g r o u p feeling 
characteristic of these village communities (see Appendix 
D • 
Such sentiments of solidarity resulted in part from the 
type of centuries-old irrigation system based on village 
tanks. Irrigation village tanks required a high degree 
of cooperation among cultivators, which extended well far 
beyond the sphere of cultivation. In fact inhabitants of 
Sinhalese Dry Zone villages were usually close relatives 
and regarded themselves as belonging to a particular sub-
caste (variga). They were strongly opposed to the 
settlement of strangers in their village and were 
prepared to pay higher prices crown land sold offered, 
simply to keep outsiders away (Kloos, 1989:2). A typical 
village in the Dry Zone consists of a small tank (veva), 
paddy fields (yaya), a cluster of dwellings (gamgoda) and 
a surrounding area of land for shifting cultivation 
(chena). Some writers, using historical records, have 
described the functioning of the social organization of 
these villages as that of "independent village republics" 
(Hewavitharana, 1973:12). Villagers had their own ways on 
constructing and restorating village tanks3. They divided 
the land that could be irrigated from the tank according 
to the principle of the share of labour and inputs 
contributed to their construction. This sharing principle 
(pangu system) applied also to other activities, such as 
water distribution, production, and the clearing of 
canals as well as the right to catch fish in the dry 
seasons. 
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With the advent of British rule and the impact of a 
plantation economy based on the exploitation of 
cultivable land for commercial purposes, this old order 
and peasant economy were disrupted. Most of the forests, 
chenas and uncultivated land passed into the ownership of 
the Crown, and the traditional irrigation villages were 
neglected. Village councils, which under the leadership 
of the more active members, took all the decisions on 
behalf of the village community fell into disuse and in 
their place were appointed state officers, designated as 
chiefs and minor headmen who functioned under the control 
of Government Agents. 
During the colonial administration the economic structure 
of Sri Lanka with its irrigation organization was 
modified to become an export/import based 'dual' economy, 
concentrating on export-oriented plantation agriculture. 
During British rule, plantation production was rapidly 
expanded to produce commodities such as tea, rubber and 
coconuts; and most of the public works during the 
B r i t i s h p e r i o d w e r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h up-country 
plantations. For example, highways were constructed 
between Colombo and up-country plantation areas for the 
transportation of these commodities. Thus, until the end 
of the 19th century, about 75% of government expenditure 
was directed towards the development of the Wet Zone, 
which comprises about 1.5 million hectares of land, and 
only about 25% was spent on the Dry Zone, which consists 
of about 6 million hectares of land, out of which nearly 
5 million hectares where considered suitable for 
cultivation (Sessional Papers, 1840-1900). There were 
pressures on the colonial government to open up 
plantation areas with road and rail. The revenues for 
this derived to a large extent from export/import 
duties, sales of land, and from various taxes that were 
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levied on the peasantry. It appears that even the small 
amount of public investment on highways and irrigation 
in the Dry Zone area was undertaken with the specific 
objective of minimizing peasant unrest that might 
threaten the plantation economy (Manamperi, 1968:12). 
However, colonial administrators themselves soon realized 
that they had paid little attention to the traditional 
system of irrigation organization that had been the 
basis of Sinhalese civilization. Indeed provincial 
administration was difficult without active state 
involvement in irrigation development and provincial 
administrators often made complaints to the governor 
about the deterioration of state-peasant relations in 
traditional village irrigation areas. For example, in 
contrast to the rapid expansion of Wet Zone plantation 
agriculture, the condition of village irrigation in the 
Dry Zone sector was reported to the Governor Sir John 
Ward in the following manner: 
"The irrigation system has been made use of in a 
destructive manner; there was no reconstruction of 
any form; the majority of people forced into a 
state of misery in a degenerated economy has been 
increasing daily. They die of diseases and 
starvation; the village tanks are becoming shallow, 
their capacity to hold water is getting reduced. The 
p e a s a n t s themselves had neglected the past 
construction work, they are not either party to the 
maintenance of tanks in good condition; neither do 
they co-operate. The frustrated peasants cut down 
the tank bunds selfishly in order to ensure supply 
of water. They cut down forests mercilessly and 
cause wanton destruction. They have also forgotten 
the past prosperity and are now used to convenient 
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enjoyment of imported food. The interest of 
cultivation is largely diminished. The ancient 
irrigation system has been defunct, and the main 
water ways are in a state of decline due to 
non-use. When location of water discharging anicuts 
(water gate) was difficult the peasants cut holes at 
different places of the bunds nearest to their paddy 
fields and secure supply of water" (Bailey, 
1952:28). 
There were, in fact, structural problems inherent in a 
narrow and limited pattern of economic growth dominated 
by an export-oriented plantation sector. Marginalization 
of peasants, landlessness, unemployment, a far lower rate 
of growth in the neglected peasant sector and a high 
degree of dependency on the external market for consumer 
goods, were continual and mounting problems, not only 
for colonial but also for post-colonial governments. 
However, these events were not merely the result of the 
development of plantation agriculture in the country, but 
also a consequence of the specific intervention strategy 
adopted and intervention strategy shaped by external 
administrative measures of the colonial government. As 
some writers argue, at the level of state policy there 
appeared some articulate advocates of laissez faire 
capitalism and bourgeois liberalism but in their 
confrontation with the advocates of mercantilism they did 
not achieve a final triumph; for a class structure had 
already entrenched itself deeply on the basis of a 
mercantilization of pre-capitalist!society. The interests 
of the dominant class or the group within it did not 
require a radical dissolution of the pre-existing 
economic order (Michel and Shanmubaratnam, 1984). Thus, 
despite the general neglect ofl the Dry Zone, the 
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intention of the colonial government was not to take 
measures aimed at completely dismantling the pre-existing 
economic and social order. There were several reasons for 
this. 
First, despite the structural changes that had been 
i n t r o d u c e d w i t h i n the p l a n t a t i o n s e c t o r , the 
characteristics of irrigation organization in the Dry 
Zone could not easily be destroyed or replaced by 
conditions of commodity production because, unlike the 
Wet Zone, commodity exchange had little influence over 
the social life of Dry Zone village communities. Since 
taxes were paid in kind, internal exchange relations did 
not become monetized. Second, the colonial administrators 
had failed to supply an adequate amount of wage labour 
for large-scale commercial plantations from the 
p e a s a n t r y , w h e r e social and cultural relations 
reinforced the resistance to external forces. Third, due 
to the neglect of the Dry Zone (in terms of 
infrastructure, health, and agriculture), people were 
severely affected by malaria and other diseases. These 
various factors, then, pressed farmers to find solutions 
to their own problems: insecurity generated cooperation 
and strong social organization within their communities. 
Although commodity (exchange) values and money became 
widespread, in the national economy the effects were 
uneven, with considerable regional disparities. Nor did 
the introduction of a legal superstructure legitimizing 
private property and freehold serve to create the 
pre-conditions for a radical alteration in the labour 
processes and existing social structures of the Dry Zone. 
On the contrary, conditions intensified the degeneration 
of productive forces, leading to the reinforcement of 
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small-scale peasant production primarily geared to the 
satisfaction of household economic necessities. 
Intervention Practices of the Colonial Government and 
Outcomes 
With the introduction of the Crown Land (Encroachment) 
Ordinance of 1 840 and subsequent Ordinances, the 
colonial state acquired legal and administrative 
authority power over communities and their land tenure 
system. All unoccupied forest and uncultivated lands 
were proclaimed Crown land. Privately-held lands were 
recognized on the basis of uninterrupted cultivation 
during the previous 3 0 years, but the peasantry was 
deprived of the cultivation of chena which had given 
peasants the right to cultivate in highland areas2. 
Under the new law, rural producers could not prove legal 
rights to these chena lands because land-use practices 
were based upon village land allocation which did not 
involve the demarcation of fixed boundaries in the form 
of individual rights of ownership. The village principle 
was simply abused when the British resorted to 
gratuitous forced labour for the construction of modern 
public works such as military roads, bridges, taoeal 
(post) office stations, and agents' residences, which 
were of no direct benefit to local people. The 
construction of roads and bridges (under the Road 
Ordinance of 1 848) was of direct benefit to the newly 
established plantations (Sessional Paper 4 of 1867). The 
nature of these works required that villagers be 
deployed outside their home village. The introduction of 
a district administration increased the power of central 
authority at regional and village! level. Each Government 
Agent was empowered to compel claimants, by issue of 
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notice, to appear before him and prove title to land. If 
claimants failed to do so, then the lands belonging to 
them were deemed to be owned by the Crown. This 
legislation was enforced with the double purpose of 
giving opportunity for the plantation owners to acquire 
access to suitable land for investment and to create a 
cheap wage labour force. Yet this marginalization of the 
peasantry did not form the basis for the creation of a 
labouring class since the so-called landless and 
sharecroppers were not altogether denied access to land 
and had some means of surviving as peasants, using 
traditional methods of sharing production (pangu system). 
Later, from about the 1870's onwards, Government Agents 
of the British administration in Sri Lanka became aware 
of the fact that British rule had neglected the Dry Zone 
for fifty years or more. Many felt it their task to 
repair the damage done. And so eventually the colonial 
government came to recognize the importance of irrigation 
development in the country and the adverse impact created 
by the reforms they had introduced. The intention of 
state policies had been to protect the growth of the 
plantation economy and to avoid social pressure from the 
majority of peasants, but later they discovered that 
successful, co-operation and co-ordination between 
colonial officials and the plantation community was a 
system that could be replicated in other areas of the 
country. Therefore they took immediate steps to recreate 
local authorities that strengthened and supported the 
quasi-traditional landowning structure. In this way the 
colonial bureaucracy hoped to develop closer links with 
the native landowning class in order to achieve good 
administration and to acquire leverage over the 
peasantry. The colonial bureaucratic administration was 
extended to include Sri Lankan agents within the formal 
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administrative system. The role of these agents was to 
keep a check on rural unrest through legal means, by 
rehabilitating ancient irrigation works and by providing 
for landless families in the Dry Zone. The intention was 
to reinforce the political subalternity of the 
smallholder population and its general dependence upon a 
Sri Lankan elite. They, following the colonial methods of 
management, viewed the problems in terms of external 
institutional deficiencies, and conceived of solutions in 
terms of legal and institutional forms of policy 
intervention. The common failures of these initiatives to 
articulate and incorporate the kind of demands and 
policies appeared to represent the true interests of the 
small holders themselves4. 
This tendency finally took the form of the policy of 
s t a t e - a i d e d l a n d r e - s e t t l e m e n t ( M i c h e l a n d 
Shanmugaratnam, 1984:84). Thus the peasantry was to be 
kept under state control by promoting the smallholder's 
position through establishing peasant re-settlements. In 
this way allocation of state land to villagers was 
implemented on a large scale, especially in the 1920s 
when the Sri Lankan elite became an effective challenge 
to state power. The programme was conducted in the name 
of the peasantry, but in fact owed little in origin or in 
detail to political pressure fromjthe villages. Instead, 
the Sri Lankan elite seized upon and articulated what 
appeared to be potential or actual peasant grievances to 
give moral and ideological support to its own claims to 
rule. Hence state intervention to promote smallholder 
development must be placed within an interpretation of 
Sri Lankan history and society that shows how it served 
the interests of the Sri Lankan elite's claims to 
leadership, a process also used strategically by small 
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farmers for the pursuit of their own social and 
political struggles. 
In the process of changing the social and economic status 
of the rural aristocracy, which resulted from their 
changed position vis-a-vis the state bureaucracy, the 
interests and instruments of this class were diversified 
rather than made more uniform. For example, those who 
became state bureaucrats often preferred to use statutory 
powers over existing local forms of control organization. 
The majority of them enjoyed the new positions given to 
them, such as M u d a l i y a r s (Head of a r e g i o n ) , 
Ratemahathmaya (Head of an area) or Headman, and in this 
manner they became incorporated into the colonial system. 
In some cases their positions were entirely colonial 
creations. Some of these officers later rose to higher-
level public service positions, becoming the elite of the 
Ceylon Civil Service. Officers of the latter constituted 
the core of the system of territorial administration, and 
were recognized officially as the legitimate spokesmen 
for peasant interests. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, unemployment, 
poverty, landlessness, and external dependency on food 
emerged as the most crucial problems and were felt 
particularly during the First World War. Imports of 
staples for an increasing population (including migrant 
labour from India) were difficult given the shortage of 
supplies from countries such as India. Peasant rice 
production in Sri Lanka also fell while prices rose 
sharply. This led to protests by not only the local 
population but also the plantation community, against the 
overall economic strategy that allocated national food 
production to a secondary place. Therefore there was 
heavy pressure on the government to alter its policies. 
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Aims of Nationalist Leaders and State Intervention in 
Irrigation Settlements 
The State-sponsored settlement programme became the main 
policy in the 1930's. This had resulted from the mounting 
social and economic crisis during this period, which 
continuously forced the government to take immediate 
action to increase food production and to develop 
irrigation simply in order to cope. The world depression 
of the 1930's thereby exposed even more forcibly than 
earlier periods the contradiction^ built into the uneven 
pattern of agrarian growth. Most! of the estate owners 
suffered losses after 1930 due td a sharp fall in their 
export incomes. And so they began to reduce productive 
investment, labour and wages in the plantation economy 
in order to offset these losses. As a consequence, a 
large number of families in the Wet Zone were thrown out 
of work. 
This was happening at a time when the country's political 
environment was in the process of change due to the 
emergence of nationalist movements ranged against the 
colonial administration. One result was that, after more 
than a century of British rule, the Donoughmore 
Constitution of 1931 introduced a system of universal 
s u f f r a g e . Beginning with government measures to 
i n t r o d u c e m o r e d e m o c r a t i c '• f o r m s , s u c c e s s i v e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s then used Crown land alienation 
procedures to distribute land in the Dry Zone through 
irrigation colonization projects, and, to some degree, to 
transfer population from the Wet Zone. 
This was an important turning p|oint in the political 
h i s t o r y of Sri L a n k a , and conceived with the 
establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land (in 
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1931). The new constitution gave the Sri Lankan members 
of the State council a considerable influence over the 
formulation of policy, especially in respect of 
irrigation settlement. 
A leading role was played by D.S Senanayake, leader of 
the nationalist movement, Chairman of the Agriculture and 
Lands Executive Committee under the collegial Donoughmore 
Constitution of 1931, and the later first Prime Minister 
of independent Sri Lanka. It was in response to the 
conflict with the colonial bureaucracy over guardianship 
of peasant interests that he suddenly changed tack 
towards the welfare of peasants with the intention of 
gaining popular support. More than anyone else, 
D.S.Senanayake was responsible for infusing Sinhalese 
nationalism with the vision that colonization of the Dry 
Zone was a return to the heartland of the ancient 
irrigation civilization of the Sinhalese. Consequently 
preservation of the peasantry through a settlement 
programme became the major theme of state council 
debates during the 1930's, which was finally translated 
into a state-sponsored settlement strategy. Thus the 
settlement programme in Sri Lanka became a major means 
of external intervention but was manipulated by local 
leaders who had their own interests in promoting 
irrigation development. Sri Lankan members of the 
legislative council stressed the importance of self 
sufficiency in rice production. They were, it seems, 
particularly interested in development-oriented state 
intervention in order to secure the support of peasants 
and in order to achieve state power. They legitimized 
this through their involvement in irrigation settlement. 
They sought to acquire the popular support of the 
peasants through restoration of village irrigation 
systems and through the construction of major irrigation 
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schemes in the Dry Zone. The provision of irrigated land 
to local people was, they reasoned, the best means of 
gaining their support. Secondly, growing economic and 
social problems, landlessness and increased class 
conflict had created serious insecurity among landowners 
and entrepreneurs in the plantation sector. Hence, the 
Sri Lankan elite argued for the establishment of 
settlements in the Dry Zone as a means of separating 
these 'problem creating' landless and poor unemployed 
groups from their villages, thus shoring up the existing 
class and property structure. 
In the light of the above situation, the government gave 
more and more attention to the settlement programme, 
with an emphasis placed on the restoration of major 
irrigation works that lay abandoned in the Dry Zone of 
the country. The setting up of District Agricultural 
Committees and of the Irrigation Department facilitated 
the Government Agent's work as the principal co-
ordinator of the irrigation programme in his area. These 
institutions (consisting only of government officials) 
were incorporated into the Irrigation Ordinance No. 32 of 
1946 which provided legal backing for them. A 
significant outcome of this change in perspective on 
irrigation development was the enhancement of the 
decision-making power of the bureaucracy, with the 
f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e of imposing limits on the 
participation of the farming coitimunity. The protected 
tenurial system prescribed in ithe Land Development 
Ordinance, under which the newly-reclaimed lands in the 
irrigation schemes were distributed, required continuous 
supervision by officials. This had a great impact on the 
relationship between officials and farmers. During this 
period, then, irrigation development became a major 
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instrument of legitimizing the role of bureaucratic 
institutions. 
After 1931, land alienation was based on a "mapping out 
policy". The main objective of this was to improve the 
living conditions of rural society by promoting the 
development of agriculture. Providing land to landless 
peasants was intended not only to stimulate food 
p r o d u c t i o n but also to regularize the "peasant 
proprietor system" aimed at transferring landownership 
to peasants. In this process some land was reserved for 
v i l l a g e expansion and forests and pasture; and 
settlement of surplus population in colonization schemes 
was also initiated. This was the beginnings of a 
systematic implementation of land settlement schemes and 
alienation programmes under rules and regulations enacted 
by the Land Development Ordinance of 1931. Unauthorized 
transfers or sales of allotments were prohibited, while 
poor peasants were given small parcels of land. 
Later, the government's land settlement strategy 
underwent important changes; yet it still failed to find 
a solution to the crucial problems of the peasantry. 
Policy decisions were taken to make land alienation more 
efficient so that more and more landless and poor 
peasants could obtain small parcels of land. However, the 
process of distributing these benefits fell to the 
discretion of public officials and politicians, and thus 
was a stimulus to politicization, while, especially in 
relation to the choice of settlers for Dry Zone 
i r r i g a t i o n schemes, a variety of criteria were 
introduced, making the scope for political, manipulation 
very wide. Supervisory control over the use of alienated 
land, which is implicit in the paternalist and custodial 
nature of the work of officials, was not in fact 
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practiced. And so in Dry Zone irrigation schemes the 
state almost ceased to attempt to control illegal 
f r a g m e n t a t i o n , sales, mortgaging and leasing of 
allotments, practices that continued to widespread. 
Attempts to enforce planned cultivation programmes in 
these schemes have likewise failed. 
This land and irrigation settlement policy stressed the 
technological side of agriculture, and did not take 
sufficiently into account the ecological and social 
background of Sinhalese cultivators. In the long run the 
policies of the state did not bring what they had hoped 
for. There seem to have been two reasons for this 
failure. In the first place, there was a lack of 
understanding of the complexity of Dry Zone cultivation 
and secondly, irrigation plans were not carried out in 
accordance with the local interests and practical needs 
of farmers. 
State Intervention Welfarism and Outcomes 
In 1939, Mr D.S. Senanayake, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Lands, reformulated settlement policy in an attempt 
to speed up the settlement of people in the Dry Zone. The 
new policy made the government responsible for providing 
almost all the inputs and services other than 
cultivation. This included the construction of channels, 
the provision of engineering services, assistance for 
clearing jungle areas, building houses, and providing 
health services, seeds, hospitals, basic agricultural 
implements, co-operatives etc. This type of state-aided 
' ready-made' settlement scheme was highly welfare-
oriented and public investment in this programme 
increased sharply. Since non-industrial Sri Lanka could 
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not provide other alternatives, almost all the 
unemployed and landless poor were attracted by this type 
of 'spoon-fed' welfare scheme. 
Later, after Independence in 1948, the Sri Lankan state 
elite set about improving the relationship between 
government and peasantry by expanding social welfare. As 
a result of the Malaria Eradication Programme initiated 
in 1945 and other welfare measures, there was a sudden 
fall in mortality and sickness, while the birth rate 
increased. The death rate of the Dry Zone area fell from 
18.7 in 1 945 to 12.3 in 1953; while the birth rate 
increased from 36.7 to 47.2 during the same period (Dept 
of Census and Statistics). Between 1946 and 1948, about 
400,000 people were added annually to the total 
population and the number of unemployed nearly doubled 
during the same period. Thus social and economic 
problems in the late 1 940's and early 1950's grew much 
faster as a result of this population explosion. After 
independence, political leaders attempted to meet the 
political challenge by giving priority to the social 
welfare of peasants and to state-aided settlement 
schemes. But, despite independence, Sri Lanka continued 
with the same structural dilemmas of earlier periods. The 
expansion of the settlement programme in the Dry Zone 
was seen as the only solution for rapid demographic 
growth and for tackling social issues such as 
u n e m p l o y m e n t , poverty, landlessness and external 
dependency on food. Parcelling out small plots to poorer 
sectors in the countryside was seen as part of an 
overall welfare package. 
Until this stage, attempts to increase local food 
production arid to provide relief to the poverty-stricken 
rural population by giving them more land had been the 
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main strategy followed. This was achieved through 
rehabilitation of ancient irrigation works, land 
development and colonization in the Dry Zone. The 
selection of the particular projects was guided primarily 
by the availability of irrigation facilities. Hence 
dilapidated irrigation works became the nuclei for the 
formulation of new projects. Detailed feasibility studies 
were not considered necessary as the decision to 
implement these projects was simply based on the 
availability of irrigation facilities. Planning was 
restricted to project-level physical planning and both 
planning and implementation were carried out almost 
wholly by bureaucrats and technicians. 
Participation by local people who were supposed to 
benefit from these projects was negligible. The 
government's strategy was to motivate and persuade people 
to migrate to an unfamiliar and inhospitable environment 
by supplying all possible facilities and inducements. 
This made the alleviation of rur^l poverty by means of 
colonization a very costly operation. Nevertheless, it 
did lead to the transfer of some benefits, mostly in the 
form of new assets, to poor villagers who, although not 
explicitly stated, comprised the target group of this 
development activity (Gunadasa, 19B5). 
In the period following Independence in 1948, policy 
changes were attempted through introducing amendments to 
the Irrigation Ordinance. These changes were based more 
on certain abstract notions of the value of a centralized 
system of administration than from any empirical 
assessment or monitoring process. However, as revealed in 
the 1960's, the benefits which followed from increasing 
investment in land development and settlement proved to 
have only a marginal effect on poverty, landlessness and 
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unemployment (Kandyan Peasantry Commission Report, 1956). 
Thus the main theme of the State Council debates in 1950s 
was the need for a well-planned, organized agricultural 
policy. In order to achieve this a six-year plan was 
prepared. Increasing productivity by adopting more 
intensive and scientific methods of farming was the 
primary goal of this plan. It also attempted to identify 
available land for allocation to a maximum number of 
families. This was to be achieved through two measures. 
First, the allocation of larger holdings (about 50 acres 
per person) to middle peasants was restricted and, to 
some extent, this eased the problem of the shortage of 
land for poorer people. Second, the size of allotments 
given to poor peasants was reduced from 5 acres of paddy 
land and 3 acres of highland to 3 acres of paddy and 2 
acres of highland. This reduction in the size of 
allotments was intended to provide a plot small enough 
for. a poor family to manage and to create more land for 
a larger number of landless unemployed. Hence the main 
focus of the change in policy was a shift in favour of 
the 'poorer peasants' (see Appendix 1 ) . 
However, by the 1960's, the state-aided settlement 
programme was critically reevaluated because its 
achievements were considered far below those expected* 
The, peasant rehabilitation programme was apparently not 
ah effective solution to the ever growing problems of low 
levels of food production, scarcity of irrigated land, 
and increasing unemployed rural labour. Moreover the 
total cost of the programme at the end of 1960's was 
about Rs 345 million, with returns amounting to about 
Only Rs 25 million. A FAO/IBRD team reported in 1966 
that the very high costs involved in the provision of 
irrigation facilities, infrastructure, housing, credit, 
marketing, and health management were out of all 
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the growing demand, the size of plots was determined 
therefore primarily by political interests. 
This indicates that, rather than arising out of the 
application of some 'rational policy' or systematically 
f o r m u l a t e d plan, the determination to undertake 
irrigation settlement schemes resulted from the quest for 
stability and maintenance of the political and 
administrative statuesque, 'Keeping some in power and the 
offices in being' (Schaffer, 1984). 
Hence the state, once again, stepped into the physical 
rehabilitation of irrigation works, which it saw as 
critical for slowing growing 'peasant problems', and 
sought to arrange for their better management. Yet what 
resulted from these well-intentioned state programmes 
was, on the one hand, a throw-back to a paternalistic 
attitude adopted by local officials and a concomitant 
dependency syndrome among farmers, and on the other hand, 
an incorporation of the village unit into an island-wide 
and uniform organizational structure in which officials 
played an even larger role (Wimaladharma, 1986). 
Historical Experience and the Mahaweli Irrigation 
Settlement Scheme 
As the above account indicates, irrigation settlement in 
Sri Lanka has a long record of excessive state 
intervention based principally upon rigid and non-
accountable bureaucratic structures. The present-day 
Mahaweli Irrigation and Settlement Programme in Sri 
Lanka, recently initiated with the assistance of the 
World Bank, reveals that the state in fact continues to 
play a similar role in irrigation development and 
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settlement, which it attempts to resolve national 
problems through strengthening formal organizational 
structures and promoting a large bureaucracy. Out of this 
arises the central question as to whether the state has 
the capacity to define and deliver policies when there 
are such deep-rooted organizational problems in these 
state-sponsored irrigation settlements. Such problems, of 
course, have been shaped by struggles for power and 
clashes of interest both within the state institutions 
themselves as well as within the farming community. 
The understanding of state intervention process in 
irrigation and settlement development, therefore, depend 
very much on the analysis and diagnosis of the 
individual and corporate interests and views of state 
functionaries, as well as of their responsiveness to the 
needs and demands of the farming community. A major focus 
for research is to understand the ways in which the 
state apparatus in the Mahaweli settlements forms part 
of the local arena made up of different social actors: 
political agents, bureaucrats, farmers and traders. 
Historical experience shows that state intervention in 
irrigation settlement has involved a gradual expansion of 
formal organizations together with the emergence of 
conflicting interests based upon public goals that could 
not be attained. The abuse of state resources in the 
process of planned intervention is a major criticism that 
has been raised against people representing formal 
institutions. The assumption here is that the struggles 
occurring between intervening parties and farmers over 
scarce resources are not merely th^ result of the lack of 
such r e s o u r c e s b u t also a j consequence of the 
mismanagement and misuse of them. Although the number of 
institutions and officials in the irrigation schemes 
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grew, they remained not only ineffective but also 
disruptive since they forced farmers to depend upon 
formal organizational structures which in the end tended 
to undermine the capacity of local organizations to 
manage their own social affairs. Another important 
historical tendency in state-sponsored irrigation schemes 
in Sri Lanka is that failures often generated further 
opportunities for corrective measures leading to further 
interventions which only served to reproduce the same 
set of problems. These problems will be explored in the 
following analysis of organizational problems in a 
Mahaweli irrigation settlement. 
Notes 
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(1) According to the Report of the Kandyan Peasantry 
Commission, the basic principle Of this economy was to 
achieve self-sufficiency in food and employment. Its 
nucleus was the paddy field which supplied the main 
article of diet. Gardens and chenas produced an 
additional supply of food and the village forest the 
building materials for the village housing. Sufficient 
employment was found in agriculture and subsidiary 
pursuits for it to be said that, for an agricultural 
people with a peasant economy, thpre was sufficient food 
and employment (Kandyan Peasantry Commission Report, 
Sessional Paper, No 18, 1951:9). 
(2) This ordinance and the subsequent regulations 
enforced by the state during both colonial and post-
colonial periods nevertheless failed to control farmers' 
cultivation practices such as chena farming because, as 
Roberts argues, if peasant numbers were to expand 
subsequently the peasant population would be obliged or 
forced to turn to the state for new land, either formally 
or by encroachment (Roberts, 1973:17-18). As a result, 
during the 1960s the number of encroachments was twice as 
high as actual alienation (Report of the Land 
Commission, Sessional Paper, 1965). 
(3) Raiakariva (King's rule), originally an order of the 
King for compulsory village labour for building of their 
irrigation tanks, was used by villagers during the 
colonial period to build and restore their village 
tanks. However, for the building of larger tanks they 
employed Tamil labour from outside areas (see Kloos, 
1989:4). During the colonial period some 1720 small 
village tanks were restored by! villagers themselves 
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under the raiakariya principle (Administrative Report, 
Anuradhapura District, Blue Books, 111, 1861). 
(4) Different authers provide different explanations 
about the relationship between political ideology and 




C O M P L E X I T I E S OF FAMILY FARMING IN THE MAHAWELI 
SETTLEMENT-SYSTEM "C" 
A major problem of intervention ' practices in Mahaweli 
settlements emerges out of the contradiction between the 
official assumption of uniformity: in family farming and 
the diversity that actually exists in the process of 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Similarly, uniform procedures of 
programme implementation (i.e. uniform management of 
farm plots, water inlets, service and input deliveries, 
water distribution, timing of tasks, crop production, and 
marketing), are based upon the policy makers' assumption 
that the social behaviour of local officials is unitary 
in nature and shaped by one type of discourse. Therefore 
they expect all local officials to play a similar role in 
the process of planned intervention. However, in reality, 
the official discourse that is used and the authority 
structure that is to be put into practice, often clash 
with the more complex development problems and local 
structures that emerge, as a result of the differential 
responses and reactions of individual farmers and social 
groups. Secondly, the formal communication system or 
policy discourse used has its inherent rigidities and 
limitations, since it is governed by a set of rules and 
regulations which the local officials cannot apply when 
confronted with the more relevant and highly diverse 
local strategies and types of discourse used by farmers 
in accordance with their own practical knowledge. Thus, 
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the multiplicity of interests and behaviour of local 
officials are shaped by the diversity and complexity of 
the practical problems they face. They are, that is, 
faced or compelled to formulate alternative objectives 
and actions as a means of coping with problematic 
situations. This chapter then, analyses the ways in 
which these conflicts and contradictions emerge and 
examines the nature the structural location occupied by 
local officials in three contrasting settlement units. 
From the perspective of policy implementors, diversity 
has a different meaning. They explain it principally as a 
management problem, and if, the latter is considered 
real, then one needs to determine how far this diversity 
is externally determined and reproduced by the actions 
and ideologies of the intervening parties themselves. An 
explanation of the different situations in the three 
settlement units, therefore, requires understanding how 
project officials evaluate problems and set about 
devising "solutions" for them. This is important because 
intervention practices are based upon officials' ways of 
conceptualizing the problems of family farming and of 
categorizing farmers and their production problems. For 
example, settlement unit managers often categorize 
farmers in terms of "progressive" versus "backward", 
"efficient" versus "inefficient", "adaptable" versus 
"unadaptable", "educated" versus "uneducated", "trained" 
versus "untrained" etc., which they use to explain the 
diversity of family farming which they see as their job 
to solve. This means that they consider their role as 
indispensible to making farmers "progressive". According 
to them, "failures" cannot be avoided but can be 
c o r r e c t e d with proper management or "corrective 
actions" . For corrective measures, more and more 
officials, facilities and formal institutions are needed, 
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Intention of Intervention fUniform Family Farming 
Strategy) in Mahaweli Family Farming 
A main policy objective of the Mahaweli Settlement 
Project was to attain the national goal of self-
s u f f i c i e n c y in rice (the staple food) through 
facilitating the production of High Yielding Varieties of 
paddy. This was not different from attempts at state-
sponsored irrigation settlement in the past (see chapter 
two). The total package of 1.2 hectares of land, 
improved cropping patterns, inputs, extension services 
and credit was provided to each family to ensure not only 
a reasonable standard of living, tout also to maintain a 
high level of production. In providing them with uniform 
one-hectare irrigated plots and a production base with 
tabula vasa conditions, an eventual transformation into 
egalitarian family farms was envisaged (Weitz, 1980:21). 
The concept of small farms, with an equitable 
distribution of 1.2 hectares alloted to each farmerl, was 
considered the most appropriate; and effective human 
settlement plan for encouraging a high degree of self-
sufficiency within settlements knd for enabling the 
settlers to maximize production. An even more far-
reaching measure was the decision to keep the size of all 
land holdings under this project to a standard small size 
which was intended to eliminate larger landlords and to 
introduce equality among farmers. The allocation of equal 
allotments, together with specific regulations aimed at 
preventing either the sale or fragmentation of land, was 
and this process is what constitutes the central 
o r g a n i z i n g principle of the Mahaweli settlement 
development strategy. 
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seen as a definite step towards removing one of the major 
sources of rural inequality. Renting or leasing of these 
family farms was made illegal. 
The settlement families were supposed to cultivate their 
small areas of land with family labour and generate a 
sufficient income for the family(2). However the Mahaweli 
Settlement Authority's functions of irrigation settlement 
and management were considered vitally important to the 
implementation of the policy. The elimination of 
independent decision making by the farmers concerning 
production would provide the Settlement Authority with 
the power it needed to achieve its goals. Thus, in order 
to maintain expected levels of production on family 
farms, management officials took over the control of 
basic resources (such as land, irrigation water, credit, 
inputs) and the organization of production. 
A large number of state institutions and officials were 
assigned to various tasks. Thus, when the cost of 
establishing this institutional structure is taken into 
account, the fixed and variable costs of creating and 
maintaining a successful family farm in the Mahaweli 
Settlement was much greater than similar expenditure on 
non-Mahaweli peasant households. According to a World 
Bank estimate, the average cost of administration and 
management for settlers in the Mahaweli Scheme in 1979 
was about 15 times higher than the average public 
expenditure incurred by farmers in the country at large. 
In addition to this higher variable cost, more than Rs 
150,000 had already been invested in the preparation of 
each irrigation allotment (Resident Project Manager's 
report, 1985). 
The present situation of System "C" is such that there is 
one officer for every 17 settlers, one vehicle for every 
150 settlers and one building for every 35 settlers. The 
number of full-time government officers employed among a 
comparable group of farmers outside the Mahaweli Scheme 
amounts to less than 2 % of the staff attached to 
Mahaweli settlements. This means that there is heavy 
pressure on farmers to produce cash crops for the market 
in order to meet the high overhead costs of the 
settlement (see Table 1 ) . 
Table 1. Accelerated Mahaweli Programme 
Expenditure for the Development of System "C" 
1. Estimated cost Rs. Million = 5,529 
2. Estimated area to be developed 
in hectares = 28,000 
3. Average estimated cost per hectare Rs. = 197,464 
4. Cumulative cost up to the end of 1984 
- Rs.Mln: = 1,830 
5. Total area developed up to the end of 1984 
in hectares = 5,658 
6. Total cost per hectare up to 
the end of 1984 = 393,000 
Source: Mahaweli Projects and Programme 1979-1984. 
Discrepancies of Interest. Influence, and Control: The 
Situations of the Settlement Units 
The behavioral patterns that 4 m e r 9 e d i n t n e three 
settlement units reflect highly heterogeneous settlement 
families, different group interests and conflicting 
values which are mediated at the critical point of 
linkage between farmers and officials, who devise their 
own strategies for negotiation and interaction at local 
level. There are many factors that contribute to the 
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The following broad features can be identified units: 
Settlement Units Main Features 
Unit No.1 (UI) Represent upcountry farmers who 
e i t h e r cultivate commercial 
crops in small gardens for day-
to-day survival or work as 
agricultural laborers. They were 
selected by local political 
a u t h o r i t i e s and g o v e r n m e n t 
officials. 
Unit No.II (UII) R e p r e s e n t m i x e d g r o u p s of 
different origin and settler 
category (such as selected, 
r e s e t t l e d a n d e v a c u a t e d 
settlers). 
Unit No.111 (UIII) R e p r e s e n t m a i n l y r e s e t t l e d 
f a m i l i e s from the original 
i r r i g a t i o n villages of the 
settlement area. They cultivate 
mixed crops bothin rainfed and 
irrigated areas. 
Settlement Unit Nol (UI) 
Settlement Unit UI was located at the upper part of a 
main canal in System "C" of the Mahaweli Settlement 
Scheme. Settlers in this unit had easy access to 
irrigation water. They also had additional benefits such 
as better marketing and transport facilities because the 
settlement unit was situated very close to the main 
diversity of settlement units, such as the different 
origins of settler families, differences in farming 
e x p e r i e n c e , demographic composition, location of 
irrigation plots and attitudes towards commercial 
farming. It is important, therefore, to explain the 
local characteristics of diversity in the three 
settlement units. 
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township. But, according to women of this settlement 
unit, its geographical location was a disadvantage not 
only because the main town was full of liquor and 
gambling - a temptation for their husbands! But also 
because they were forced to depend too much on the 
market. 
As shown in Table 2, the settlers in this settlement unit 
represent a selected group of farmers, with 84 per cent 
of them coming from up-country frem the Wet Zone of the 
Central Province. Their adaptability to planned cash-crop 
farming was different from other groups due to several 
reasons: 
a. They had some previous experience of cash-crop farming 
in their villages of origin, where export production 
(such as tea, rubber, cocoa, and spices) had 
developed rapidly. 
b. They were exposed to a semi-urban life style and to 
market-oriented production which helped them to be 
integrated into cash-crop farming under the Mahaweli 
Scheme. 
c. They had some understanding of the various mechanisms 
that were operating in the commodity economy of the 
Central Province. 
This, then, is a group of farmers |Who have a distinctive 
orientation and way of understanding problems and 
organizing their lifeworld. The cjverage family size of 
those selected (up country) settlers is smaller (average 
family size is 3.5) than the family size of U 111 
settlers (average family size is 5|.8) and the proportion 
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of younger age groups between 25 to 44 years i; 
comparatively high in U 1. 
Table 2. 
Settler Type Settlement Units 
U1 % U11 % U111 
Selected farm families from 
Wet Zone (up-country) areas 214 (84) 80 (34) 22 ( 9) 
Evacuated families from the 
reservoir area (up-country) -- -- 42 (18) 15 ( 7) 
Resettlers from the settlement 
area (traditional peasants) -- -- 52 (22) 172 (75) 
Selected farm families from 
Dry Zone.(low-country) areas 41 (16) 62 (26) 21 ( 9) 
Average family size 3.5 4.1 5.8 
Total 255 (100) 236(100)230 (100) 
Source: Own Survey, Maha (Wet) Season, 1985. 
About 80 percent of landowners in this unit fall into 
this age range (see Table 3 ) . 
Table 3. Age Structure of the Settler Heads of 
Households in the Three Settlement Units 50 
families (random sample) from each Unit 
Age Groups U1 U11 U111 
Years No. % No. % No. 
25-34 18 (36) 20 (40) 10 (20) 
35-44 22 (44) 18 (36) 21 (22) 
45-55 8 (16) 9 (18) 10 (20) 
Above 55 2 ( 4) 3 ( 6) 9 (18) 
Total 50 (100) 50 ( 100) 50 (100) 
Source: Own Survey, Maha(Wet) Season, 19 85. 
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A few small children, coupled with an insufficient number 
of active agricultural workers, is a factor which 
influences settler families to depend upon friendship 
networks for the organization of labour in their bid to 
become commercial farmers. 
A one hectare plot is sufficient for this type of family 
to manage but additional labour is usually necessary 
since the average family size is small as compared to U 
111. It cannot therefore be assumed that such families 
can easily engage in commercial family farming since they 
would have to hire labour. The old pattern of paddy 
cultivation, relying exclusively on family labour and 
reciprocal help among villagers, has become difficult 
among this settler group. Another major factor affecting 
this are time constraints of the official cultivation 
timetable. All farmers have to pursue and complete the 
same kinds of operations at about the same time, and in a 
very short period. Therefore it becomes difficult to 
finish cultivation operations jointly in successive 
fields as was common in traditional villages(3). Work has 
to be done simultaneously. Moreover given the labour 
requirements of modern paddy farming with its distinct 
peaks, family labour is totally insufficient. In a cross-
system comparison, it was concluded that "family labour 
resources are exhausted (even) at relatively small farm 
sizes and moderately low aggregate family labour inputs 
per farm". Above a threshold of |about 100 man-days of 
family labour per season the proportion of hired labour 
often exceeds 50 % of the total aggregate labour input 
( F a r r i n g t o n and Fieldson, 19 8 1 : 1 2 ) . A Mahaweli 
Development Board survey in tjhe 1980 Yala season 
calculated the relation between family labour, wage 
labour and exchange labour for Galnewa region in H1. This 
was approximately 40: 50: 10 per cent respectively. The 
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estimate was applicable only to selected families from 
the up-country Wet Zone. 
In the Mahaweli Scheme the labour requirements for 1 
hectare of paddy is calculated to be to 175 man-days 
(Project Office, 1984). Although the labour inputs per 
hectare differ greatly between different colonization 
schemes (from 75 to more than 200 man-days per hectare),, 
by and large these schemes represent areas of high 
labour input of over 60 man-days per acre as compared to 
the rest of the peasant sector in Sri Lanka. Of course, 
the labour input varies considerably from farm to farm 
and is highly dependent on cultivation practices, the 
availability of family labour and the size of the 
cultivated area. As shown in the Table 4, as many as 38 
families in U 1 (about 76 per cent) hired more than three 
wage workers during the 1985 cultivation season. However, 
among this group of farmers there are alternative 
strategies of production as well. For example, these 
selected upcountry farmers cannot be considered as 
completely dislocated from their previous areas in the 
same way as the evacuated settlers. In fact they 
continue to enjoy various benefits. They exchange 
materials and labour with their relatives and friends in 
their villages of origin, and most school children in the 
higher grades remain in those villages where educational 
facilities are better. However, the availability of part-
time family labour among farmers in U 1 is likely to be 
more limited, since the separation of families (some 
children remaining in the original village and rest 
residing in the new settlement) creates special 
difficulties. 
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Table 4. The Use of Hired Labor Maha (Wet) Season, 
1985* 
50 families (random sample) from each Unit 
U1 U11 U1 1 1 
No. of No. Of No. Of No. of 
Wage Workers Families % Families 9* Families 
1 4 ( 8) 6 (12) 6 
2 5 (10) 4 ( 8) 3 
3 6 (12) 7 (14) 1 
4 10 (20) 6 (12) 1 
5 10 (20) 3 ( 6) 0 
6 8 (16) 1 ( 2) 0 
7 4 ( 8) o ( 0) 0 Family Labour 
Only 3 ( 6) 23 (46) 39 










* Average wage labour employment for land preparation, 
ploughing, transplanting, manual cutting, threshing and 
harvesting. 
Source: Own Survey, Maha(Wet) Season, 1985. 
Nevertheless, the settlers in this settlement unit 
display a certain degree of capability and willingness to 
adopt new production techniques since they were settled 
at the top of end of the irrigation system. This assures 
them a better supply of irrigation water. But, the model 
of the family labour farm does not work in this 
settlement unit, because farmers are forced to develop 
more diversified household strategies in order to 
minimize the increasing costs of; production. They also 
employ more hired labour than in other settlement units. 
Thus there is a greater dependency on high-cost 
managerial practice, which runs counter to the capital 
efficiency expected from this type of family farming. 
C o s t s of p r o d u c t i o n and c o n s u m p t i o n i n c r e a s e 
disproportionately to the net returns to the farm. 
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U 1, then, is an example of the strategy of maintaining 
the family farm through combining the intensive use of 
non-wage household labour with extra-household wage 
labour. This illustrates the case for the persistence of 
family farm economies advanced by various authors (see 
Chayanov 1925, Shanin 1973 and Vergopulos, 1978). Even 
though its economic achievements are somewhat lower than 
expected, U1 is a success story in this respect. Its 
superiority is largely due to satisfactory water 
distribution, better management by farmers, and high 
access to resources. U1 settlers receive inputs, such as 
credit, water and other services, early because their 
unit has the best location. 
On the other hand, the way officials interpret this 
situation is rather misleading. For example, calculating 
"farm gate" incomes gives a high income level, although 
this does not mean that these settler families are well-
off, since this income is off-set by traders' profit, the 
personal expenses of heads of household, interest 
payments, etc., all of which are considerably higher 
under the commoditization of agricultural production. 
Conversely low income from agriculture in U 111 does not 
mean that families are starving. They can also earn an 
income sufficient for a livelihood but, as we shall see, 
their strategies are quite different from those of U1. 
Settlement Unit No.11 (U11) 
In contrast to the advantages of good location for 
settlement unit UI, the settlers in UII have to face many 
difficulties due to being isolated at the end of the 
irrigation canal. Also the distance between this unit and 
the main township is about 15 kilometers (see Map V ) . As 
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shown in Table 2, this settlement unit consists of 
different groups of settlers, namely, selected (up-
country) Wet Zone farm families (34 per cent), re-
settlers from traditional Dry Zone villages (22 per 
cent), and selected Dry Zone (low-country) farmers (26 
per cent), and evacuated families from the reservoir area 
(18 per cent). Evacuated farmers from the Mahaweli 
reservoir areas were the most desperate group of farmers. 
They were forced to adapt themselves to the Mahaweli 
settlement due to their dislocation from their original 
villages as a result of the building of the reservoirs. 
Some evacuees worked even harder in order to survive and 
reproduce their social life within 1the new socio-economic 
environment, but their number was not large. 
Although the settlers of U11 have different backgrounds 
and farming experience, in the local situation they share 
a common set of problems revolving around the scarcity 
of irrigation water. Hence, their encounters and 
interactions are principally shaped by irrigation water 
distribution problems. Although the family structure of 
"selected" young families is more or less similar to U 1, 
the settlers in U 11 employ less wage workers. This is 
mainly due to the greater risks of family farming under 
conditions of poor water supply. These "tail-enders" are 
settled in a difficult location and are becoming 
marginalized in the process of settlement since, being at 
the tail end of the distributory canal, they cannot earn 
a sufficient income from their farming. They therefore 
fall into the lower strata of the settler hierarchy. Yet, 
under these circumstances, they are more active in 
developing their own social networks and in devising the 
strategic actions for managing external forces. 
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In such a situation the success of the settlement is 
largely dependent upon how far they can create some 
b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r v i s - a - v i s government officials 
r e s p o n s i b l e for water management and settlement 
administration. 
U 11 is essentially an example of the failure of the 
settlement policy and of implementation strategies at 
local level. In this unit, the irrigation system cannot 
be operated by local officials in accordance with their 
programmes, since they themselves cannot effectively 
control the allocation of resources. As a result, they 
are compelled to relax their formal tasks and allow 
farmers to manage their own activities. In this situation 
U11 settlers, taking advantage of ; the weaknesses of the 
official programme, reshape planned intervention in 
accordance with their own interests (see Chapter five 
for more detailed discussion). 
Settlement Unit No.Ill (U1111 
Settlement Unit U111 consists mostly of re-settled 
traditional villagers from the Dry Zone (75 per cent), 
where social organization was based primarily upon 
kinship ties (see Chapter 2 ) . Production of mixed crops 
for family subsistence was the main goal of family 
farming in traditional villages. Now under the Mahaweli 
Scheme they are located in the middle of the system of 
distribution canals. Access to irrigation water in this 
unit is not as difficult as in UII, but, according to 
officials, water management 1s neglected by these 
farmers, which account for thejra being labelled as 
"backward". 
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Their lack of adaptation to new cash-crop farming is 
considered an important management problem by officials. 
The latter refer to the farmers' incapacity to follow 
instructions. But, in making such remark, they simply 
o v e r l o o k the s p e c i f i c knowledge and adaptative 
capabilities shown by them as compared to those 
"unadaptable" farmers in the U11. 
According to officials, their performance in the Mahaweli 
settlement has been poor due to several reasons: 
a) They were used to extensive subsistence farming in 
their original villages. Therefore they came to be 
known as 'traditional' farmers. 
b) The production of use-values, and indigenous methods 
of cultivation are more important to them than cash-
crop farming with sophisticated methods. 
c) The types of 'knowledge' and 'education' necessary for 
intensified commercial family farming are lacking or 
unimportant among the majority. 
d) They are unwilling to change from their previous way 
of life. 
As compared to other groups, this group of farmers 
demonstrates the discrepancy of interests that exist in 
the settlement units. They have their own goals of family 
survival and try to achieve them through a subsistence-
based production strategies. Therefore, labelling them as 
"backward" also implies that the officials themselves 
have failed to change their ways of organizing their 
lifeworlds. This social fact is thereby interpreted by 
officials in terms of the so-called inefficiency of the 
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farmers (Chapter 5 provides more detailed analysis on 
this problem). 
According to management officials, since settlers in this 
settlement unit are backward, agricultural extension and 
water management are hardly known to them. Whenever 
there are meetings with officials these farmers occupy 
the 'backbenches' because new programmes are unimportant 
to them. 
Theoretically, a positive balance between family size and 
farm size (e.g. a manageable number of family dependents 
and sufficient family labour) is1 necessary to achieve 
production goals and the self-sufficiency of each farm. 
Table 5 shows the family structure of the sample 
households. 
Table 5. Age Structure of Settler Families in the Three 
Settlement Units 
50 families (random sample) from each units 
Age Groups U1 U1 1 U111 
Years No. g, "6 No. % No O, • o 
Below 5 32 (13.5) 28 (12.6) 48 (17.0) 
6-14 68 (28.8) 55 (24.7) 78 (27.7) 
15-24 30 (12.7) 41 (18.4) 46 (16.3) 
25-34 62 (26.4) 45 (20.1) 32 (11.3) 
35-44 34 (14.4) 38 (17.0) 28 ( 9.9) 
45-54 8 ( 3.4) 12 ( 5.4) 38 (13.5) 
55 and above 2 ( 0.8) 4 ( 1.8) 12 ( 4.3) 
Total 236 (100) 223 (100) 282 (100) 
Source: Own Survey - Maha (Wet) Season, 1985. 
Among re-settlers in U 111 there jis a greater imbalance 
between family and farm size. On average there are about 
seven members depending on each one hectare plot but 
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contribution of family labour is nevertheless low, since 
about 40 % of the population is below 15 years of age 
and 11 % over 50 years of age. Thus more than half the 
population can be considered dependents. Under this 
situation, the goals of farmers and their households 
focus primarily upon family survival, rather than 
returns on cash-crop production. One reason why there are 
so many older people in this unit is that many settlers 
were the original landowners before their land was 
acquired for the development of the Mahaweli Scheme. 
They were compensated with plots within the new 
settlement scheme. 
Unlike some families in U 1, most of the families in U 
II 1 are reluctant to employ hired labour because 
apparently they are not so interested in commercial 
family farming. They often adopt other methods of 
overcoming household livelihood problems. For example, 
child employment is a common practice in U 111, where a 
high rate of school dropouts has been recorded. 
Settlers in U 111 are considered to be poorer than those 
in U 1 and U 11. Yet this does not mean that they are 
being marginalized faster than the other two groups of 
settlers. Rather the opposite is true. Indeed, as far as 
livelihood strategies are concerned, the settlers in U 
III are in fact more organized than other groups. They 
know how to obtain social welfare assistance from the 
Mahaweli settlement. They ignore the cultivation of land 
using modern inputs and sometimes they work as 
agricultural laborers. Nevertheless their net incomes 
have not dropped far below those of U 1 and U 11 settler 
families. 
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Table 6. Cultivation Practices ih the Settlement Units 
50 families (random sample) from each Unit 
U1 U11 U111 
Acreage % Acreage % Acreage % 
Amount not 
cultivated 6 ( 4 . 8 ) 23 (18.3) 12 ( 9 . 6 ) 
Amount 
cultivated 118 (95.2) 103 (81.7) 113 (90.4) 
Total Irrigated 
land 124 (100) 126' (100) 125 (100) 
Amount rent or \ 
leased out 8 ( 6.5) 16i (12.7) 48 (38.4) 
Amount cultivated 
by settlers 110 (88.7) 87 (69.0) 65 (52.0) Amoun  a ed in 
or rented in 24 
Own Survey, Maha(Wet) Season, 1985. 
i 
Cultivation Practices. 
Given the above pattern of heterogeneous settler groups, 
it is important to observe the various cultivation 
practices adopted by them. The possession of actual 
operational holdings and the income earned by their 
operators cannot be quantified accurately because many 
arrangements are informal and there are many seasonal 
changes. However we can draw somej conclusions based upon 
observations and on information provided by Unit 
Managers. Although the relationship between the owners 
and operators of land varies, the! cultivation of land by 
actual operators is shown in Table 6. U 111 recorded the 
highest amount of land leasied and rented out, 
constituting about 38.4 percent of the total area of the 
irrigable land. 
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Table 7. Number of Settlers Leasing or Renting out Land 
50 farmers (random sample) from each unit 
Settlement Entire plot Between 75%-50% Below 50% 
Units No.of No. of No.of 
Settlers % Settlers % Settlers % 
U1 1 ( 2.0) 5 (10.0) 4 ( 8.0) 
U11 6 (12.0) 10 (20.0) 4 ( 8.0) 
U111 12 (24.0) 16 (32.0) 12 (24.0) 
Source: Own Survey, Maha(Wet) Season, 1985. 
Resettlers in U 111 are thus becoming marginalized in so 
far as the cultivation of High Yielding Varieties is 
concerned, but they are not squeezed any further by 
demographic pressure since entire households are inserted 
into both subsistence agriculture and the wage labour 
market within the area. Agriculture among this type of 
farmers is becoming a supplementary source of income, 
although as owners of plots they do not become completely 
separated from the means of production. In fact they 
As shown in Table 7, an increasing number of settlers in 
U III ignore the cultivation of their own land. About 24 
percent of the farmers have leased or rented out their 
entire plots, the main reason being lack of finance for 
competitive commercial farming. However, it is important 
to note that these settlers were more interested in 
working as share-croppers in order to share the costs of 
production than undertaking cash-crop farming which is 
risky and unfamiliar to them. They therefore adopt 
different land use practices from those selected from in 
U 1 and U 11. Part of their land is offered to friends or 
relatives who share the costs and labour. 
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remain Mahaweli settlers as long as they retain 
ownership of land. 
The above unevenness of change and the co-existence of 
different economic processes at the level of the 
settlement units indicate the complexity of development 
and its local tendencies based upon farmer control of the 
production process. On the other hand, tendencies in U 1 
demonstrate how simple commodity forms of production 
articulate with other forms of production. The demand 
for wage labour in "progressive" units, such as U 1, is 
supplied by non-commodity producing settlement units such 
as the U 111, since settlers in the latter are unable to 
survive with paddy income alone. Also income from land is 
becoming less and less important ijn relation to earnings 
from other sources. For example,: about 24 percent of 
farmers who leased out their entire allotments are 
working as full-time agricultural laborers . Most of them 
rent or lease out their land for two or three cultivation 
seasons, at a rate of Rs.4000/- to Rs.5000/-. A family 
with three workers can earn about Rs.5100/- per season 
from wage labour (on the basis of Rs.85/- x 60 working 
days). Therefore, settlers in U 111 can earn a net 
income not lower than the net income of those who 
cultivate their own land, although, as I emphasized 
earlier, this does not mean that they are completely 
separated from their means of production. Indeed the 
majority cultivate a part of their!allotments, while some 
f a m i l y m e m b e r s seek wage employment. Different 
agricultural practices and livelihood strategies of 
settlers in each of the units reveals, therefore, not 
only the heterogeneity and great diversity among settler 
families but also the comple;xities of production 
processes. 
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The Official Viewpoint on the Diversity of Family Farming 
The settlement plans, irrigation designs and management 
system of the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme are different 
f r o m t h o s e of the old c o l o n i z a t i o n s c h e m e s . 
Theoretically, the cluster concept of settlement was 
attempted in the Mahaweli, thus breaking with the 
changing previous ribbon type of settlement. The 
objective was to encourage better social relations among 
settlers through cluster-based settler organization. This 
was to be promoted by the Unit System whereby about 250 
settlers were grouped to form one unit under a Unit 
Manager (UM). But in the process of organizing a top-down 
structure for administrative and management purposes, the 
original objective of cluster settlement was overlooked. 
As a result, not only has the gap between the formal 
organization of the Unit System and the actual patterns 
of social organization among farmers increased but it 
has also created a feeling among the latter that the 
functions of settlement units and Unit Managers (UMs) 
are external to the reality of their own problems, and 
that therefore they must organize internally in order to 
achieve their goals, through the manipulation of external 
agency intervention. Hence, once the distrlbutory canals, 
field canals and inlet systems were put into operation, 
it became difficult for Unit Managers (UMs) to deal 
effectively with farmer behaviour and organizational 
strategies. This was due to several reasons. 
a) State intervention at the unit level has a different 
meaning when placed within the context of the 
interactional processes and individual and collective 
strategies of farmers. For example, UMs play the role 
of providers of resources and services, and at the 
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There is no consistent or uniform pattern of 
interaction between farmers and officials. Officials 
are part of the state apparatus but they cannot 
m o n o p o l i z e economic and social power in the 
settlements, nor do they have exclusive control over 
intervention initiatives. Although they are supposed 
to respond to the institutional interests that 
dominate "government machinery", they are forced to 
adjust themselves to the actual "local machinery" and 
arenas wherein practical problems emerge. And 
whenever the constraints and limitations of their own 
institutions become a barrier to their performance as 
outside intervening agents, it becomes necessary for 
them to take on the role of 'insiders' in accordance 
with farmers' interests. This way they can gain the 
backing of farmers to deal with the rules and 
procedures of their own external agency (see Chapter 4 
for detailed discussion of this!issue). 
Farmers, have their own 
institutions, such as the Unit 
these differently as groups or 
problem is interpreted by 
management problem. 
understandings of new 
stem, and may express 
as individuals. This 
as constituting a 
Sys 
UMs 
same time attempt to control resource utilization by 
the farmers. However control is severely affected by 
the scarcity of resources, the malfunctioning of the 
delivery system, and the red tape and formalities that 
are entailed. This makes it difficult for officials 
to deal effectively with the diverse interests and 
maneuvers of farmers. 
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As I explained in Chapter 2, the clusters of a 
traditional irrigation village are inhabited by people 
from one kinship group associated with a group cluster 
of dwellings with their own inter-household patterns of 
organization. In contrast, a new settlement unit of the 
Mahaweli settlement consists of about 250 settlers made 
up of people from different backgrounds with different 
social values, interests and knowledge. Each of them has 
a number for identification purposes. The settler, his 
home, farm canal, and inlet are numbered and UMs use 
these numbers for organizing their activities. 
The new irrigation network of the System ' C of the 
Mahaweli Development project is, for technical and 
administrative purposes, divided into a number of 
"blocks". The distributory canals, which are connected to 
the main canals, supply water for about 20 - 25 turnout 
areas. Each turnout area consists of about 15 farmers 
(see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion). Under this new 
irrigation network, farmers in a turnout area are 
responsible for maintaining the field canals only within 
their turnout area. There are then about 20 to 25 rows of 
settlers dependent on the water supply from common 
distributory canals. Control and management of water 
beyond the turnout area is the duty of officials. This 
makes it difficult to ensure that all farmers receive 
equal amounts of water or get sufficient water. The 
reasons are as follows: 
a) The levels of the turnouts along the distributory 
canals are not equal and thus there is no equitable 
distribution of water. Some turnouts are placed in 
lower parts of the distributory canal, while others 
are at higher levels. For the latter, the water level 
of the distributory canal is lower and therefore the 
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supply from this is very uncertain. As a result, 
those farmers in the lower reaches of the distributory 
canal have to block the turnout of the upper part of 
the distributory canal in order to obtain more water 
for their lower part. UMs are responsible for ensuring 
an equitable distribution of water and must respond to 
the complaints of both top-enders and tail-endors. 
When they fail to deal with such conflicting 
situations they usually explain this in terms of the 
lack of cooperation among farmers, although the 
farmers themselves often express the view that these 
conflicts are created by the officials themselves. 
b) There are some turnouts supplying water for only 8 
settlers, whilst others supply water to more than 16. 
The supply of water in such cases depends on the water 
controller's way of operating the irrigation system. 
When a large number of farmers influence him to 
provide water in response to the actual water 
shortage they face, the methods used for uniform 
water control have to be altered in accordance with 
the discrepancies in the field. However, even if the 
maximum level of water is :supplied through the 
turnouts in U 11, settlers ceuld never receive the 
same amount of water compared with those in U 1 and U 
111. This situation has led to the division of 
settlers into two groups: those who have easy access 
to water and those who do not. The differential 
interests and the complex nature of practical problems 
that arise between these groups cannot be dealt 
handled simply by the UM using his authority on an 
uniform basis, since the solution for one group 
becomes a problem for another.' Moreover in a turnout 
area, settlers' problems relating to water, soil 
quality and salinity cannot be solved by the settlers 
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t h e m s e l v e s . N o t o n l y do they not have the 
responsibility to attend to them but these problems, 
in the farmers' eyes, must be solved by UMs who are 
paid by government to do so. Hence the new turnout 
system has become an imposed administrative unit in 
which clashes between officials and producers 
regularly take place. 
c) Trying to introduce some ideal form of settlement is 
of no avail if local conditions and problems are not 
faced equally by all settlers. Thus, what"may appear 
to be no more than relatively small technical and 
management difficulties become transformed into major 
organizational problems once they confront the 
problems of local diversity in ecology and social 
structure. 
Different forms of farmer behaviour due to locational 
d i s p a r i t i e s , t h e n , a s s u m e m a j o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
proportions. In a large irrigation scheme such as the 
Mahaweli Project, irrigation water is diverted from main 
canals and then distributed to settlers through a network 
of distributory and sub-distributory canals. This large 
physical layout is controlled by officials who take a 
major role in irrigation water management. According to 
these officials, this is more important to the production 
process than any decisions that farmers might make over 
irrigation water use. Settlement planners made the 
assumption that every settler would benefit equally 
after being provided with an equal amount of irrigation 
water. But, as farmers came to realize, once installed, 
the system functioned unequally. Unit managers likewise 
failed to make headway with this water management system, 
since in the circumstances, they were unable to reconcile 
the conflicting interests and production practices of 
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Problems of Cultivation Time Schedules 
Cultivation time schedules and a well-planned timetable 
of water supply are essential In a large irrigation 
project like the Mahaweli Scheme. The total irrigable 
area to be cultivated, the water capacity of the 
reservoirs, the main canals and distributory canals, 
climatic changes during the Yala (dry) and Maha (wet) 
seasons, the crops to be cultivated, the water 
requirements for various crops are considered when 
cultivation and water management time schedules are 
prepared. The officials' objective is to direct or train 
farmers to cultivate according to a prearranged 
timetable, so that the management and operation of the 
cultivation programme will be uniform and easy. It is 
argued that, cultivation according to a timetable can 
help settlers not only avoid the adverse effects of 
climatic fluctuations but also assist them in adopting to 
a common cultivation routine. However, settlers' own farm 
and household planning are based on quite different 
criteria, generally implying that they are likely to 
concentrate more on the most immediate problems and 
difficulties they face in the process of cultivation and 
in their social life generally. 
Secondly, although settlers are requested to participate 
in cultivation committee meetings called to prepare the 
d i f f e r e n t groups of farmers that generally ran 
contradictory to official water 1 management practice. 
Nevertheless, Unit Managers believe that it is simply the 
locational disparity of settlement units that contributes 
to the present unevenness of farmer organization and farm 
development. 
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next season's cultivation time schedule, their attendance 
is very poor. It was revealed, according to unit office 
records, that participation in cultivation committee 
meetings covered only 5 percent of the settlers of the 
unit. This situation arose mainly for the following 
reasons: 
a) During the earlier seasons, cultivation time schedules 
were not followed precisely, and so farmers did not 
have much confidence in such them. 
b) There was a big gap between the time schedule and 
actual time spent by individual settlers. More than 80 
percent of the settlers in the sample were found to be 
behind the time schedule. Moreover the majority of the 
s e t t l e r s who participated in the cultivation 
committee meetings were farmers who had adequate 
access to inputs, capital and water in order to 
complete cultivation on time. There were several 
constraints on settlers preventing them completing 
cultivation tasks as scheduled. These were mostly 
financial and so they found it of no avail to attend 
in the meetings. The result was that decisions were 
made in favor of a minority of settlers. 
c) Settlers in the sample could not adjust their 
expenditure to suit the cultivation calendar. After 
the harvest of one season they sold their paddy and 
spent this income on various consumer durables that 
they needed to purchase, without reserving any of this 
money for the next season. 
Facing such practical problems with the official 
cultivation programme many farmers were led to organize 
their own programmes. About ninety percent of the 
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settlers in the sample were found to prefer to plough 
with buffaloes, and so they made their own arrangements 
for hiring them for the entire season from villagers 
outside the Mahaweli and later paying in kind (paddy) 
after harvesting. In this way they abandoned the use of 
tractors, broke the timing of the official cultivation 
programme and economized using their own programmes. The 
latter involved various types of non-monetary 
transaction (such as family labour exchange, inter-
household credit transactions, and the exchange of 
agricultural implements) with relatives or friends. 
Rotation of Water Supply 
Rotational water supply was introduced especially during 
the Yala season. The aim of management in adopting such a 
measure may have been to motivate; and train settlers to 
minimize wasteful use of water. TJirough rotational water 
supply the amount of water in the Reservoirs can be saved 
to distribute to settlers in the project area during the 
dry season. It was also expected that it might lead to 
minimizing traditional habits of using too much water in 
the paddy field in order to kill weeds. A minimum use of 
water can in fact prevent damage to field ditches and 
canals and protect soil fertility. But in practice this 
system of rotational water supply has created more 
problems than it has solved. M o r e o v e r the benefits of the 
rotation of water supply are not the same for all 
settlers. This is for several reasons: 
a) The time allocated to suppl^ water to individual 
settlers was fixed without \ considering distances 
between turnouts and inlets. The majority of settlers 
at the tail end of the field canals could not receive 
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During the 1983/84 Maha and 1985 Yala seasons, there were 
only five settlers who completed cultivation according to 
the set timetable, while the rest were behind. Agreements 
were made between officials and farmers on water 
requirements, but these were never met in practice. Thus 
though the timetable was said to be indispensible for 
managing a large-scale irrigation scheme, it was 
impossible to put this into operation unless the 
specific problems of the settlers were properly addressed 
and solved. The time schedules were prepared on the 
assumption that all settlers had equal qualities of soil, 
equal access to water and inpujts, and equal income, 
interest and capital. 
The Problem of Farmer Efficiency 
A complaint voiced by Unit Manager U111, was that he had 
difficulty in organizing farmers to carry out the 
programme of cultivation, which he assumed was due to the 
poor selection of 'backward' farmers, whose interest it 
was to remain at a subsistence level, using their own 
cultivation practices. This, he argued, was an obstacle 
to uniform and well-planned settlement management. 
Bad selection, according to him, could be defined by 
reference to the poor education of the older settlers, 
families with too many children, and farmers with 
traditional values - all reasons given by unit managers 
for their failure to achieve their; goals. However, during 
monthly meetings held between high-ranking Mahaweli 
officials and unit managers, I sought to obtain further 
clarification on this problem of management among 
heterogeneous farming households. This led to the 
realization that there was in faqt no common agreement, 
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nor widely accepted opinion among them as to the critical 
factor, thereby showing that conflicting views and 
interests existed not only among farmers, but also among 
the officials who were promoting the concept of uniform 
management. 
UMs categorized some groups as of 'poor education' and 
'backward'. Yet the farmers they pointed to had been 
resettled from village irrigation communities and were, 
in fact, the most experienced farmers in irrigated 
farming. Therefore the 'education' they expected from 
farmers took no account of the useful skills they already 
possessed. 
A main difficulty faced by UMs was what they called 
farmer "inefficiency". According to unit managers, in 
some s e t t l e m e n t units (such as U III) farmer 
inefficiency caused them to introduce new farmer-training 
programmes and special community development projects. 
Failure of the intervention programme therefore was 
interpreted in terms of farmer inefficiency and did not 
challenge the notion of "successful implementation". 
Failure, in this case, was not the fault of implementing 
officials: it was a problem requiring corrective measures 
and incentives applied by field staff so that they would 
eventually achieve their policy objectives. In this way 
officials provided their own interpretation of the 
problems through recourse to the notion of inefficiency. 
Yet there was a growing contradiction between officials' 
ways of identifying the managerial factors necessary for 
farmers and farmers' own management practice and criteria 
of viable family farming. An efficient farmer, according 
to officials, should be able to manage his farm with 
m o d e r n i n p u t t e c h n o l o g y . He should follow the 
instructions of officials regarding carefully timed 
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application of inputs, water management and production of 
targeted yield. All these services and inputs entailed 
high expenditure, which many farmers could not afford. 
But such cost factors of modern family farming were not 
considered important in the assessment of farmer 
efficiency by officials. 
The heterogeneous nature of household units of production 
in the Mahaweli settlement is one of the most difficult 
administrative problems at grass-roots level, since there 
is no uniformity in the strategies adopted by settlers, 
nor equal capacity among them to improve the 'efficiency' 
of family farms along the line expected by the Mahaweli 
management. The allocation of one hectare to each family 
is a measure that runs counter to the need for flexible 
landholding and land use necessary for balancing the 
demographic variation of farming households. Secondly, 
despite its assumption of egalitarian family farms, the 
settlement strategy could not avoid distributing greater 
benefits to some settlers. 
Productivity and Household Income 
Yield per hectare is the most common and direct monitor 
used for assessing efficiency and productivity of small 
units of production in System ' C . Official records often 
show higher yields per hectare th^n independent studies. 
Many grassroots officials keep the|r own yield records in 
order to defend their work and to justify, as it were, 
the heavy monthly wage bills of; the large number of 
officials. Even then the average paddy yield per hectare, 
as given in official records, is below the projected 
yields in all cultivation years in System ' C . According 
to estimated yields and production, a farmer produces 
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Table 8. Average Yields per Hectare (kgs.) 
Mahaweli System ' C and Neighboring Districts. 
1! 383/84 1984 1984/85 1985 1985/86 
System ' C 2696 3051 4201 4076 4389 
Polonnaruwa 3846 3908 4932 4452 4932 
Anuradhapura 3177 3156 4034 3804 4619 
Amparai 3135 4201 3887 4618 3329 
Source: MEA, Department of Agriculture 
In system 'H', where the Yala (dry) season is devoted to 
the cash crop production of chillies some possibilities 
for changing from unprofitable to profitable crops are 
possible. This is not the case in System ' C , (see Table 
9 below) where even during the Yala season paddy farming 
predominated, despite its unsatisfactory yield per 
hectare. 
over 5200 kgs. of paddy per one hectare plot, but, as we 
can see from the Table 8, the highest yield per hectare 
received in System ' C was only 4389 Kgs (in 1985/86). 
This was not only below the projected yield, but also 
lower than the average yield in neighboring districts 
such as Polonnaruwa and Anuradhapura (excluding Mahaweli 
areas). 
But according to the opinion of officials, when yields 
fall below the expected level, the efficiency and 
productivity of farms can be improved by adopting crop 
diversification methods. 
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Table 9. Work Plan - Agricultural Production Programme 





Red Onion 20 
Cow Pea 70 
Green Gram 40 
Soya Beans 15 
Black Gram 30 
Ground Nut 08 
Vegetables 120 
Gingelly 






Source: Agricultural Division 
' C . 
Project Office, System 
The lack of confidence among farmers, inadequacy of 
extension services, and unsuitable soils, are the main 
f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g the p e r s i s t e n c e of paddy 
monoculture. Small farm productivity in irrigated areas 
depends to a great extent upon the; suitability of 
soil types for the crop selected. Table 10 shows the 
percentage of land classified for paddy as against other 
cash crops in System ' C under the Accelerated Mahaweli 
Programme and compares with the situation in three other 
systems. System ' C has the lowest irrigable area 
suitable for paddy farming. This means that high-level of 
paddy production cannot be expec 
cent of the land area in System 
area were used for paddy farming 
about 10 per cent of the land is 
suitable for upland crops, which 
ted from about 75 per 
C , even if the entire 
On the other hand, 
categorized as highly 
underlines the limited 
ng from paddy in System possibilities available for changi 
' C . Irrigation development in this part of the Mahaweli 
originally involved destruction of high-value rain 
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System Areas (Hectares) 1 R 2 R 1 U 2 U 
A 14000 67 16 07 05 
B 31300 30 40 15 15 
C 19550 25 40 10 25 
D 15950 50 20 25 15 
1 R - Highly suitable soil for paddy 
2 R - Moderately suitable 
1 U - Highly suitable for Upland Crops 
2 U - Moderately suitable for Upland Crops 
Source: World Bank Report on Mahaweli 1977 
When all these factors are taken into consideration 
irrigation development itself manifests a gloomy picture 
of ecological and economic disaster, unless and until 
family farm productivity is raised to offset these 
losses. Selection of profitable crops for farming under 
well organized crop diversification systems would, it 
seems, be the best method of raising household income, 
but, as I have argued, it is difficult to achieve given 
the poor quality of soils in System ' C . 
Dr. Walter Abeygunasekera, Former General Manager of the 
Mahaweli Development Board lays out the whole gamut of 
the problems as follows: 
forest and conversion to an irrigable area, which, as 
the above data show, was only marginally suitable for 
successful cash-crop farming. In the same manner, one of 
Sri Lanka's best natural environments and tree-crop 
plantation areas, known as the Dumbara Valley, have also 
been lost due to the construction of the reservoirs. 
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These issues are becoming crucial in System ' C since 
alternatives are limited. All settlers in the three units 
studied have cultivated paddy from the inception of the 
"As the majority of settlers were new to irrigated 
agriculture, more especially to irrigated production 
practices of other field crops (OFC) on upland 
soils, the design envisioned the provision of a 
highly intensive and experienced extension service, 
initially with the appointment of one extension 
agent for 250 families with close linkages and 
strong technical back-stopping by the Department of 
Agriculture, with special emphasis on research and 
education activities centered at Maha-Illuppallama. 
Extension agents have had little exposure to the 
technology of irrigated production of OFC which 
requires precision knowledge :.n land preparation, on 
farm irrigation, and irrigation layout, specialized 
knowledge on Water Management of individual crops, 
irrigation methods, frequencies and quantities, 
aeration status of the root system in relation to 
drainage, technically feasible agronomic systems of 
multi-cropping, inter-cropping and relay cropping to 
optimize production, storage and processing methods 
etc. However, research addressed sufficiently to the 
wide spectrum of needs, problems and expertise 
required to improve cropping patterns and cropping 
intensity of farmers in order to produce more 
efficient and effective techniques for management of 
land and water resources are necessary. My 
experience says that the answer is probably in the 
negative. Farmers are selective in accepting advice 
rendered by most extension agents" (Abeygunawardena, 
1986). 
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settlement. No attempts have been made to grow OFC on 
irrigable lands. Irrigation water is being provided only 
for paddy farming and has become the major interest of 
rural producers. 
Before concluding this chapter it is important to stress 
that the income of small-scale paddy holdings does not 
only depend on soil quality but also on many other 
technical factors, such as the proper levelling of land 
so that all plants grow standing in water, as well as the 
timely and routine application of manufactured chemicals 
such as fertilizer, weed killers, pesticides etc. Given 
these complicated agronomic conditions, the role of state 
agencies becomes crucially important in recognizing and 
r e s e a r c h i n g the complexity of different farming 
situations and in taking full account of farmers' 
perceptions, expectations and strategies. Many of the 
problems outlined in this chapter arise from the 
unwillingness of government personnel and institutions to 
seriously address themselves to these issues. But, more 
importantly, they reflect the inherent contradictory 
tendencies of large-scale settlement development based 
upon top-down planning methods. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the 
possibilities and limitations of uniform family farm 
settlement in the Mahaweli Scheme. A central aim was to 
show how discrepancies in the physical, locational, 
o p e r a t i o n a l and s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e s have 
contributed to the local problematic of planned 
intervention. I also explored the incompatibilities 
between the Mahaweli model of development and the 
interests and realities of different farmer groups. It 
was argued that the reasons put forward by intervening 
parties in justification of their intervention goals and 
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strategies are questionable when farmers' own social 
practices, images and social forms are taken into 
account. These latter must not be seen simply as making 
up the complexities of the empirical context in which 
intervention occurs, but as shaping in a significant way 
the form that intervention practices and processes take. 
In this regard, two fundamental dimensions are central: 
a) the clash between the official government model, which 
explains the rationale and underlying concepts concerning 
the delivery and distribution of project resources, and 
the individual strategies and interpretations of local 
officials who are responsible for! the implementation of 
the model; and b) the power; and influence which 
individual farmers and groups of farmers exert over the 
kinds of intervention strategies devised by local 
officials in their day-to-day struggles and work. These 
two aspects are explored in detail in the next two 
chapters. 
Notes 
(1) The average size of plot in previous settlement 
schemes was about two hectares. This was further reduced 
to one hectare under the Mahaweli Settlement scheme, 
without taking into account the problems of the second 
generation. 
(2) Demographic, social and cultural differences among 
settlement families became a major constraining factor in 
the process of implementing this uniform family farming 
system. 
(3) Unlike Mahaweli settlements, cultivation activities 
in the traditional villages were undertaken by the 
villagers collectively, under the guidance of village 
leaders (gamarala), and in accordance with established 
customs. For example, those in the lower reaches were 
allowed to take the first delivery of irrigation water, 




ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMAS AT THE LOCAL-LEVEL AND STRATEGIES 
OF FIELD OFFICERS 
This chapter examines the strategies, attitudes and 
behaviour of local officials in the Mahaweli settlement 
units. In this way I attempt to depict the reality of the 
social life of UMs (local field Officers) . In the first 
part of the chapter, I explain the "theory" of planned 
intervention, in which the procedures, rules, tasks and 
responsibilities of local officials are laid down. In the 
secondly part, I analyze the practical problems of 
programme implementation. I show how the work and 
effectiveness of field officers are affected by the 
external constraints of the institutions to which they 
belong and by the internal struggles of the farming 
population with which they interact. Thirdly, I discuss 
the failure of local officials to take intervention 
initiatives that fall in line with the exigencies of the 
top-down authority structure. Finally, the behavioral 
patterns of local officials are analyzed from an emic 
point of view in order to understand their role in the 
social construction of ongoing so|cial processes. Thus I 
argue in this chapter that, in tlieir confrontations and 
interactions with farmers, local (officials come to form 
part of the social reality of lcj>cal processes and not 
just part of the "project" as defined by the Mahaweli 
Settlement Authority. 
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In the previous chapter I dealt with family farm 
settlements in general and outlined the myriad of 
socio-economic complexities that contribute to, what 
M a h a w e l i o f f i c i a l s call, "management p r o b l e m s " . 
Furthermore, I argued that family farms exhibit a 
heterogeneous pattern of development generating different 
patterns of response and change. In order to understand 
the dynamic and emergent characteristics of these 
different processes, our analysis should now address 
itself to critical points of linkage or entree into local 
arenas. These critical points are likely to be found at 
the settlement unit level, since it is here that farmers 
and intervening parties (particularly UMs) meet, 
negotiate, and interact in an effort to realize their own 
goals. In so doing, they contribute to the crisis of 
intervening organizations. 
The implementation of planned programmes depends very 
much upon the reliability and accountability of local 
agents. However, their effectiveness and work discipline 
cannot be guaranteed by top-down management strategies 
based on rules, procedures, and reporting to superiors 
since control from above is possible only under a 
reliable and accurate information flow from below. 
As I will elaborate in this chapter, this information 
flow is controlled, manipulated and distorted by local 
actors in pursuit of their own goals. This obstructs 
domination from above. The control and administration of 
a large number of local officials and their activities is 
largely based on general circulars in the form of written 
instructions. These instructions are formulated on the 
assumption that all local officials carry out equal 
tasks, face similar problems and respond in a common way. 
However, as I explained in the previous chapter, the 
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diversity of producer groups, and conflicting interests 
and discrepancies relating to the distribution of 
resources, generate different types of local problems for 
UMs. A top-down management system cannot address itself 
to such diversity; and it is this weakness of the 
centralized management system of the Mahaweli that 
creates space for local officials to work out their own 
local solutions. 
A related point is that local officials, the bottom layer 
of the institutional structure, are far away from the 
Mahaweli Authority in Colombo. Their links are maintained 
through a communication system based upon follow-up 
reports, monthly returns and the keeping of field 
records. But they live with the fajrmers and regular face-
to face interaction with them is unavoidable. As one UM 
explained: 
"with regards to our day-to-day problems, farmers 
who are waiting in front of us are much more 
important than the orders we: receive from our Head 
Office". 
Because of this practical situation, UMs have to separate 
the i n t e r n a l and external dimensions of their 
intervention practices. The internal dimension is a more 
dynamic process which involves day-to-day interactions 
and negotiations with farmers and other local actors. The 
external dimension involves dealing with high- ranking 
officials and providing written information. In this 
chapter I will discuss the organizational dilemmas of UMs 
and show how they contribute to the patterning of social 
r e l a t i o n s with clients that entail negotiation, 
bargaining and resistance. I will also explore how 
planned intervention is retarded by the more dynamic and 
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pervasive characteristics of relatively small-scale 
'minor' processes. 
Understanding the conditions under which farmers manage 
their own livelihood problems is important for several 
reasons: 
a) A well-designed top-down management system is severely 
affected by struggles over the utilization of project 
resources at settlement level between field staff and the 
large number of farmers. 
b) Since farmers' behaviour, strategies and claims vary 
considerably, the implementation of policies through a 
unified administrative structure becomes difficult. Thus 
a gradual separation of local actors' activities into 
their own "internal world" has led to the bureaucratic 
and political failure of official attempts to develop 
Mahaweli family farms. 
c) Field-level officials of the Mahaweli management 
hierarchy are compelled to alter policies and programmes. 
They deviate from the main goals of the Mahaweli 
Authority because they are forced to get involved in a 
diversity of tasks in an attempt to resolve the conflicts 
between them and farmers. Although administrative control 
and supervision of the agricultural activities of 
settlers has been strengthened, the interaction between 
the parties in the settlement units cannot be effectively 
manipulated by central authority. As a result, it is 
difficult for the Mahaweli authority to attain the goals 
it sets for itself. It is this crisis point that gives 
room for farmer resistance and for the emergence of other 
kinds of farmer strategy. 
Settlers 1 work in the Mahaweli is supposed to be guided 
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or "directed". This "directive" approach is characterized 
by a framework of centralized control and administration 
by which management objectives and the means of achieving 
them are established by government or the sponsoring 
a g e n c y . A l l m a j o r d e c i s i o n s and the o v e r a l l 
organizational framework remain firmly in the hands of 
state officials or representatives of the sponsoring 
body. Thus the state, through its official agents creates 
the main organizational framework for the use of 
technology, the management of agricultural inputs and 
credit, and for marketing. In 1 addition, Government 
statutes and regulations define tl(ie precise criteria for 
membership of the project, the rtiles for allocation of 
land and water, and the parameters for the distribution 
of returns obtained on production (see Long, 1980). 
However, explicitly formulated intervention plans cannot 
work out in practice because not only farmers but also 
local officials themselves manipulate intervention 
activities in line with their own realizable goals. 
In this context it is important to study how a centrally-
planned settlement programme comes to be implemented by 
its local-level agents in accordance with their own 
interests and local circumstances. Furthermore, although 
technical and management know-how is brought in from 
outside to handle the socio-economic problems of the 
settlers and to combat trends, such as the sale or 
leasing of land, there is no assurance that the packages 
(material and services) will be introduced in accordance 
with the needs of farmers. This lack of fit between 
external inputs and local needs and practice makes it 
difficult for the official management system to replace 
some of the fundamental elements that enable individual 
settlers to choose and act in their own life-worlds 
rather than simply following recommended practices. Also, 
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in order to understand how external management becomes 
involved in crises at local level, it is necessary to 
study the organizational problems in the settlement units 
that result from the resistance and differential 
responses of farmers themselves. 
Management Structure: Theory and Practice 
Figure 2 (A) and (B) below indicates the delegation of 
power under the Mahaweli Economic Agency (MEA) at three 
l e v e l s w h i c h are v e r t i c a l l y i n t e r l i n k e d in a 
semi-autonomous manner. The main body of the Mahaweli 
Authority has general responsibility for settlement 
development and management, and the Resident Project 
Manager (RPM) overall control of the System ' C of the 
Mahaweli Settlement Scheme. The Block Manager (BM) is 
entrusted with about 2000 settler families comprising 
about 8 to 10 units of settlement. Each Unit Manager 
(UM), who reports back directly to the BM, has about 250 
families in his unit and on him devolves the total 
responsibility of unit organization relating to the 
agricultural, administrative, economic, social and 
cultural activities of his unit. The UM is allowed one 
Field Assistant who is expected to have basic training in 
agriculture, and who takes the onus of the entire unit in 
his sphere of work. This permits the UM to avoid some of 
the occupational hazards of the lack of co-ordination and 
divisional conflict. It is the duty of the UM to function 
as the sole representative of the Mahaweli service and to 
oversee the allocation of land, irrigation water, credit 
facilities, health assistance and other related basic 
amenities, and also to undertake to resolve all settlers' 
conflicts. The UM is also expected to show such as 
F i g u r e 2 (A) 
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Figure 2 (B) 
Organisational Structure 
Project Level 
of the Mahaweli Settlement Management - System 'C 
Deputy 













































1 1 7 
Tasks and Responsibility of Unit Managers 
Within this bureaucratic structure, it is the UM at the 
settlement unit level, who plays a central role in 
transforming state policies during the process of 
implementation. The settler/UM relationship is intended 
to encourage or compel settlers to accept the latter as 
their undisputed leader since he is expected "to lead 
more by example than by precept". If this works then it 
is supposed that he will enhance the authority of the 
policy makers and decision takers in the MEA. The most 
important aspect of unit management is the type of social 
relations that the UM builds with his farmers, and his 
ability to establish smooth working relations is judged 
by the level of farmer participation in production and 
development activities, as well as by the farmer's 
willingness to accept external agency instructions. 
Finally, he is supposed to be their closest friend and 
supporter. This means that a UM should be able to explain 
to the settlers what is expected of them in the programme 
at hand and what the benefits will be and to persuade 
them to participate accordingly. After being given a work 
task and a monthly salary, it is pimply assumed that UMs 
will perform their tasks as expected. With their 
confidence in the Unit Managjement System higher 
management officials believe that'settler administration 
at the field level is well geared to the development 
goals of the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme. 
dedication, commitment, responsibility and paternalism 
which it is assumed will result in high levels of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , social involvement and 
co-operation among settlers. 
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Practical Problems at the Level of Implementation 
However this process does not happen in practice because: 
a) The UM is committed to conceiving and organizing his 
field activities according to the demands and problems of 
settlers and yet, at the same time, also has to perform 
duties within the existing administrative system and is 
expected to further the interests of the external 
institutions. Thus he faces difficulties in dealing with 
the wide-ranging and flexible problems and demands of 
settlers within the rigid framework in which he is 
expected to function. This type of rigidity involves not 
only the clearance of formalities but also responding to 
outside instructions. 
b) Although the structure was established to include 
many layers of state bureaucrats, the required flow of 
government resources to the local level through this 
structure has been grossly inadequate. As a result, local 
officials have to re-adjust their activities and 
strategies to take account of the very poor external 
supply of resources and the high local demand for them. 
c) Local-level officials cannot keep within the policy 
framework of settlement development since their are many 
loopholes in the system of policy implementation and its 
supervision. 
d) The relationships between various social groups and 
local officials do not follow a uniform pattern. Under 
prevailing resource constraints, local-level officials 
cannot maintain a sufficient financial and social status 
to attract the affluent group of farmers; and some are 
compelled, or choose to develop an alliance with the poor 
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rather than with the better-off farmers. 
External Factors Influencing the Role and Attitude of 
Local Officials 
The UM's efficiency and performance is influenced by 
three basic factors:(a) the attitudes and expectations of 
his superiors; (b) his own domestic pressures; and (c) 
settlers' demands. The attitudes of the UMs' superiors 
also reflect on the use of power Within the bureaucratic 
structure. The state structure Cannot be viewed as a 
unitary mechanism operating in !accordance with some 
dominant class interests; rather its local-level 
operation is influenced by various specific factors, such 
as the social characteristics of the field officials, the 
nature of the socio-economic environment and the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of different localities, and the 
negotiating and resisting capabilities of farming 
households. One should not assume, therefore, that within 
the hierarchy of management, officials play a passive 
role, only carrying out the instructions of their 
supervisors. Unit managers are important intermediary 
actors between farmers and the Mahaweli Authority and 
organize their activities to suit different situations 
and changing circumstances. 
Theoretically the Mahaweli Settlement Authority at the 
Colombo Head Office level has! both the necessary 
political and statutory powers to: reward performance in 
support of the stated objectives of the Authority and to 
take punitive action against those who obstruct their 
achievement. But, in practice, these rules remain 
ineffective due to difficulties in making correct 
assessments of what is actually happening at local level. 
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Indeed, sometimes, the recording system is viewed by 
local officials as a corrupt system of political and 
personal favoritism which leads to the weakening of 
vertical links and relationships. However, there are 
several groups that can influence policy objectives and 
practice in Government-sponsored settlement schemes. 
These are institutionalized political and private sector 
interests which exert some degree of control over the 
inclusion or exclusion of specific items on the agenda 
for public action (Hulme, 1987). And it is the 
conflicting interests of these power groups that often 
influence various actors at the settlement unit level to 
react differently. 
Within this set-up, a Block Manager who supervises a 
number of UMs can demonstrate to his subordinates a 
considerable degree of, what they might consider, as the 
irrational and arbitrary application of power expressed 
in forms of social control. This has a demoralizing 
effect on UMs, making them either fearful of taking 
initiatives or frustrated. However the Settlement 
Authority is often unable to achieve its goals, or to 
detect the officials responsible for such failures, 
because it is faced with the more difficult task of 
establishing control over the entire bureaucracy, 
particularly the UMs and other officials at the field 
level. Thus resistance comes not only from the farmers 
but also from the bottom layer of the state structure 
itself. 
As the Unit Manager of U111 stated: 
"It is a matter of preparing the field environment 
(up-to-date field notebooks, required statistical 
and progress reports, and some hand-picked farmers 
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to provide information etc, ) in order to relate 
positively towards the randomly selected supervisory 
actions of the Block Manager. It may perhaps have 
nothing to do with our actual work in the field. It 
can be a highly exaggerated interpretation of the 
reality; or, it can even be a wrong opinion. Yet, 
whatever it may be, I must be very careful in my 
response to the BM's inquiries during progress 
meetings with the Mahaweli Authority" 
The UM, who is expected to conceive and organize the 
activities of his particular! settlement unit, is 
constantly under the constraints of his external supply 
agents or is subject to pressures and obligations due to 
the political patronage he has received. Some examples 
are as follows: 
According to the UM - U1, he was given instructions by 
the BM to take legal action against the encroachers of a 
land reserve in his settlement unit. He followed this 
order and removed five encroachers from the settlement. 
Since then environmentally important reservations of land 
could be protected. But after a few months there was a 
political decision to move 22 additional settler families 
into the settlement unit. The UM was reluctantly 
compelled to settle them in the land reserve. As a 
consequence, many settlers began to encroach areas 
reserved for forest plantation and canal improvement. 
They simply ignored the UM's instructions as well as the 
several regulations. 
According to the records of the uk-U11, all the UMs were 
requested to punish people who extracted timber from the 
settlement. Thus about 32 illegal timber extractors 
(until the end of 1986) had been arrested by the police. 
122 
However, under the permission of the local MP, some 
businessmen were allowed to cut timber in selected 
locations in the settlement unit. The ultimate result was 
that illegal timber extraction in the settlement had 
increased beyond control. The officials themselves were 
involved in this business. 
Under this push-pull set-up the UM has to be very agile 
in the performance of his duties. Theoretically, the 
unstinted co-operation of a BM and close working alliance 
with other UMs will not only help in solving inherent 
problems in the unit but also motivate and facilitate the 
efficient operation of the Unit Management System. But, 
in practice, quite the opposite can happen depending on 
the types of response and farmer resistance in the 
settlement units. In resolving his problems and disputes, 
the UM cannot impose authority or work according to 
formal instructions because the necessary resources for 
the implementation of his programme are hardly ever at 
his disposal. Therefore, a UM who is initially dedicated 
and loyal will reluctantly be compelled to take evasive 
action to avoid undue blame from his immediate superior, 
the BM. Due to various external factors and constraints, 
the number of problems actually solved by the UM is 
extremely low. The main reason for this is the very poor 
supply of resources by external institutions. Moreover 
internal quibbling and the different attitudes of BMs 
leads to the internalization of settlement unit level 
activities independently from those of the Block level 
and above. It would seem, therefore, that the functioning 
of the bottom layer of the state structure is more 
susceptible to influences from below rather than from 
above. 
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I n t e r n a l Circumstances Constraining the External 
Relations of Local Officials 
As I argued above, the state's attempt at incorporating 
local actors into the planned settlement programme often 
works against itself since its local agents are not 
sufficiently equipped with the material and financial 
resources to challenge the ways in which settlers 
c o o r d i n a t e their activities in their day-to-day 
situation. It is misleading, therefore, to speak of the 
logic of transformation not only because all conditions 
are able to be transformed, but also because of the 
alterations that are made by intermediary agents who 
develop strategies for keeping superiors away from the 
realities of farmer behaviour. 
The fact is that the system has never worked as it was 
conceived. There are breakdowns along the line and local 
officials have to face the consequences. However, they 
have found a way to survive. Paradoxically, all forms of 
dependence on external institutions introduced into the 
Mahaweli Settlement provide some access to local 
transactional processes with farmers. This enables local 
officials to influence to some dejgree. the activities of 
farmers, and in some cases to assist the poor farmers to 
reduce or eliminate such dependencies. It is in this 
respect that a careful study is required of the 
strategies developed by the actors of the bottom layer of 
the state structure and how successful they are. 
An important internal factor t h a t contributes to the 
effectiveness of a UM is his own domestic commitments 
through pecuniary involvement^. The socio-economic 
condition of the UM, particularly! his low pay, leads to 
financial pressures from the domestic front due to his 
124 
responsibility towards his kinfolk who are usually 
dependent on his earnings. Most of the UMs come from 
lower income groups with large families and the financial 
strain is evident in the performance of their duties. 
Therefore, their economic and social status itself is an 
obstacle to the development of relationships within the 
bureaucracy and with certain categories of farmer. 
Every UM is provided with a motorcycle, whose cost is 
deducted from his salary in monthly instalments. This, 
together with other loan deductions, such as those taken 
for his university education, make up about 25% of his 
monthly wage. The UM, therefore, receives approximately 
Rs.750/- to Rs.900/- net salary per month. If he is 
married and has children and/or other family dependants, 
then he cannot possibly exist on this wage. This leads 
him to seek other avenues of income to make up the family 
budget deficit. Such activities are invariably nefarious 
and indirectly related to his job, and may lead to bad 
management or the misuse of power for his personal gain. 
This situation contributes to a practical consciousness 
among farmers that motivates them to avoid being linked 
into the local settlement bureaucracy and to by-pass it 
whenever possible. At the same time, rich farmers come to 
realize that the UMs are not a privileged and resource-
rich group of state bureaucrats who could help them. 
Another administrative deficiency is the fixed monthly 
transport allowance of Rs.750/- for all UMs, without 
consideration of the actual travelling distances 
involved. For example, a UM who lives in close proximity 
to the Block Office and Main Development Centre may be 
content with this allowance of Rs.750/-, but not those 
who live farther away and who have to maintain constant 
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(Source: Block Office Records- Batalayaya). 
In addition to the above meetings and discussions, a UM 
should play the role of data collector for various 
purposes at the Project and Head Office level. In fact, 
he has to submit about 8 to 10 reports per month 
regarding the activities of his unit. Some of these 
reports have to be prepared on a regular basis such as 
the (a) Implementation Programme, (b) Extension Service 
Programme, (c) World Food Aid Distribution Records (d) 
Evaluation Reports, (e) Crop insurance Reports, (f) 
Credit Disbursement, (g) Sanitary Facilities, (h) Land 
Problems, (i) Health, (j) Population and (k) Yield and 
allowance quite inadequate for carrying out their 
workloads which are also likely to be far greater than 
that of a UM living at the main center. The end result is 
that the UMs work suffers, the reports filed are grossly 
incorrect, and this becomes a deterrent to the 
implementation of specific tasks, and also affects 
officially expected outcomes. The average number of 
occasions that each UM travelled to the Block Office and 
Main Office in 1985 were as follows: 
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Production. 
The MEA administration in Colombo and its officers 
responsible for the various aspects of settlement 
development insist that the UM meets his deadlines in 
submitting the reports which should enable them to 
formulate their own departmental tasks within the 
Ministry and the Mahaweli Authority. These reports are an 
absolute necessity to the Mahaweli Authority upper 
echelons since they allow them to put forward their own 
claims to various foreign agencies for funding of the 
Mahaweli Scheme. 
Though the submission of reports is considered a 
necessary evil, it is done at the cost of the UM's 
activities in the field, which, if neglected, create a 
derogatory and reluctant attitude among settlers. It is 
such a situation that various internal problems are 
likely to crop up involving resistance, conflict, and 
struggles between different local groups which the UM is 
obliged or committed to resolve. The UM in U11 gave his 
opinion on this problem which, though uttered in a light 
vein, has great relevance to the situation: 
"Our senior officers who hibernate in plush 
airconditioned offices in Colombo occasionally feel 
that the natural country air would be a welcome 
change. So they visit the settlement on a given date 
on the promise of "briefings". These "briefing" are 
time consuming and not applicable in any way to the 
settler as he is not literate enough to assimilate 
any part of the briefings forced on him via the UM. 
In this situation I feel that those "bushman's 
holidays" by the Head Office Superiors are highly 
detrimental to the settlement as the time used on 
127 
these briefings could have been used more gainfully 
on the settlement itself". 
Provision of irrigation water and land is the main 
objective of the Mahaweli Irrigation Project. But at the 
level of implementation these are scarce and divisible 
resources to which settlers are supposed to gain access 
through a bureaucratically- regulated process. The 
mechanism created is such that while access to water and 
irrigable land may be granted to some, such as the 
settlers in U1, it is at the same time denied to others 
in the periphery because of the impossibility of meeting 
their demands. This leads to a major defect in the supply 
of resources, and to the malfunctioning of the inner 
layer of the state structure where resistance by local 
l e v e l o f f i c i a l s takes the form of a lack of 
responsibility, initiative and dedication to the given 
tasks. This is also due to the fact that, despite 
discrepancies in the nature of work and in the types of 
problems that arise in each settlement unit, all UMs are 
equally paid and the criteria for promotion or handing 
out rewards are mostly based upon political and personal 
interests of higher-ups. 
According to UMs, field work and office work are two 
different tasks and sometimes contradictory. But they may 
use the existance of these two tasks to create room for 
manoeuvre. For example, when they are charged with 
unsatisfactory field work, their explanation is that they 
have too much office work; and when their reports are 
delayed, then their field notebooks will indicate that 
they have too much field work. 
This type of organizational dilemmas in the institutions 
set up by the government notj only minimizes the 
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effectiveness of local level brokers but also leads to a 
breakdown in the alliance between them and their 
superiors. Moreover the relations that develop between 
local officials and settler households are influenced by 
these conflicting relations between superiors and local 
officials. Understanding these organizational processes 
is important also for the way in which these 
circumstances influence farmers to organize themselves. 
Another discrepancy is the allocation and size of 
settlement units in respect to different UMs. While some 
units comprise less than 200 settlers, others cover as 
many as 300. This serves to emphasize that the greater 
the number of settler households the greater the problems 
relating to field canals, water inlets and volume of 
water available to a unit. Thus one defensive strategy 
used by UMs is to concentrate on the minor problems, 
while the major ones are left unattended. 
Within this complicated settlement situation there are 
different attitudes, values, and interests governing a 
UM's individual strategies in the settlement. The career 
of a UM, therefore, is not dependent on the salary he 
earns but on the ways he manages these different local 
processes. 
According to the experience of many UMs, they are 
uncertain about their future prospects. UM/U1 expressed 
his doubts concerning the future prospects of his 
occupation in the Mahaweli Scheme: 
"Funds of the Mahaweli Scheme are deteriorating-
foreign aid will be further reduced in time to come. 
Since the cost of operation and maintenance is very 
high, there can be further setbacks in the 
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facilities provided at the UM level. Therefore it is 
important to get the maximum out of the present 
opportunities and we should try as much as possible 
to gain whatever economic benefits are available". 
With this type of attitude some UMs take initiatives to 
manipulate intervention activitiesi directly in accordance 
with their own personal interests.! And such emotional and 
negative responses of UMs towards intervention models and 
ideologies have a considerable impact at the level of 
policy implementation. This shows itself as a strong 
local tendency which runs counter to the broader 
tendencies of development expected! by planners. Paramount 
amongst the attractions of statie-sponsored settlement 
from a bureaucratic stance is the [support that settlement 
initiatives provide for keeping the office going. They 
provide a means for the maintenance and often the 
expansion of the public services.' However, there is the 
constant threat that new bureaucratic sub-empires, built 
with large amounts of foreign assistance, will not 
survive and that the activities of the Mahaweli Project 
in the future will be more limited. Hence, in order to 
eliminate job insecurity, a new concept of settlement 
development was proposed by one UMi who argued that: 
"It may be useful for the UM|s to keep up a certain 
level of social conflict at the unit level in order 
to create a situation more favorable for the UMs' 
own survival. If the farmers are kept away from 
programme implementation theiR incapabilities can be 
proved. Then the service of the UMs will be needed 
further for the reorganization of activities of the 
settlement unit". 
Thus the UM creates the self-fulfilling prophecy that he 
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is indeed essential to the successful operation of the 
settlement programme. On the other hand, his job becomes 
redundant if his settlers do not accept his work. It is 
interesting in this context to note how UMs distinguish 
between so-called "fortunate" and "unfortunate" postings 
or appointments. According to them, attitudes towards 
these two categories and the circumstances they entail 
can be depicted as follows:" 
Fortunate" Category 
1. Service as an UM will be started in a new settlement 
unit which involves preliminary work. At this stage 
new settlers have to depend heavily on the UM for 
basic assistance in settling and making a living, 
and the UM's function is that of a good social 
worker who distributes free inputs, materials, 
financial assistance, health and housing services. 
He helps and guides the new settlers and thus 
becomes very popular among them. 
2. He can engage himself in other income-earning 
ventures that are readily available such as canal 
and road construction, transport service, and the 
timber business. 
3. The pressure from above is minimum if the UM works 
under an active and friendly Block Manager. 
4. It is advantageous to shift to another unit before 
the first delivery of water. The unit he takes over 
should be located at the top end of the canal 
structure, so that he can escape from water disputes 
and irrigation problems. 
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During the dry season, cultivation can be continued 
without irrigation water problems. Thus farming is 
possible throughout the whole' year. 
Farmers in the unit are efficient and obedient and 
management is easy. 
7. It is better to be located closer to main roads and 
the Block Office. 
One should produce impressi 
progress reports about family 
vfe production data and 
farming in the unit. 
"Unfortunate" Category 
1 . Service will be started from a unit where first 
delivery of irrigation water for cultivation is 
taking place. Numerous problems relating to water 
distribution, land levelling, and canal defects will 
be brought to him by settlers who expect the UM to 
solve them immediately. He is unable to solve 
irrigation problems and the! resultant criticisms 
from the settlers makes him unpopular. 
2. Settlers are always after the UM to get their water 
and land problems solved. Therefore no time is 
available for private work and additional income 
sources are limited within th£ unit area. 
3. If one works under an inefficient and despotic Block 
Manager, who often blames, tjie UM's one's capacity 
to solve problems at the unitj level is limited, and 
so there are pressures from bcjith ends. 
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4. If there are no possibilities of changing the unit 
or taking over a unit at the tail-end, the same 
problems and conflicts concerning water management 
continue. 
5. During the dry season water distribution becomes a 
serious problem. Social conflict and water disputes 
increase with detrimental consequences for farmers. 
6. Farmers are not efficient and do not follow the UM's 
orders, but complain against him to the higher 
authorities. 
7. The location is far away from main roads and the 
Block Office, and so transportation is difficult. 
8. Finally, with bad records of farming and production 
and increased conflict within the unit one becomes 
an "unfortunate" UM. 
The above categorization, based on the opinions of UMs, 
illustrates two extreme situations in which a UM becomes 
trapped in the process of field-level interactions. 
Disappointment can curtail the activities of a UM in a 
divisive unit and can also affect his attitudes towards 
his job prospects. Initially, at the commencement of his 
career, the young UM is like the proverbial 'new broom' 
that sweeps clean. All the work assigned to him at this 
experimental or probationary period is undertaken and 
executed with gusto by the unmarried UM. Problems at 
grassroots are sorted out and solutions attempted, since 
at this stage he looks to himself and is not yet fully 
aware of the limitations of the administrative machinery. 
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In fact a new UM is often misled about the smooth 
operation of top-down intervention promoted by policy 
makers and top-level bureaucrats of the Mahaweli 
Authority who give simplified 'briefings' on policy 
objectives and implementation strategy. For example, they 
paint a picture that settler families, settlement units, 
and blocks are generally homogeneous with equal resource 
endowments for settlers. Thus the ijnanagement capabilities 
required and the nature of the problems to be managed are 
uniform. However, when the UM meljlows with his job, he 
begins to appreciate the daily bottlenecks and has to 
circumvent their socio-economic ramifications. Observing 
their seniors, or through theit own trial-and-error 
methods, they begin to slacken their momentum and choose 
the m o s t s u i t a b l e t a c t i c of m a n i p u l a t i n g the 
administrative machinery to suit their personal ends, 
thereby off-setting management difficulties and economic 
losses. Disappointments of unit management at a later 
stage of job experience influences the UM to incorporate 
new thinking into his organizational strategy. Some 
features of this thinking are as follows: 
a) Tasks oriented to hard work without recognition and 
without resources do not bring job satisfaction. 
b) It is easier to be the working partner of superiors 
according to their interests and , to leave the settlers 
with their own problems and way of\living. 
c) Concentrating on solving thej shortcomings of the 
infrastructure is time consuming,! which time could be 
spent on more gainful personal enterprise. 
d) Maintaining silence is a better} solution for settling 
problems than raising a hornets' nest about them. 
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Table 11 . Extra Sources of Income for the UMs: order of 
priority 
Activity UM 1 UM 11 UM 111 
Building and canal 
construction business 1 1 2 
Leasing farmers 1 land 0 3 1 
Marketing of farm products 3 4 0 
Hiring out of tractors and 
other implements 2 0 0 
Money lending 4 2 3 
Trading (including timber) 0 0 4 
Others 0 5 5 
Key: a) 0 = not applicable 
b) The numbers are according to the priority given 
by each U.M. 
c) Activities are carried out under pseudonyms 
d) Corruption, illegal business, and commission are 
not included. 
e) In a settlement unit, most of the household 
requirements of a U.M. are provided by the 
settlers. This includes the supply of free labour, 
vegetables, fruits, grains and other gifts (for 
more detail, see the next part of this 
chapter). 
(Own Survey, Maha(Wet) Season, 1985). 
At this phase the UM looks for a suitable marriage 
partner; and, if he is already married, for extra income 
for tending infants, building a new house and purchasing 
Table 11 illustrates the types of additional income-
earning activities of the three UMs showing their 
priorities: 
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Table 12. Reasons for Additional Earnings of the UMs 
UM 1 UM 11 UM 1 1 1 
1. Economic crisis in the 
family and lack of income no yes yes 
2. To gain future economic 
security yes no no 
3. Job insecurity and 
frustration yes yes no 
4. To maintain a high social 
status yes yes yes 
5. For children's education 
in reputable schools yes no yes 
6. If many others are involved 
why shouldn't we? no yes yes 
Source: Own survey, 1985 Maha(wet) season. 
Intentions and Strategies of UMs as Intermediary Actors 
A l t h o u g h Unit Managers play a leading role as 
intermediary actors in the settlement units their 
experience has not been given sufficient attention in 
existing settlement studies. However, their role in the 
consumer durables. And so he comes to feel that his time 
is better spent in this way than in trying to eradicate 
o f f i c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d g r a s s r o o t s p r o b l e m s for 
agricultural development. 
There were many reasons given by the UMs for their 
involvement in additional income-earning activities. 
These reasons are shown in the following table: 
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process of distributing project resources, goods and 
services as well as in regulating and withdrawing such 
resources or penalizing certain farmers, is crucial for 
understanding the differential responses to state 
intervention. Diversity in the operation of an apparently 
uniform state structure takes place at this very 
important interface between implementors and their 
peasant 'clients'. Moreover since state policy on 
Mahaweli family farm settlement hardly supports or allows 
members of the locally-dominant class to establish 
capitalist forms of production in accordance with their 
own interests, it is only through a coalition with local-
level bureaucrats that they can maintain their economic 
and social status. One might assume, therefore, that UMs 
would become a powerful social group capable of 
manipulating public resources in favour of the dominant 
class. However, in reality the UMs represent an 
intermediary structure which operates within the 
constraints of the farmer-state structure. Hence it is 
important to recognize the various limitations placed on 
them in adopting bourgeois behaviour and alliances. What, 
then, is exactly the status of UMs in local social groups 
and the class structure? Can they actively maintain a 
dominant class coalition in the process of family farm 
settlement development? What strategies do they adopt 
internally for their own survival in the settlement 
units? 
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to 
open a window on the reality of social life of UMs (local 
o f f i c i a l s ) and observe how they process social 
experience. Once UMs are settled among farmers as 
external agents of local field stations, intervening 
agencies expect a robot-type of behaviour from them in 
order to develop more unitary discursive means for 
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decision making. But, in reality, UMs cannot play such 
role when their local field stations are surrounded by 
farmers and everyday encounters and types of discourse 
based upon the problems of survival. Their activities and 
objectives are influenced and affected by human and 
social contacts and events. Therefore UMs' behaviour, 
evaluations and interpretations : of social life are 
dependent upon their social locatibn and social practice. 
The Significance of Social Factors Influencing UMs' 
Lifeworlds 
During discussions with the UMs an attempt was made to 
record their answers to questions of this kind. On the 
basis of in-depth, informal discussions, I came to 
appreciate UMs' perceptions and explanations on what they 
call "their internal world" ("apfe abyanthara lokaya"). 
Indeed they had their own opinions on almost every issue 
of settlement development. Among ithese, explanations of 
the settler-UM relationship were the most revealing. As 
an implementor of policies, the UM often explains this 
relationship in terms of an unavoidable set of measures 
taken in the settlement under changing internal and 
external circumstances. UMs argue from their own 
practical experience. The local situation they face is 
not conducive either for favouring better-off farmers in 
the allocation of project resources, or for manipulating 
resources in such a way that poorjfarmers gradually lose 
their means of production. 
The three UMs who were closely associated with me during 
the field research had their Own understandings of 
general political and social problems. They had each been 
involved in various struggles during their university 
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life, and two of them came from to poor peasant families. 
According to UM-U11, Mr. Jayasena, the seven members of 
his natal family had only one acre of agricultural land 
between them to provide for a living: 
"During my university education my parents had a 
very difficult time. My father had to pawn all the 
jewellery of my mother and sister to pay for my 
education. It is true that the free education policy 
of the government made it possible for me to enter 
the university, but my basic living expenses were 
the problem. During this period I gained much 
experience from the difficulties of my own family. 
They doubled their labour input on sources of income 
and worked hard to keep my education going. At that 
time they had the capability of managing any 
difficulty that arose and sacrificed any aspect of 
their household living. When I went home during the 
university vacations they always behaved quite 
normally, although they suffered a lot." 
According to him, this experience was important because 
when he came to the Mahaweli Settlement after university 
he felt that he was living again in his own family 
environment and this had a great influence on his work 
with the farmers. In 1 9 72, the Government took over the 
excess lands of several landlords in his village 
(Kandeketiya, a village in the Central Province) under 
the new Land Reform Act and allocated to this landless 
people. His family also received a small plot of land 
(one acre) under the Village Expansion Programme. (Before 
this his family lived as landless tenant farmers). Since 
then the landlord, who had owned the land before the Land 
Reform, has not been on good terms with Jayasena's 
family. Another problem was that the landlord's children 
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had failed to educate themselves well, whereas Jayasena 
from a poor family had entered ! the university. As a 
result, the landlord often blamied the Government for 
implementing the policy of free education, which thus 
benefitted the poor stratum of the country. And he 
followed this by spending a large amount of his money on 
politics, especially in order to work against the 
government in power. 
In 1977, a new political party supported by this landlord 
came to power and one of his friends became the local 
Member of the Parliament. Although the landlord expected 
various types of political s u p p o r t to help him improve 
his economic condition through acquiring more and more 
land, the new government had to ' give priority to more 
serious political issues, such as unemployment and 
landlessness, in order to ensure a degree of political 
stability. The Accelerated Mahaweli Programme was in fact 
at that time a major undertaking of this new government. 
In 1979, Jayasena received his final degree and sought a 
job simply to uplift his poor family. He applied for the 
UM's post advertised by the Mahaweli Authority, which he 
obtained in 1980. 
Prom discussions with Mr. Jayasena about his background, 
an important dimension emerged. 
The introduction of electoral and party politics, in a 
country where marginal and landless peasants constitute 
an important segment of the electorate, has often led 
incoming governments to emphasize rural development 
programmes. As the UM pointed oht, Sri Lanka's party 
politics was such that every party had to compete with 
one another to attract voters in their lower income 
groups. This was done by making various welfare-oriented 
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and political promises. There was strong pressure on new 
governments to formulate policies oriented to the welfare 
of the poor rather than the benefit of the dominant 
class. It was also necessary for them to maintain a 
greater degree of autonomy in order to work effectively 
with problems such as rural unrest, political instability 
etc, because in the end governments are accountable to a 
broad base and not to the particularistic interests of 
any particular group or set of individuals, however 
powerful. 
Once development programmes have been formulated to deal 
with problems like landlessness, unemployment etc, then 
the dominant class may find it difficult to transfer 
sufficient resources in favour of their own mercantilist 
interests. Furthermore, instead of avoiding radical 
structural reform, the state will be obliged to organize 
a range of public sector activities which would be 
intended to stabilize the economic security of marginal 
farmers. This includes providing subsidies, land 
development and resettlement, agricultural extension, 
infrastructural inputs, education, and health which cater 
for a broad electorate rather than satisfying the 
interests of a so-called dominant class. 
When Mr. Jayasena accepted his job as a UM in System ' C , 
one senior UM in the area advised him to organize his 
working environment as follows: 
"The higher officials of the Mahaweli Authority will 
ask for various reports but if you really want to 
work for the farmers: 
* Do not waste your time in the field collecting 
genuine information for the preparation of reports. 
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* If you please your boss that means you only have a 
temporary advantage since your superior can use 
frustrated farmers' complaints as a weapon against 
you whenever he wants to control your operations. 
Therefore, you should maintain sufficient freedom to 
work as you want to work" 
Although Mr. Jayasena was scared to follow this senior 
UM's instructions, he was able to guess what these 
conflicting interests were betwee4 local-level officials 
and external institutions. Howeve::, he was particularly 
interested in working for the settlers and becoming a 
popular UM among the farmers. This was mainly for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, he had his own family experience from which he 
* Delay the reports until the final reminder and 
then prepare them with estimated figures in order to 
suit the interests of the Head Office. 
* The Block Manager will give; various orders but you 
should not follow all of them and always argue with 
the facts and figures from the field that are 
unknown to your superiors. 
* If you please farmers that means you will have 
more power to safeguard yourself for a long period, 
since any punishment by superiors will not be 
possible if the farmers support you when inquiries 
are made. According to the (democratic constitution 
and labour regulations, the state can dismiss you 
only by using the law and not simply through 
coercion. 
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learned the difficulties of poor farming households. 
Secondly, during his university life many student friends 
were radicals and he himself participated in many 
struggles of the poor. These experiences were also a 
factor influencing him to work for the benefit of the 
poorer settlers. 
During the UM's training programme, the various UMs came 
to know each other. Except for a few, most them came from 
the lower stratum of society with similar experiences. At 
the end of their training, several points had been 
emphasized both by the political authorities and by the 
Executives of the Mahaweli Authority. Jayasena understood 
some of these as follows: 
* You should work as a member of the settlement 
families and always live with them as their village 
representative. 
* You will be given full freedom to work in your 
settlement unit. 
* You should treat all the settlement families 
equally and ensure equal distribution of project 
resources. The regulations regarding resource 
allocation to families are laid down in the Mahaweli 
Settlement Strategy. 
* You are responsible for the implementation of the 
Mahaweli Programme as expected by the government. 
* You should tackle village-level conflicts 
effectively and make sure that all settler families 
reach the expected egalitarian status. 
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8. Went for the next monthly m e e t i n g . 
A special meeting with Head Offic^ 
personnel. Internal problems, postponed. 28 
Soon after he took over the settlement unit, the settlers 
assailed him with many problems and complaints. He 
thought that it was his responsibility to help them. 
T h e r e f o r e , he immediately prepared a report on 
irrigation, land and agricultural problems in the 
settlement unit. According to the instructions given him, 
the report was submitted to the Block Office for the 
allocation of funds, machinery, materials and manpower 
for the necessary repairs. The time spent, procedures 
followed and what the UM finally achieved, can be 
summarized as follows: 
Action and Response Deration - No .of Davs 
1. Submitted the report to the BM 
before the Maha season, 1985. 
No response 3 
2. Went to the BM to insist that he 
grants approval. The BM referred it 
to the Irrigation Engineer(IE). 
Poor cooperation. 2 
3. The report was submitted to No response. 6 
IE and a meeting was held. 
4. A discussion with the IE. 
A date fixed for inspection. 2 
5. Two visits to IE's office 
to remind him about the papaer. 
Promissed to forward the report to the 
Project Office for the approval of funds. 5 
6. Went to the Project Office for discussion. 
Suggested that he wait until the next 
monthly meeting. 14 
7. Went for the Project meeting. i 
Tight agenda. No time for discussion. 
Meeting postponed. 30 
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9. Went for the next meeting. A special 
request was made to the R.P.M to take up 
the paper. The matter was taken up. 
Due to urgent allocation of funds for 
the new are development, action on 
the unit's problems was postponed. The 
paper was turned down. 3 
10. Came back to the settlement unit. 
UM had failed to take intervention initiative 
He can no longer impose authority. To avoid 
this difficult situation in his unit he decided 
to work according to the interests of the farmers. 
Total number of days - 93 
He had realized the difficulty of working with external 
counterparts who are ineffective and unreliable. 
According to the UM, it was not possible for him to 
implement policies in a way consonant with the broader 
goals of the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme and at the same 
time to ensure that he represented the demands of the 
local people because there existed a basic contradiction 
between the farmers and external agencies. Although the 
UM was supposed to act as the state's agent, he decided 
to work according to the interests of the farmers, either 
violating or altering certain regulations. This was 
necessary since he had to live with the farmers on a day-
to-day basis. 
Lack of funds, inputs, and irrigation water had damaged 
his reputation and his career as a UM, though, of course 
the resource constraints were not of his own making. Most 
farmers, particularly the better-off ones, thought that 
he was a powerless person who did not have sufficient 
clout to allocate resources independently. Therefore, the 
wealthier group found it useless to make an alliance with 
him. 
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In order to establish an alliance with the better-off 
settlers, the UM must be able to maintain the state-
directed external patronage system by acting as a 
'gatekeeper' to public resources so that they flow into 
the s e t t l e m e n t . But, w i t h the a b o v e type of 
organizational incompetence, the centralized delivery 
system of public resources and services could not be 
operated as efficiently as expected. However, this 
failure did not lead to a collapse of the system. 
Instead, this weakness itself became a resource available 
to the UMs for maintaining relative autonomy at the local 
level and for transforming policies in the process of 
implementation. UMs are aware that, for their own 
survival as government officials, they should avoid the 
temptation of breaking their links with the farmers. 
Furthermore, UMs receive pressure from the settler 
community itself to work according to laid-down 
procedures of the Mahweli Authority; and to ensure equal 
distribution of inputs and services, especially as 
resources are limited. A well-off farmer, on the other 
hand, realizes the uncertainties and risks involved in 
his informal relation with officials for obtaining 
resources by illegal means, given the struggle by the 
large number of farmers for scare resources. Hence the 
proprietorship of small plots by farming families and 
their right to struggle for equal distribution of project 
r e s o u r c e s b e c o m e s an o b s t a c l e to c a p i t a l i s t 
transformation in Mahaweli Settlemsnt. 
Operational control of settlers' lands in the form of 
leasing and renting has its physical and legal limits 
s i n c e large-scale operations | undertaken by rich 
entrepreneurs reflect badly on the whole concept of the 
Mahaweli Settlement Strategy. Under these circumstances, 
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better-off farmers could not go beyond a certain limit, 
since the political ideology behind Mahaweli settlement 
is not favorable to their interests. Therefore, rather 
than making an alliance directly with the UM, it was 
necessary for them to develop good relationships (based 
on patron-client relations) with the poorer farmers if 
they wanted to control larger operational holdings under 
various tenancy arrangements. 
As the UM stated: 
" It was very difficult for me to live in the 
settlement unit when farmers regularly came with so 
many problems. I often failed to obtain the 
necessary inputs and services at the correct time to 
manage these problems effectively. Finally the 
circumstances were such that I was compelled to 
formulate my own programme in order to satisfy 
settlers and avoid conflicts. For example, when 
technical defects in the canals obstructed water 
distribution and I was unable to repair them 
immediately, the farmers simply cut the distributory 
canals and took water, which I had to allow if they 
were to survive. Also when farmers wanted to 
cultivate their own crops with limited irrigation 
water I had to allow them since I am unable to 
provide sufficient water for the cultivation of HTV 
of paddy according to the official farming system. 
Our living environment is surrounded by farm 
families, their human and social struggles for 
survival, as well as by unavoidable moral bonds. 
This is our "internal world" in which our 
involvement may even become counter-productive 
depending on the particular local situations we are 
confronted with." 
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According to him, he had to depend heavily on external 
agencies for the approval and clearance of formalities 
that are required for the supply of funds, inputs and 
services from the center to the local level. Therefore, 
he was constrained from channelling resources in favour 
of particular interest groups, since supplies were seldom 
timely and could not be planned) well in advance, nor 
could external agencies be relied! upon for delivery. Of 
course, he had some power to changje the flow of resources 
at local-level. But the UM was forced to negotiate with 
settler groups in order to avoid conflict. Such conflicts 
are often used to evaluate the career of a UM. Therefore, 
in the type of internal world in which this UM worked 
there were very limited possibilities available for an 
alliance with the rich. This does not, of course, mean 
that rich farmer-UM relationships do not exist. As the UM 
stated: 
" We have to maintain a good relationship with the 
progressive farmers. Sometimes we help them within 
our limitations. We do so mainly for our own 
personal requirements. For example, we have to use 
these progressive farmers as "show pieces" when the 
supervisors or World Bank officials come to visit 
our settlement units. We also use better-off farmers 
to generalize the progress we are making during the 
evaluation meetings. Sometimes these farmers help us 
personally by providing our families with farm 
products free or at a low] price. But it is a 
friendly relationship and dot a coalition to do 
anything else" . 
According to the UM, when resources such as funds, 
inputs, irrigation water etc, are especially scarce, 
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a) He remains silent at Block level meetings and tries to 
their distribution has to be done strictly according to 
the procedures dictated by the Project Office. This 
implies a greater limitation on personal control over 
available resources. In the words of the UM : 
"When we deliver World Food Aid or any other 
material assistance there may be possibilities to 
reserve a small part of it for our own family use. 
But on many occasions it was patron-client 
relationships between poor farmers and traders which 
were more important for transferring resources from 
the poor to the rich. Secondly, farmers are cleverer 
than we thought. They know exactly what is 
happening, how much they are entitled to and keep 
watch over the movements of the officials. 
Therefore, we could not use our discretion to make 
changes in the flow of such resources. If we go 
beyond our limit, settlers spread rumours that we 
are corrupt and they also send petitions to the 
higher authorities". 
In general, then, UMs resort to evasive methods in order 
to avoid settler problems that are beyond their scope and 
which leave the settlers disgruntled and dissatisfied. 
Hence the UM avoids taking internal problems to his 
superiors who will not really comprehend the problems and 
their gravity, but will instead lay the blame on the U.M. 
himself and make him feel that he is responsible for the 
situation. 
Even when the UM's presence in the Block Office is 
essential, his self-effacing behaviour follows a set 
pattern. 
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* Theoretically, the settlement structure had been 
designed to maintain a "top - downward" control and 
supervision of the policy implementation process and 
avoid communication so that he can keep his internal 
world more or less independent from links with external 
agents and institutions. 
b) In his response to his superior's questions, he tries 
to create confusion about the actual situation at 
grassroots level, so that direct action against him will 
be difficult. 
c) He misdirects his superiors by distorting the 
situation. 
d) He adopts a strategy of self-defence. 
This situation illustrates how the planned strategies of 
settlement development are continuously modified or 
altered at the level of implementation. From the bottom-
up this structure is heterogeneous in its class nature. 
The Unit Management System therefore reflects a complex 
overlapping and interpenetration o f economic, political, 
administrative and cultural agencies, relations and 
interests, and a characteristic combination of formal and 
informal, official and unofficial, public and private, 
and legal and illegal activities. 
Several implications may be noted from the above account 
of the strategies adopted by the local-level officials. 
* The bottom layer of the state structure, which 
consists of UMs and settlers, does not function the 
same way as its top layers do!. 
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a ' b o t t o m - u p w a r d ' d e p e n d e n c y on e x t e r n a l 
institutions. But, in reality, the top management of 
the Mahaweli Authority depends heavily on the field 
staff for the organization of the activities of 
their respective departments. 
* The state structure cannot be treated as a unitary 
one since it consists of multiple interests and 
organizations. Since many different social interests 
are represented in the state structure, which 
directly or indirectly shape the actions of state 
policies, the latter cannot simply be derivative of 
either class relationships and struggle, or the 
logic of capital accumulation (Long, 1988:6). 
* Although policies and models of settlement 
development are formulated and processed at the 
Colombo Head Office of the Mahaweli Authority, they 
are severely affected by organizational constraints 
at the level of implementation. General procedures 
and models of settlement development may be a 
product of foreign and local experts' knowledge. But 
when these models and policies are handed over to 
the UMs, the latter usually make their own 
modifications and alterations, depending on the 
practical situation at grassroots level and on the 
nature of the specific problems they face. 
Therefore it is not "experts knowledge" of development 
models that actually works at the field level but the 
UMs' own knowledge and experience which emerge out of 
micro-level economic, social and political factors. The 
day-to-day struggle of UMs with their own problems is 
dominated by the pragmatic motive, that is their everyday 
life is essentially oriented towards solving practical 
151 
problems. One sort of practical knowledge which is 
limited to pragmatic competence is routine performance. 
This occupies a prominent place in the stock of knowledge 
these individuals process (Arce and Long, 1986:10). 
Although local officials are identified as monthly wage-
earning development bureaucrats, they cannot simply be 
separated from local processes i and on-going social 
constructions. With their rural backgrounds (most of them 
are from rural farm families) and life experience they 
are close to the reality of social life in the Mahaweli 
settlement. Thus their work styles and career patterns 
become a part of local processes where local actors 
attempt to give social meaning to ordinary events and 
situations. Hence they represent the ongoing social 
processes rather than the Mahaweli "project". Since they 
are compelled to get involved in local human interactions 
they cannot simply escape from the social justifications 
of the communicative order. Thereifore when behaviour of 
local officials is analyzed from the inside and from an 
emic standpoint one can understand how they become 
important actors at the intermediary level. 
It is also equally important to study how the farmers 
attempt to manage this complex organizational set-up 
where market-oriented cash-crop farming is imposed on 
them. The next chapter analyses farmer behaviour, 
resistance and the struggles taking place in response to 
the official programme of agricultural development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SETTLER REACTION. RESISTANCE AND STRATEGIES 
Family farmers in Mahaweli settlements are heavily 
controlled and supervised by a large number of officials 
with strategic intentions aimed at changing farming 
practices towards a modern-input technology based upon 
cash-crop production. Farmers have limited possibilities 
for making their own decisions concerning agricultural 
production and the distribution of resources. Yet, 
although there is very limited room for manoeuvre, these 
farmers do resist, negotiate and struggle in a variety of 
ways. They study the behaviour of intervening parties, 
identify their weaknesses and generate their own 
battlegrounds for confrontation with them. In doing, so, 
they reshape the so-called controlled programme of 
planned intervention. This reshaping process generates 
common ground upon which to press their demands. Some 
farmers "internalize" external intervention through 
influencing officials to re-adjust intervention practices 
in accordance with farmers' programmes of action. Thus 
they respond in several ways and their actions contribute 
to the ongoing political and social struggle, although it 
is difficult to predict the particular pattern that these 
strategies will take or the ways in which they will be 
applied by farmers, individually or collectively. 
The following sections explain the different farmer 
strategies according to the specific problems they face. 
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One UM expressed his rationale and thinking towards 
Mahaweli settlement development as follows: 
Farmers in settlement unit UI try to create the necessary 
space for their actions through direct face-to-face 
confrontation with local officials and in this way they 
block intervention practices and force officials to 
negotiate with them. Farmers in UII are involved in a 
struggle for irrigation water. The incompetence and 
i n a b i l i t y of o f f i c i a l s to c a r r y o u t t h e i r 
responsibilities for irrigation water distribution, 
create space for farmer strategies. Farmers are thereby 
able to question the meaning of the rules and procedures 
and in this way influence actual practice. The so-called 
"backward" settlers in UIII also develop their own 
strategies, but these are based oil feigned incompetence, 
aimed at diffusing attempts to impose change from above. 
As detailed in the previous chapter, local-level 
officials and farmers struggle to ejemarcate their domains 
and to identify the value and meaning of their encounters 
under diversified patterns of family farming. The 
pressure on them varies depending! on the nature of the 
operational problems emerging at different levels of the 
organizational structure. This chapter focuses on the 
strategic actions adopted by settlers in response to the 
agricultural tasks imposed upon them by officials. 
Although the Unit Manager (UM) plays a subordinate role 
among his superior officers, he must maintain some 
authority among settlers as a liaison officer. The 
activities of state agents, however, cannot be confined 
strictly to their formal responsibilities. They have to 
act multifariously according to 'their own interests, 
which often run contradictory to the project ideals of 
equity and participation. 
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"Mahaweli settlers are not equal. There cannot be 
common problems and common goals to achieve. No 
collective struggles take place. Their different 
b e h a v i o u r c r e a t e s s e r i o u s difficulties for 
administrators, since there is no method on for 
dealing with different types of farmers. Organized 
action from settlers will not be allowed by a wise 
administration. Secondly, if all the Mahaweli 
Settlers can improve their living standards to the 
level of self support, and if all of them are 
equally capable of self management, the importance 
of the UMs in the settlement units decreases and 
there will be job insecurity among grassroots 
administrators. A wise Unit Manager will not allow 
such a situation to arise". 
This type of attitude by implementors indicates the 
uncertainty and unreliability of planning practice during 
the implementation stage of the Mahaweli Settlement 
Scheme. 
Rational models of policy and planning procedures have 
much to recommend them. Their internal logic is 
consistent; they provide a means for defining the roles, 
activities and contributions of various individuals and 
agencies, and they facilitate the programming of events, 
funds and materials. However, when the actual experience 
of land settlement schemes is analyzed, we discover that 
these formal models have generally not in fact been 
followed (Hulme, 1987; Dunham, 1983). This means that 
settlement approaches based upon equity, as documented in 
feasibility reports, create a particular image of 
participation ideals, but in reality state agents cannot 
translate these ideals into practice, not only because of 
1 55 
the demographic, cultural, economic and educational 
disparities that exist among settlement families but also 
because of the contradictions that we find between stated 
goals and the personal interests of management officials. 
However, this does not mean that the ideals of equity and 
participation are ignored by settlement staff. In fact, 
they are used not merely as concepts but as weapons in 
the process of bargaining with the settlers over 
distribution of resources at f i e 4 d level. For example, 
when some settlers explain their cultivation problems, an 
equity-based judgement is usually mentioned. A water 
controller (Field Assistant) explained this as follows: 
"Every farmer is given an equal size of land, an 
equal amount of irrigation waiter services and other 
facilities. All the settlers |are equally treated by 
the management officials, and if some farmers can 
use these resources efficiently without problems, 
why cannot others do the same? The failures of some 
farmers can be attributed to their own negligence 
and backwardness. It is the inefficient farmers who 
raise problems while efficient farmers cultivate. 
Administrators should take severe action against 
those inefficient farmers". 
However, settlers have somewhat different opinions about 
the same problems, emphasizing that family farm 
settlement gives them the right of equal access to 
project resources. According to one settler: 
"When we were re-settling the Minister of Mahaweli 
Development told us that it was government policy 
that we receive an equal amount of project 
r e s o u r c e s , (such as water, credit, inputs, 
subsidies, health etc.). Therefore if any farmer 
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gets anything more than I get, I have the right to 
ask for the same amount. The officials should do 
it". 
Hence, they often blame the bureaucrats for the unequal 
distribution of resources. According to them, officials 
are corrupt and support only their favorite groups. 
Officials who regularly interact with the farmers have 
the status of 'Unit Managers', with some formal power to 
achieve assigned tasks. According to farmers, UMs usually 
do not like to be saddled with problems, although they 
like settlers to display some incompetence so that they 
can then assume an active role advising them. UMs believe 
that the distribution of resources cannot be handed over 
to settlers because of their low education, lack of co-
operation and organizational incapacity. This view is, of 
course, grossly incorrect. UMs' argue that, though some 
settlers are powerful, the majority are weak and the UM 
m u s t therefore take responsibility for resource 
allocation among settlers in order to look after the 
weaker groups and to infuse confidence in them. 
In this type of situation, the UM's intention is not to 
motivate settlers to participate in the activities 
decided by the settlers, but to use statutory powers to 
induce them to participate in the agricultural tasks 
organized by the officials. In order to maintain 
administrative status and power, the UM does not 
encourage farmer organizations to take over his 
responsibilities completely. The task of the UM is to 
organize farmers for better water management, input 
application and modern farming practice. Farmers' 
reactions to these interventions are based upon their own 
individual experiences which are not necessarily 
157 
the water management 
ents of the officials 
of the farmers. The 
conducive to collective or organized froms of response. 
These then, are some of the reason^ for the non-existence 
of so-called "efficient" settler! organizations in the 
settlement, even though in offcial ideology settler 
participation is considered an 1 essential factor for 
efficient water management and uniform family farm 
evelopment in the Mahaweli. 
Although an attempt was made mor£ recently to organize 
farmers into Turnout Groups for Vater management, this 
exercise appears to have been f r u s t r a t e d , mainly because 
UMs perceived such a solution as artificially imposed. 
According to the observations of management officials (as 
documented in the minutes of the follow-up programme 
meetings of the Turnout Groups), the Turnout Groups did 
not function satisfactorily from their inception, even 
though the programme was implemented with heavily-funded 
foreign expertise and regular supervision by management 
staff. Some of the problems identified were as follows: 
a) Farmers (there are about 15 farmers in one turnout 
area) belonging to a Turnout should select a Turnout 
Leader. However, these leaders were selected under 
the influence of officials and did not necessarily 
represent the farmers of the entire turnout. They 
were then supposed to undertake responsibilities 
according to the UMs' instructions with the result 
that they were forced to manage irrigation water 
according to the interests o 
officials. Thus they were ag 
and not the representatives 
majority of them were from the head reaches of the 
field canal, where irrigation water problems were 
insignificant. The information taken by the Turnout 
Leaders to the farmers in the Turnout Group was not 
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accepted by the farmers, primarily because they 
regarded them as no longer working in the interests 
of farmers. 
b) The relationship of Turnout Leaders to settlers was 
conflictive, because they became caught in the 
crossfire between field officials and farmers. 
c) The Turnout Leader-official relationship became 
personalized and settler representation was thereby 
minimized. 
d) Turnout Leaders were 'hand picked' supporters of the 
UM and did not therefore win the co-operation of 
farmers; instead such leaders often acted to 
sabotage the very objectives of the Turnout Group 
Programme. 
Despite all these weaknesses, the UMs were willing to use 
the Turnout system to approach settlers through Turnout 
Leaders, without making any effort to build village or 
hamlet level settler organizations. All attempts at 
"social promotion" and at gradually "creating" a class of 
enlightened and responsible farmers failed. The official 
government image of farmer participation was that Turnout 
Groups would become a class of farmers who would 
u n d e r s t a n d the b e n e f i t s and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of 
agricultural development, manage their own affairs and 
contribute to the development effort. 
One reason for the failure of Turnout Groups was that the 
officials did not have much interest in understanding the 
transactional characteristics of farmers' relationships, 
nor social foundations for local participation. They only 
wanted to create Turnout Groups in an artificial way 
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since they were given 'deadlines' for the formation of a 
specific number of Turnout Groups. A study (Siriwardena, 
1981) revealed that when settler :representation in the 
leadership was low, the dependency 1 of the Turnout Leaders 
on UMs was higher because 'hand-picked' leaders had to 
strengthen their relationships with managers in order to 
compensate for their weakening links with the settlers. 
This Turnout Leader-UM relationship cannot be viewed as a 
successful integration of intervention practices. For 
example, many UMs wanted to use Turnout Leaders as their 
data collectors for preparing monthly reports for the 
Head Office without having to! make field visits. 
Secondly, UMs could convey messages to farmers through 
Turnout Leaders and thus save \ time for their own 
businesses. Thirdly, the UM-farmer relationship became 
weaker since they tended to meet Turnout Leaders, rather 
than interacting with farmers in the field. 
It is under the operation of this type of structure that 
settlers, as individuals and social groups, develop 
different livelihood strategies. Settlers do not usually 
protest directly against the official model of the 
farming system: instead they put forward various demands 
(individually or collectively) and expect the UM to solve 
them, after which they watch his actions carefully to see 
how he conducts himself. Table 13 shows some of the main 
demands and their preference ranking (1) by settlers of 
each settlement unit. This underlines the absence of 
uniformity in livelihood interests and points to the 
existence of diversity within! household production 
units, which makes it difficult! for UMs to response 
effectively to multiple and conflicting interests. 
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U1 recorded a comparatively higher yield per hectare, 
better agricultural performance and lower incidence of 
irrigation water problems. One might assume, therefore, 
that the survival of the UM in this unit would be much 
more likely than in U11 and U111, but in reality it is 
just the opposite. The main demands (see Table 13) put 
forward by the majority of settlers cannot easily be 
accommodated or are rather difficult to solve by the UM. 
About 85 percent of the settlers demand additional 
sources of income even though they obtain a comparatively 
higher paddy yield than other units. Few in fact are 
employed, (e.g. as wage labourers on government 
demonstration farms, forest plantation projects, or in 
the construction sector). And although the UM was able to 
help a small number of people, this actually created 
dissatisfaction among the majority, with consequent 
negative reactions. 
As Spittler (1983) argues, there is nothing more 
difficult than to administer millions of rural self-
provisioning households. According to him, peasants use 
specific strategies geared to meet their own semi-
autarkic household needs, and are not as much interested 
in influencing the administration as in keeping it at a 
distance. He takes his example from a self-provisioning 
village peasantry in Africa. The situation of the 
Mahaweli is quite similar. There are many situations in 
which farmers organize themselves, but, since cultivation 
risks and dependency on external agencies are low, the 
settlers in U1 have considerable freedom and bargaining 
power vis-a-vis their managers. 
Settler Strategies in U1 
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Table 13. Main Demands of Settlers in the Three 
Settlement 
Units 1985 Maha(wet) season. 





2. Inputs and 
service at 73.5 
correct time 
3. Better market 
for farm 
products 72.7 
4. More power 
to settler 
groups 71.2 

































6. Good education Provide better 
for the irrigation 
children 58.8 plots 68.5 
Source: Own survey (25% sample frdm each settlementunit) 
Total number of settlers: U1 = 225/ U1 1 = .236, U111= 230 
Secondly, most settlers who practice paddy farming 
according to the instructions given by the officials, 
have discovered the impossibility of increasing their net 
income in the face of the rising! costs of production. 
This type of disappointing experience with paddy farming 
is an important factor in the i n c r e a s i n g dissatisfaction 
among settlers. One typical response of settlers in U1 
was: 
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"The officials cannot practice what they preach. 
They request us to use different types of 
agricultural inputs and seeds. But they are unable 
to ensure a regular supply of these in sufficient 
quantities and at the correct time. When we raise 
questions they invariably clam up, but when there is 
a simple mistake they find fault". 
According to the settlers, they can improve their income 
from agriculture if their managers are efficient in 
delivering the necessary inputs and services, including 
marketing. As one farmer explained, the officials do 
nothing but put farmers "into a bull fighting game". They 
tie farmers to a strict cultivation schedule and bring 
them to the fields on a specific day. They then insist 
that they transplant new seed varieties. After the 
farmers become involved in this modern, external-input 
and dependent farming, the officials withdraw, leaving 
the farmers to fight it out, compete and struggle in the 
black market to buy the necessary inputs, sell their farm 
products, and finally to defeat their own purposes. 
73.5 percent of settlers in U1 are uncertain about the 
services provided by officials. As one experienced farmer 
explained: 
"The Mahaweli Scheme is not simply a settlement 
programme for settling farming households. It is 
also an employment bureau for providing employment 
for technically qualified but unemployed people who 
have no practical experience. Once they are employed 
in the settlement they must do something to convince 
the World Bank and the Ministry that their work is 
indispensible". 
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The settlers who do not trust managers want to avoid 
dependency on external sources and wish to use their own 
inputs and seed materials, even though it is difficult 
for them to do so since extension officials evaluate 
their agronomic principles as rudimentary and primitive. 
However the potential of certain forms of practical 
knowledge used by settlers for solying their own problems 
cannot really be undermined by professionally qualified 
extension officers. The latter argue in terms of 
projected yields, that are tested only in their 
experimental farms and laboratories, whereas farmers' 
knowledge arises out of long-termj practical experience. 
Hence the types of 'scientific' ' training provided by 
government officials is often not junderstood or put into 
practice by farmers. 
One typical response was: 
i 
"Although our own farming has nothing to do with 
these programmes, some of us participate just to 
satisfy the officials so that they can send in their 
reports, subsistence and travel claims without 
troubling us again. In this way, if we lend a 
helping hand towards their survival then they also 
let us work according to our own interests". 
Extension officials are not in a strong position to argue 
with these types of farmers. They can only request 
farmers to attend extension training programmes for 
recording purposes. 
Settlers often claim that they onc):e lived in a state of 
well-being that has been undermined by compulsory 
cultivation routines associated with High Yielding 
Varieties of rice, which are in fact uneconomical (see 
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Table 8, Chapter 3 ) . They also complain about the 
financial crisis of their families as a result of buying, 
selling and competition. 
According to the experience of farmers, officials can 
explain various modern methods and calculate high yields 
at meetings, but they cannot prove their real benefits in 
relation to costs. Thus what is theoretically feasible is 
practically impossible if the financial incapacity of 
ordinary settler households are taken into account. 
Extension officials have made distinct steps towards 
linking themselves with settlers and defending their own 
professions. However, untried new brands of agro-
chemicals are being recommended that require important 
changes in methods and time of application. As a result, 
66 percent of the sample settlers in 111 reported that the 
new weed killer they used in the 1986 Yala season, was 
not so effective as the previous brand. Also new products 
were not readily available. Another complaint was that 
services were provided without identifying the real needs 
of the farmers. Some settlers in U1 insisted on setting 
up small poultry farms but had very little experience 
with poultry, whilst at the same time a few farmers who 
were not prepared to undertake poultry farming were given 
training. Similarly farmers who had never transplanted 
paddy, were virtually compelled to attend training on the 
use of new methods of transplanting and a new paddy 
nursery system, without really being able to assimilate 
this knowledge. 
Officials are interested in their jobs, particularly in 
sending monthly reports to the Head Office regarding the 
number of training sessions held and the level of farmer 
participation. While farmers help them to fulfil their 
duties, they try at the same time to develop their own 
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For example, during my field work, the Unit Manager of 
Settlement Unit No.1 explained some of the reasons for 
the progress made by many of the farmers in his 
settlement unit. According to him, those farmers 
considered progressive had strictly followed his 
i n s t r u c t i o n s and training on 
agricultural extension and the 
technology: "I take full responsibility for distributing 
project resources and services on time and for training 
farmers to get maximum benefit out o f o u r systematically 
planned action programme". He also showed me various 
p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s and g r a p h s r e p r e s e n t i n g his 
achievements. 
water management, 
application of new 
projects, based on practical experience, which differs 
from the type of extension training and farming methods 
promoted by officials. 
When settlers are not satisfied with the work of the UM, 
they cannot protest because they believe they will be 
penalized. The practical experience of the farmers, 
however, provides them with a basis for developing 
farmer-farmer relationships and social networks. As some 
farmers explained, there already eicist clandestine farmer 
groups, particularly among groups >^f friends who organize 
activities aimed at developing forms of collective 
bargaining vis-a-vis the UM. On the basis of this 
experience, many farmers in U1 are seeking more statutory 
power with which to stand against the injustice and 
misuse of power by officials. Farmers develop their own 
identities, values and interpretations in their own life 
situations, and on the basis Of this they seek to 
conceptualize alternative programmes, whereas UMs aim to 
impose their normative interpretations on the process of 
change. 
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However, it was my concern to monitor farmer behaviour in 
the field in order to understand how farmers actually 
managed their farming and livelihood problems. The 
experience I acquired living with farmers ran quite 
contrary to the UM's opinion. His intention was to 
justify his role as a local agent of external 
intervention, whereas farmers maintain that they manage 
their basic livelihoods not by following the instructions 
of the UM but by abandoning many of them and relying on 
their own methods and knowledge of farming, particularly 
when faced with crisis situations. Thus they internalize 
various components of external intervention, draw upon 
proven practice and evolve their own social constructions 
based upon their own networks. Various circumstances 
prompt them then either to resist proposed changes which 
do not fit their requirements or to alter the UM's 
programme of action. The case study that follows, shows 
how three farmer friends evolve their own way of solving 
their farming and livelihood problems and of demarcating 
their own social domain that protects them from outside 
intervention. 
The Case of Three Friends 
I met Ranasinghe (settler U1/T12/No.2) when he was 
repairing a plough with two other settlers. Since I had 
already been in their village for more than two months he 
started talking to me whilst continuing to work. He began 
the discussion with a long story about his friends and 
friendship. According to Ranasinghe, his friends (settler 
U1/T12/No.3 and settler U1/T12/No.4), who live in the 
same village, cultivate adjoining farms and always work 
together. During the last five years their friendship has 
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External Intervention: A Lesson of Failures 
When Ranasinghe arrived at the settlement from his 
original village (Padaviya, North Central Province) the 
land was not well levelled, field canals were only partly 
constructed and there was no sigh of irrigated farming 
whatsoever, even though the cultivation time schedule had 
been given to him. The UM had promised to solve all these 
problems and guaranteed the supply of irrigation water 
for both the Yala(dry) and Maha(wet) seasons. Farmers 
were requested to go ahead with land preparation. 
While Ranasinghe was struggling to| level his land within 
the given time, the Mahaweli officials advised him to 
cultivate B.G 34-8, the best High! Yielding Varieties of 
paddy, especially recommended for Mahaweli farmers. He 
started to discuss this new cultivation programme with 
his neighbouring farmer friends. They agreed that each of 
them would undertake the official farming system on an 
been consolidated as they became dependent on each other 
for solving their agricultural problems, sharing 
resources and making decisions. Ranasinghe said: "we are 
just like brothers belonging to one mother." 
All the strategies they followed had strong connections 
with the changing livelihood problems they had faced from 
the inception of their settlement life. They call these 
problems 'the Mahaweli Lessons'. Many training programmes 
dealing with farming, extension, and water management 
questions had been organized by dfficials; however 'the 
Mahaweli lessons', as Ranasinghe explained, do not refer 
to the lessons leraned from the successes of such 
programmes, but to the lessons leajrned from the failures. 
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experimental basis since they had a feeling that the new 
cultivation programme would be better than their own. 
Ranasinghe, together with his friends, decided to follow 
all the instructions of the UM. He borrowed credit, 
purchased fertilizer, hired labour for transplanting, and 
used tractors to complete the agricultural tasks within 
the given time schedule. But the UM could not keep his 
promises: the field officials simply failed to provide 
a d e q u a t e irrigation water. So during the first 
cultivation season, more than 50 percent of the paddy 
land was severely affected by a lack of water; and at the 
end of the season Ranasinghe's income was far below the 
investments he had made. The loans borrowed from the bank 
could not be repaid. Then, in the second cultivation 
season, Ranasinghe faced a serious family crisis since 
there was hardly anything left for day-to-day sustenance. 
This failure provided the stimulus for him to ask his 
friends for their help and suggestions. They came to 
several conclusions: 
a) Official methods of farming are not only non-
sustainable but also not feasible economically. Even 
the most basic elements of modern technology, like 
chemical fertilizers or hybrid varieties such as the 
B.G 34-8, had failed to provide the solution to the 
most basic of farm and household problems. 
b) The picture painted of the future prosperity of the 
Mahaweli through T.V. programmes, statistics, and 
lectures during the farmer training classes was far 
removed from reality. Officials are outsiders whith 
a mandate to conduct research and extension training 
for improving the technology of farming and 
developing modern methods. But they commence without 
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any practical understanding of farmers' problems; 
and farmers are treated as objects in government 
programmes designed to attain national production 
goals. 
c) It is dangerous to work always according to the UM's 
instructions and to depend on him to solve practical 
problems. Agricultural programmes designed for the 
development of commercial farming do not coincide 
with the plans of farmers. Quite often the 
recommended packages promoted by officials are not 
in line w i t h the f a r m e r s ' own needs and 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e r e f o r e Ranasinghe saw no 
alternative but to by-pass those planned programmes, 
or alter them in accordance with the practical needs 
of his household. 
d) The new varieties of paddy are more sensitive to 
drought and yields drop much faster than traditional 
varieties when the water supply decreases, even 
marginally. Moreover, the new varieties of paddy are 
more vulnerable to nitrogen fertilizer, plant 
disease, insect pests and weeds than Ranasinghe had 
expected. 
Ranasinghe and his friends decided, therefore, to reduce 
the area to be cultivated in the fourth season to 
coincide with the irrigation wateravailable. 
This time the yield for the cultivated area was high but 
the net income they received was far below that of their 
basic living requirements, mainly because the costs of 
production and consumption had increased rapidly. Under 
these circumstances they were compelled to concentrate 
further on how resolve the widening deficits in their 
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family budgets. Meanwhile, officials hardly discussed 
these problems but continued to organize their training 
sessions and lectures (2) on subjects such as the 
advantages of external - input technology, intensive 
farming methods, target yield, and achievable income. 
Social Arrangements Among Friends in the Face of Market 
Dependency and Official Programmes 
Ranasinghe met his friends regularly and gradually they 
developed their own solutions to these external problems. 
These included the internal re-organization of available 
resources within the three families, according to their 
capacities and knowledge. The three farm families had 
discussed at length their difficulties in making a living 
in the Mahaweli due to increasing market prices for 
consumer goods and purchased inputs, and decreasing 
prices for farm products. This led them to drop selected 
aspects of the Mahaweli cultivation programme and 
exercise their own judgment in managing their crops. In 
this way they changed from official market-dependent 
cash-crop farming to a more reliable balanced farming 
system combining subsistence and commercial crops. This 
was a difficult task since they had to organize their 
farming schedule against that of the official programme. 
Hence it was essential for them to maintain close 
friendship ties and to keep the UM away so that they 
could conceal their strategies. 
Ranasinghe and his friends first began to by-pass 
officials and to discuss among themselves the problem of 
the irrigation water supply. They concluded that water 
scarcity was a problem created by the UM. responsible for 
water distribution. By restricting water flow and 
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creating water shortage and thus manipulating farmers' 
demands for more water, the UM protects his own job and 
s o c i a l s t a n d i n g . T h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s w a t e r 
distribution motivated Ranasinghe and his friends to 
organize their own project according to their plans, 
which, in turn, became a threat to the UM's relationship 
with some farmers in the settlement unit. The use of HYVs 
and modern technology implies complicated agronomic 
practices, high cost, high risk and; practical problems in 
obtaining access to inputs. So Ranajsinghe and his friends 
chose instead to employ theii own knowledge and 
experience and to evolve their ow|n social arrangements 
for the solution of livelihood problems. 
Interaction and Negotiation with External Agents 
Given these intentions, Ranasinghe and his friends 
initiated a new type of interaction with the UM. This 
time they adopted a strategy of facb-to-face disagreement 
with him in bargaining for irrigation water. They did not 
want to please the UM simply for the sake of maintaining 
a friendly relationship as they had done before. Instead 
they put forward difficult demands which they expected 
the UM to solve. And if he failed, then they would be 
able to put the full blame on him and thus end their 
friendly relationship. Their negotiations centered around 
the following issues: 
a) Because there is a wide gap between the official date 
for water delivery and the actual dkte of receiving water 
by the tail- enders of the field 'canals, they insisted 
that the cultivation time schedule should be fixed 
according to the actual receiving date of water by the 
lower reachers. 
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b) The sufficiency of water should not be judged by the 
level at the Turnout gate, but should be judged from the 
actual situation of each field. 
c) If the UM was unable to complete the levelling of 
irrigable land, as he promised, he should supply water to 
cover the highest parts of the fields despite the amount 
of water delivered through the inlets. 
d) If the UM could not solve the above problems, then he 
should not expect farmers to follow his instructions for 
the rest of the agricultural tasks. 
When the UM explained (as the farmers expected) that he 
could not give water above that officially allowed, the 
farmers urged him to report the problem to higher 
authorities or at least to inspect their fields and 
record the actual situation of water flow and scarcity. 
The UM agreed only to the latter. In their interaction 
w i t h him t h e y a l s o expressed their anger and 
disappointment regarding his way of dealing with things, 
putting forward the view that the UM should not visit 
them again without a satisfactory solution. 
Even though they did not believe the UM to be competent 
or that he could ever find a solution to their irrigation 
problems, they did believe that this type of negotiation 
and bargaining would create an embarassing situation that 
would effectively keep him away from their farms. They 
would then be free to organize agricultural activities by 
themselves without his surveillance. However, they were 
careful not to destroy the UM's own survival strategy, 
since they were aware that officials can react sharply 
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when they are placed in a situation where they cannot at 
least ceremonially defend state policy, policy. 
According to Ranasinghe, the changes he wanted to make 
during the seventh cultivation season were not totally 
against the official programme. For example, he decided 
to allocate 50 per cent of his one hectare farm to the 
cultivation of HYV paddy recommended by the Mahaweli 
Authority which he could manage with the available 
irrigation water (availability was judged from the 
minimum water supply during the previous seasons). 
The Results of the Farmers' Own Project. 
By making these changes he was able to reduce the costs 
of production to about 35 percent of the costs involved 
in cultivating HTVs for one hectare of land. According to 
Ranasinghe, the marginal return per unit of inputs and 
labour was higher with this more reliable water supply. 
Table 14 shows the average costs of production and income 
computed on the basis of data obtained from Ranasinghe's 
farm records. He does not usually keep up-to-date records 
of his farm budget but maintains some important accounts 
on the main items of expenditure for the purpose of 
making his own comparison and experimentation. The items 
included in Table 14 therefore are limited to the 
information available from the farmer. 
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Table 14. 
Costs of Production and Income Costs of Production and 
Under the Official Programme Income Under Farmer 
of Cultivation (1/2 ha. HYVs) Managed Cultivation 
1984/85 Maha Season (1/2 Ha.)1985 Yala 
Season 
To complete the ploughing 
within the official 
time limit. 
To complete ploughing 
before closing canals. 
1. Hired Tractor Rs. 700.00 
Family labour 00.00 
2. Land preparation 
Hired labour Rs. 110.00 
Buffaloes Rs. 320.00 
Family labour 00.00 
Land preparation 
Family labour 00.00 
3. Purchase of HYV 
seeds Rs. 350.00 
Purchase of HYV 
seeds Rs. 350.00 
4. Transplanting 
Hired labour Rs. 375.00 
Transplanting 
Hired labour Rs. 150.00 
(only HYVs of paddy) 
5. Fertilizers Rs. 825.00 Fertilizers Rs. 700.00 
6. Weedkillers 
Pesticides Rs. 325.00 
Weedkillers 
Pesticides Rs. 300.00 
7. Harvesting 
Hired labour Rs. 325.00 
Hired tractor Rs. 200.00 
Harvesting 
Hired labour Rs. 100.00 
Hired tractor Rs. 150.00 
Total Total 
Production Production 
Costs Rs.3210.00 Costs Rs. 2070.00 
Source: Compilation of Ranasinghe's farm records. 
Secondly, he demarcated another 25-35 percent of the farm 
(this area was selected after a careful study of land 
levelling problems and technical defects of the canal 
structure) as a semi-irrigable area or partly wet land 
for the cultivation of another variety of paddy called 
'H4' which was his own selection. 
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He had been using this semi-improved variety of paddy for 
the last two decades, from the jiime he lived in his 
original village. 
According to Ranasinghe, the 'H4' variety of paddy was 
first introduced to their village jin the 1 960's and was 
especially suitable for semi-irtigable farming. The 
selection of this variety for cultivation in his new 
Mahaweli farm was explained by him as follows: 
a) The H4 variety grows taller than new varieties so that 
it can compete with weeds, standing above them, whereas 
the recommended HYV is a much shorter plant and the weeds 
outgrow it. This means that very expensive weed killers 
must be applied. Although the new variety is unlikely to 
be blown over in strong winds, the damage from weeds is 
greater than that from wind. 
b) If the costs of transplanting, weeding and weedkillers 
are taken into account, more benefits can be obtained by 
the broadcast sowing of the H4 variety of paddy. An 
experienced farmer can broadcast paddy so that a good 
distance between plants can be maintained. According to 
Ranasinghe, some of the advantages pf broadcasting the H4 
variety of paddy are: 
1 . The cost of transplanting is a very high component 
of the costs of production which can be avoided by 
broadcasting. 
11. Unlike transplanting, the space allowed between 
plants, where weeds can grbw, is limited with 
broadcasting. Therefore, the cost of weedkillers can 
be greately reduced. 
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111. Since paddy plants are closer to each other and grow 
taller in bunches, the plants rub together all the 
time so that insect pests cannot take hold. 
iv. After the harvest more dried paddy remains in the 
fields than in transplanted fields. This becomes a 
natural fertilizer and in the next season field 
preparation will also be easier. 
c) The H4 variety of paddy consumes comparatively low 
amounts of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The 
application of a small amount of urea with more compost 
or natural fertilizer is the best combination with which 
to obtain maximum yield with the H4 variety of paddy. 
d) At the maturing stage of this paddy variety the plant 
usually bends down towards the earth. During the final 
stage of its growth the paddy is left without any water 
in the field. However, scarcity of water is not a 
problem but rather a requirement for the cultivation of 
the H4 variety of paddy. 
On the basis of this wide practical experience with the 
H4 variety of paddy, the three farmer friends decided to 
broadcast the seeds in the area identified in their 
fields as semi - irrigable. Since the three plots were 
adjoining and belonged to one field canal, the three 
friends could cultivate the lands on a collective basis, 
s h a r i n g already allocated irrigation water. The 
explanation which Ranasinghe gave for this decision was 
c o n v i n c i n g , even if such "practical laboratory" 
experiments were unacceptable to extension officers or 




Estimated costs if new HYV 
is cultivated (Only for 
1/3 of the plot) 
FARMERS' SELECTION 
Cultivation of farmers' 
own variety of paddy 
(1/3 oi the plot) 
1.Ploughing 
Hired tractor Rs. 470 00 Buffaloes Rs. 200 .00 
2.Land preparation Land preparation 
Hired labour Rs. 70 00 Family labour 00 .00 
3.Seeds HYV Rs. 230 00 Seeds H4 Rs .125 .00 
4.Transplanting Rs 250 00 Broadcasting 
Family labour 00 .00 
5.Fertilizers Rs 550 00 Fertilizers Rs .150 .00 
6.Weedkillers Weedkillers 
Pesticides Rs 220 00 Pesticides 00 .00 
7.Harvesting Harvesting 
Hired labour Rs 220 00 Hired labour Rs .150 .00 
Hired tractor Rs 130 00 Hired Tractor RS .130 .00 
8.Production Production 
Costs Rs 2140 00 Costs RS . 755 .00 
9.Gross Income Gross Income 
(55 bushels x 75 (60 bushels x 75 
less production less production 
cost Rs 1985 00 cost Rs. 2995 .00 
Source: Own survey. 
There remained a further 15 to 25 percent of unirrigated 
land left in his allotment. This he decided to mainly 
utilize for vegetable and other food-crop cultivation for 
family subsistence. He resolved that this would reduce 
market dependency for basic food requirements. In this 
"scientific laboratories" or in "controlled demonstration 
plots". 
Table 15 shows the actual income deceived by Ranasinghe 
after replacing the HTV with his own H4 variety in the 
semi-irrigable part of the plots. 
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plot he cultivated green gram, onions, cowpeas, chillies, 
bananas, and several other vegetables. According to his 
own calculation, about 40% of the costs of food 
reflected in the family budget could be reduced by 
growing and consuming his own crops. 
Lessons Learned 
After experimenting with the above type of mixed farming 
system, Ranasinghe obtained quite promising results at 
the end of the seventh cultivation season. He assesses 
the advantages as follows: 
a) Many farmers in the Mahaweli Settlement experienced 
serious difficulties with the HYV of paddy (BG 34-8) 
recommended by the Mahaweli Authority, due to disease. 
HYV thus requires constant consultation with Mahaweli 
extension staff and the use of various pesticides 
available in the market. After spending heavily on 
disease control, some of the more affluent farmers were 
able to save the crop but most of the farmers had very 
low yields despite official guarantees. Ranasinghe too 
was affected badly, but fortunately the damage was 
limited to the area he had cultivated with the new 
variety, which amounted to about 35 per cent of that 
planted by other farmers. Because of this reduced acreage 
he was able to pay more attention to the crop, resulting 
in a comparatively higher yield. 
b) His own variety of paddy (H4) was not affected so 
much because it is more resistant to such disease and 
because its stages of growth are different. As a result 
he obtained the maximum yield from his own crop 
selection. 
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c) After his decision to cultivate food crops and 
vegetables in a small unirrigated area (including 
selected ridges) he was able to save a considerable part 
of his consumption costs. Because of adopting a mixed 
farming system in his irrigated plot, his visits to the 
paddy fields also became more frequent as some produce 
contributed to the regular food needs of the family. 
d) The periods of labour input required for these three 
types of farming in the same field were different. 
Therefore, apart from some exceptional peak periods, he 
was able to manage mostly with family labour. In 
contrast, the strict timing required for the official 
variety of paddy forced many farmers to hire labour 
during several stages of production!. 
e) Since he has re-organized his farming to deal with the 
irregular supply of irrigation Water, dependence on 
Mahaweli officials (such as the UM) is reduced. He now 
has the freedom to resist, negotiate, or even to by-pass 
them if they provide no benefit. Irrigation water 
problems are solved using his own farm management 
strategies, something he was unable to achieve following 
official management training instructions. 
Compared to the highly technocratic and externally-
planned official programme of the Mahaweli family 
farming system, the above type of farming model designed 
by the farmers themselves demonstrates their knowledge 
and skill in organizing and managing agricultural 
resources under difficult circumstances. It also reveals 
that farmers have a high research papability through the 
application of their own e x p e r i e n c e . Hence they have 
sufficient capacity to analyze agricultural problems and 
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to act upon this analysis and make appropriate changes 
in their farming system. As Ranasinghe clearly 
d e m o n s t r a t e s , they are knowledgeable actors who 
understand their day-to-day living situation. 
The type of relationship and interactions that exist 
between these farmers and the Unit Manager indicate 
several aspects: 
a) Although the UM is expected to carry out various tasks 
assigned by the Mahaweli Authority, he is nevertherless 
compelled to modify the planned programme and to adopt 
his own strategic approach in order to handle the 
potentially contradictory demands made upon him by both 
farmers and his superiors. For example, the UM tries to 
interpret farmers' achievements as an outcome of his own 
intervention practices which concur with the agricultural 
development plan formulated by the Mahaweli Authority. 
When farmers' own solutions to production problems are 
shown to have positive advantages, then the UM often uses 
the farmers' model to defend himself, claiming them as 
the success of his own programme of implementation. 
In the opinion of these three farmers, UMs are there 
only to give instructions, using the difficult terms they 
have learned from their theory books. Since their 
practical knowledge is poor they cannot offer appropriate 
solutions. When a farmer discovers a good solution and 
suggests it to the UM, if this is not contradictory to 
his programme, then the UM says "yes it is very good and 
this is what I expect you to do". Hence he is good only 
for commenting and criticizing. Therefore, farmers 
seek help or advice from a friend or a neighbour rather 
than from the UM. 
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* the minimization of borrowing from outside sources at 
high interest rates by adopting, their own informal 
lending/borrowing system called ' Athamaru' ( i.e. 
borrowing of small amounts of money without interest, 
when an urgent need arises and returning it immediately 
after the crisis). 
* During the glut period (just after the harvest), they 
did not sell all the harvest as they had done earlier. 
Now, one of the farmers sells part of the harvest and 
shares that money among the others to cover living 
expenses, until the glut is over.! Once prices increase 
they sell the balance and earn a higher profit. A part 
of the additional income is shared with the farmer who 
agrees to sell at a lower price during the glut season. 
The close relations that hav 
Ranasinghe and his friends emphas 
of social networks and shared s 
reshaping life worlds and fo 
components of •external intervention 
developed between 
izes the significance 




These three farmers have become confident concerning the 
advantages of farmer cooperation which their friendship 
has made successful. Some of the activities they 
organized were: 
* the exchanged of food, farm products and agricultural 
implements. 
* the utilization of family labour on an 'Attam' 
(exchange labour) basis in order to avoid hiring labour 
during the peak periods of farming!(sometimes the labour 
input of one family was exchanged iwith the agricultural 
implements of another family). 
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capability of these farmers was able to neutralize 
effectively the power of intervening parties, providing 
the farmers with a degree of countervailing power. 
General Tendencies of the U1 
Besides these three friends, other settlers in U1 now 
have the confidence to apply their own farming methods 
and they thus seek the freedom to do so. About 71 percent 
of the settlers in U1 demand the right to organize their 
own agricultural activities and manage labour by 
themselves. But many UMs do not believe that this should 
be allowed and continue to impose cropping schedules and 
other regulations. Under this situation some settlers use 
the technique of pleasing the management staff by 
appearing to go along with their instructions, while 
others more overtly try to escape from administrative 
control. 
Extending hospitality is one of the strategies adopted by 
some settlers to influence field officials. Offering 
special meals, drinks and inducements, inviting officials 
to their homes and open appreciation of the UM's work, 
are common ruses for drawing the attention of officials 
to individual problems. This is a method used to ensure 
the personal commitment of some officials to some favored 
farmers. This, of course, may develop animosity, since 
such a relationship may be often viewed as "favoritism". 
Such favoritism in the settlement units, even in the more 
progressive ones, can be raisleadingly interpreted as 
evidence of a rich farmer-UM coalition, whereas in 
reality it is a part of a farmer strategy used by both 
rich and poor for extracting certain benefits. Secondly, 
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Through this type of relationship farmers attempt to 
reduce officials' formal power so as to bring them to 
"the negotiating table". In this way they aim to 
influence officials not to support the "main project" but 
instead to support "Farmers projects". 
An impediment to this type of relationship (if it exists 
between a few farmers and the UM) is the possible 
reaction of the rest of the settlers. For example, many 
petitions are sent to higher-level' officials asking them 
to hold inquiries about certain practices. But when there 
is an inquiry into the work of a UM he will seek the 
support of farmers to provide evidence in his favor, so 
that disciplinary action from above can be guessed. Being 
protected in this way by farmers, means that the UM is 
naturally inclined to support them too. Hence farmers 
come to play a dual role. While they may help him to 
weaken the top-down flow of control and supervision that 
limit his own room for maneuere. They make it possible 
for him to take advantage of these: 'ginger groups' among 
farmers to develop effective defence mechanism of his 
own. Throughout this type of relationship some settlers 
are more able to make UMs to attehd to their particular 
problems and demands, whilst others must negotiate, 
bargain and fight hard with them fo|t this. 
Planned Settlement Unit meetings are given a prominent 
place in the official agenda of the settlement programme. 
The UMs are requested to organize! farmers into groups, 
develop close interaction witli them and allocate 
most UMs also use this relationship to protect their 
positions when they feel that they are likely to be 
accused of neglecting their duties in the settlement 
unit. 
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development activities among them. But farmer behavior is 
such that any attempt at formalizing settlement 
activities through settler meetings cannot succeed. For 
example, when Settlement Unit level meetings are held 
many farmers keep silent or avoid participation in the 
discussions if the subject has nothing to do with their 
own specific problems. 
Another strategy for influencing the UM is to ignore 
totally what he is saying and to start one's own private 
discussions in the meeting hall. The UM then has to stop 
his own talk and request that the farmers explain the 
problems that they are discussing with each other. This 
provides the opportunity for farmers to raise various 
questions. Hence, although time is allocated to the 
discourse of formally-assigned topics, it is rather 
difficult for the UM to avoid the farmers' topics. On 
many occasions the UM has to try to force the settlers to 
participate in his own subject for discussion, but If 
farmers realize that the UM is attempting to dominate 
them, then they cease their bargaining. Instead, they 
argue with each other pretending that there is a major 
conflict among the farmers. Finally, the meeting ends up 
without any useful conclusions being reached. 
Why are farmer conflicts at unit level meetings so wide-
spread? This question was answered by a farmer in the 
following way: 
"When we try to discuss our problems with the UM he 
gives an evasive answer and avoids discussion. We 
go to unit meetings because it is the only reliable 
place where we can catch him to negotiate. He is a 
'cunning' person who organizes these types of 
meeting in order to go ahead with his planned 
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programme of action. Since we cannot protest against 
him directly, we sabotage the meetings by creating 
feigned conflicts between us. Don't worry, these 
conflicts are only during the meetings and not in 
the village". 
While some groups of settlers confront the UM directly, 
the majority in U1 use less confrontationist strategies. 
Instead they study the UM's lifewoild, and work out ways 
of diverting actions directly, against themselves. 
Character assassination by exaggerating the corruption 
and mal-practices of officials is also a popular pastime 
of farmers. When superior officers or outsiders come to 
gather information settlers, complain to them about their 
UMs. According to them, UMs take bribes. They pilfer 
material assistance given to poor settlers. They engage 
in private business (such as construction and trading) 
during working hours. They cultivate settlers land and 
divert more water to their own crops. 
UM's lifeworlds are such that, although they are given 
formal duties, their priorities for action are usually 
made according to their own agendas of private life. For 
example, regular field visits and unit meetings are 
formal responsibilities but can always be postponed or 
ignored. Farmers are fully aware of this situation and 
monitor UM's behavior in order; to keep their own 
"records" on "official" and "unofficial" or "legal" and 
"illegal" activities of members of the local bureaucracy. 
Thus, while officials use their own criteria for 
labelling farmers for the purpose JDf imposing their own 
authority, farmers also may retaliate by providing their 
own evidence on the "coruptness" "inefficency" or general 
"bad performance" of UMs. This type of labelling by 
farmers reduces the real power of UM's since, in order to 
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avoid damage to their reputation and career prospects, 
UMs must relax some rules and controls over farmers. 
Settler Resistance and Struggle for Resources in U 11 
Under Water Scarecitv 
Water Scarcity: A New Space for Farmers' Struggles in 
011 
Compared to the direct negotiating power of farmers in 
U1, discussed above, farmers in U11 face a different set 
of circumstances and accord a different meaning and 
identity to their encounters with officials. As shown in 
Table 13, the main demands raised by settlers in U 11 are 
centered around irrigation water problems because this 
unit is located at the tail-end of an irrigation canal. 
Unlike U1, the settlers in U 11 face a common irrigation 
problem -water scarcity- and therefore the goals of 
individual struggles become similar. This encourages 
s t r o n g h o r i z o n t a l l i n k a g e s and i n t e r - h o u s e h o l d 
cooperation. Water scarcity is often attributed by the 
settlers to the failure of external institutions and 
management officials. In the opinion of farmers, it is 
these officials who are responsible for the water 
disputes that take place in U 11. Field officials, of 
course, maintain a different view. They argue that water 
disputes and social conflict emerge because of the poor 
participation of settlers in irrigation water management. 
Construction defects in the canal structure are 
frequently used by farmers as an example of the 
inefficiency and negligence of technical staff and 
administrators. Management Staff use the same examples to 
demonstrate farmer negligence and water mismanagement, 
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since they accept the soundness of the irrigation 
construction. 
The Challenge of Farmers 
Farmers pointed to a number of defepts in the main system 
during my field survey. They did this to support their 
complaints and to challenge officials to come and inspect 
the system. Since officials cannot;accept these types of 
challenge they generally avoid fiejd visits. But farmers 
keep a regular watch on the movements of officials and 
keep silent until they get an opportunity to hit back. An 
example is as follows: 
During the Yala (dry) season, 19 85, I was invited to 
attend a unit meeting by the UM of Settlement Unit 11. In 
this meeting there was a face-to-tface confrontation and 
argument between farmers and officials. Some higher 
ranking officials also participated in the meeting. 
Therefore it was a rather embarassing situation for the 
local officials. The Irrigation Officials started to 
explain their responsibilities and justify the irrigation 
construction. According to them, the structure was 
accurately built and they simply rejected farmers 
complaints concerning defects in the canal structure. But 
the farmers had detailed records of each and every place 
where there existed major irrigatjion problems and one 
farmer mentioned the following 4 e f e c t s - Many of the 
irrigation structures in Zone II of System ' C had 
collapsed after the second year of construction. The 
Hungama tank which was functioning:as a part of the main 
canal was washed away. The main bund of the distributory 
canal No. 202/1 was broken. About 40 feet of the main 
canal at Agala Oya had collapsed. About 800 feet of 
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concrete lining of the distributory canal No.S/D/2 was 
washed away. Several canal structures at Pahala Ratkinda 
and Viranagama had been rebuilt due to bad structural 
design. And so how could the officials say the irrigation 
system was perfect? 
Another farmer followed, took his notebook and referred 
to the following irrigation problems in his unit: 
"The water gate of S.D. 9 canal connected to 
distributory canal No.13 is broken and the full 
volume of water flows out through this gate during 
the entire period of cultivation" 
"Water distribution from distributory canal no.13 is 
difficult. In the middle of this canal, water is 
leaking into a drainage canal" 
"A main culvert fixed to the canal is not large 
enough to deliver water. As a result bunds are 
flooded. Some Turnouts are not operating and the 
settlers have to obtain water by making their own 
illegal inlets." 
"To take water to some Turnouts (T.0.68) other 
Turnouts have to be closed (T.O. 67 and 68A)." 
The irrigation officials present had no answers, and 
eventually a conflict between the management and 
irrigation staff began. They started to blame each other. 
The management personnel put the blame on the 
construction staff for these types of canal defects. Yet, 
according to construction officials, the irrigation 
canals had been handed over to the management staff after 
testing the water distribution in these new canals. Hence 
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it was the water management officials who were 
responsible for the problems after they had taken over 
the irrigation system. There were, then, endless 
possibilities of passing the buck from one group to 
another: hardly any official wisihed to accept direct 
responsibility. 
Under the existing management structure, Irrigation 
Engineers (IE) at Block level and Engineering Assistants 
(EA) at the Unit level are supposed to take care of all 
irrigation problems. The Unit Manager and his Field 
Assistant should identify irrigation problems and request 
technical staff to solve them. However, since the number 
of irrigation problems is high and the procedure adopted 
is lengthy, settlers in UII were unable to overcome day-
to-day water distribution problems through recourse to 
the existing management system^ The Block Manager 
dislikes complaints from UMs about irrigation problems 
and argues that such problems should not be brought to 
him, but should be reported to the IE. The IE, on the 
other hand, blames settlers for damaging the canal 
structure and misusing water. According to him it is the 
responsibility of the UM to introduce better water 
management through farmer participation. Finally the UM 
faces a difficult role at the unit level because water 
disputes are widespread. He may use various alternatives 
to overcome these problems, but he cannot give an 
assurance to settlers that their |water demands will be 
met. He is forced therefore to mjake false promises in 
order to avoid organized protest. |AS a result, settlers 
do not trust him. This leads to a bhange in the expected 
relationship between UM and settlers. The enforcement of 
management regulations by the UM at grass-roots level is 
felt by the settlers as an undue imposition. In turn, 
reasonable demands raised by them are frequently 
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disregarded by the UM on the grounds that settlers are 
ignorant, disobedient and unknowledgeable of what is best 
for them. The confrontations that arise from this 
situation are such that when effective solutions to the 
problems are raised by the settlers they are simply 
ignored. 
The Nature of Resistance 
As a result, the strategy adopted by settlers in U II 
usually takes the form of non-collective resistance 
against the unit level programme. Many settlers are 
involved in illegal tapping of irrigation water. Unlike 
UI, settlers in U II mostly avoid open criticism. They 
please officials but criticize them heavily in their 
absence. Slandering is a common occurrence among this 
group of settlers. They also cheat officials, which often 
goes unnoticed or undiscovered: Creating continuous 
difficulties for officials in day-to-day management by 
gathering near the Unit Office is another tactic used by 
many settlers in the UII. 
Resistance Through Blocking the Implementation of Planned 
Programmes 
Some settlers believe it is necessary to become a 
nuisance to the UM, by refusing to leave his office, for 
example, so that he will be forced to attend to their 
problems. This group of settlers may also interrupt him 
when he proceeds with his own programme and objectives 
during unit level meetings and at the fortnightly farmer 
training sessions. The latter sessions are devoted to 
providing training on the methods of minimizing wastage 
of water, canal maintenance, water measurements and 
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timely application of inputs. Such meeting are compulsory 
for UM's, and a progress report must be sent to the Head 
Office. Settlers often take advantage of such meetings to 
voice their immediate grievances, sometimes portraying 
themselves as the most unfortunate victims of the 
settlement programme, and pretending that they are 
starving, without food and without any other income. They 
raise many questions and force officials to answer them 
and to discuss their irrigation problems. Higher level 
officials who attend these meetings from Block and 
Project Office Level try to restrict the time schedule of 
the meetings. But once the importance of irrigation water 
management is emphasized, settlers interrupt the officer 
and request him to discuss their irrigation problems 
first. Embarassing higher level officials in this way 
compels them to record the complaints of settlers. Then 
in the next training session settlers raise questions 
about the recorded complaints of the previous session and 
expect some solution or assurance that something is being 
done. The ultimate result is a lack of attendance by 
higher officials after the third or fourth meeting. One 
settler in UII gave the following advice to others on how 
to behave during these training programmes: 
"All farmers should come to the meeting because 
there are some supervisory officials talking to us 
on water management. When they talk about water 
management all of us should stand and ask them to 
give us water. If the extension officers talk about 
better seeds,.transplanting and fertilizer use, then 
stop them and insist that We should have water 
first. Do not allow them to proceed with their own 
programme without answering our questions". 
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In this way settlers in U II have been able to organize 
them-selves and sabotage meetings by raising demands 
concerning their own cultivation problems. However, in 
t h i s confrontation officials also use defensive 
strategies. For example, when irrigation water scarcity 
was serious during the 1985 Yala season, the majority of 
settlers in U II organized a protest. The UM came to know 
about their plans. At the beginning of one meeting a 
settler exclaimed: 
"We are not prepared to listen to your lectures. To-
day we should devote time to discussing our 
irrigation problems". 
The UM then took out his field notebook and said: 
"According to our programme, today's meeting is on 
farmer training. First we will proceed according to 
our programme and then we can devote time to 
discussing your problems". 
Later, however, after the discussion on farmer training, 
the UM closed the session saying: 
"We have no time left to discuss irrigation 
problems. So another meeting will be arranged to 
take up your irrigation problems". 
The settlers who had planned the protest looked at each 
other in dismay and disappointment. 
This type of tactic is regularly used by the UM/UII. His 
primary intention is to avoid the direct communication of 
the settlers with superior officers above the UM level. 
Another ploy used is to talk in difficult technical terms 
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when answering settlers' questions. Highly technical or 
professional types of explanation cannot easily be 
understood by settlers, so further questions are limited. 
For example, when farmers complain about the scarcity of 
irrigation water, the Engineering Assistant (EA) quickly 
switches into 'cu sec' language: 
"We have given one ' cu sec' of irrigation water to 
each settler. According to our measurements all the 
settlers are getting sufficient water. This is 
simple to prove from the dijstributory canal gate 
indicators. Multiply the number of cu sees by the 
number of plots and then check the water discharge 
at the gate. This will always balance". 
Since settlers do not conceptualize water distribution in 
"cu sec" terms, this leads to the following types of 
confrontations between officials and farmers: 
Officer: "We provide one "cu sec" to each water inlet of 
the settlers. Therefore lack of water may be due to 
water mismanagement by the settlers themselves." 
Farmer: "Give us the required amount of irrigation water. 
We need water and not "cu sees". Those cu sees never 
reach our fields. We cannot understand how this so-
called "cu sec" solves our irrigation water 
problems". 
Officer: "To solve water problems, organize a water 
management system at the field level according to 
our instructions." 
Farmer: "We do not have water for water management. 
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First, give us water and then we can think about 
water management". 
Officer: " Our cu sec method is technically accurate and 
it is accepted by the Mahaweli Authority. You should 
measure your water supply." 
Farmer: "We cannot show our water problems in cu sec 
terms. What we can show is our paddy fields where 
plants are not growing due to lack of water. Your 
method can be applied only at the water gate level 
and not in our fields. Can you use cu sees to 
measure water leakages through channel defects, and 
illegal tapping?" 
Officer: "Settlers are incapable of water distribution 
due to lack of education." 
Farmer: "You consider only the technical possibilities 
and maintain your field notebooks according to your 
own assumptions. You avoid taking responsibility 
for water distribution. Weaker farmers at the tail-
end are poor not because of a lack of education, but 
due to lack of water for cultivation. Your "cu sec" 
does not reach the poor." 
Officer: "We provide more than one cu sec to tail-enders 
in order to ensure a sufficient amount of water for 
cultivation." 
Farmer: "Those cu sees simply pass to the drainage 
channels and not to the fields since channel 
defects are not properly repaired". 
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a) They are re-settlers from traditional villages in the 
Dry Zone; 
Officer: "Farmers are not using water saving methods of 
farming. For example, they use irrigation water to 
kill weeds instead of using the weedkillers and 
pesticides recommended by us." 
Farmer: " Cost-saving methods are more important to us 
than water saving methods. Every aspect of our 
farming is costly. Have you offered us anything 
cheaper?" 
The above kind of interactions indicate some face-to-face 
disagreement based upon different rationales. Since the 
UM is unable to solve farmers' irrigation water problems, 
farmers have some advantage in the process of bargaining 
and negotiation. The authority of the UM cannot be 
applied due to resource constraints. Thus he himself 
becomes a participant in the ongoing transactional 
process and withdraws rules and procedures in order to 
survive among the settlers. As UM/U11 stated: 
"Settlers are reasonable. They have a genuine 
struggle to solve their irrigation problems. I have 
to face this situation. They come to me and I have 
to live with them. I have to play an active role on 
behalf of the settlers in order to convince them 
that it is not my fault." 
Defensive Strategies of Settlers in U111 
As stated in Chapter 1, the majority of settlers in U111 
are labelled "backward" farmers. They differ from the 
farmers in U1 and U11 because: 
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b) So-called 'traditional' cultural values are more 
prominent among them; 
c) They do not participate in the official programme of 
cash-crop farming; 
d) Their livelihood is largely based on subsistence 
farming. 
It might be assumed that the administration of such 
"powerless" poor farmers is less problematic than the 
administration of settlers in U1 or U11. But the reality 
is different. As UM/U111 pointed out, it is rather 
difficult to handle the defensive strategies adopted by 
these "backward", "traditional" farmers (3). 
Certain important strategic actions followed by settlers 
in U111 are based upon their particular life-world 
experiences and forms of practical consciousness. Their 
day-to-day encounters with officials have convinced them 
that the more they avoid or block planned intervention 
the greater they can achieve their own goals. False 
complaint is one such strategic action they often use. 
They appear to accept the orders and instructions given 
by the management staff at unit level meetings. And so 
after a very detailed discussion on the importance of 
using new inputs, such as chemical fertilizer, agronomic 
practices and new seeds, an extension officer expects all 
settlers to follow his instructions. They always say 
'yes' to all the new farming methods but, in fact, hardly 
follow them in the fields. Hence they take whatever 
f a c i l i t i e s and material assistance are offered, 
including agricultural credit, but simply continue with 
their own subsistence farming-oriented methods. This kind 
of settler behaviour cannot be easily identified by 
administrators because strict supervision of individual 
household activities is impossible. Furthermore the 
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UM/U111 cannot obtain the necessary information from 
other settlers because they avoid communication. They try 
to keep officials at a distance so that their actions 
remain unnoticed by the administrators. 
According to the UM/U111, his management difficulties are 
as follows: 
"The Block Manager insists that I pay special 
attention to settlers in this unit since their bad 
agricultural performance is reflected in the 
progress reports. The Mahaweli Settlement Programme 
is often criticized by outsiders by taking these 
poor settlers as examples. Some farmers indeed 
lease their land and work as agricultural laborers. 
Therefore, 1 have to devoted more time to bringing 
the settlers to the Unit Office to motivate them. 
But they never follow my instructions; nor do they 
attend meetings. I have to visit each of them and 
force them to come to my office. Sometimes they 
come but they never tell me their cultivation 
p r o b l e m s . T h e y o f t e n k e e p silent. I have 
difficulties implementing my programmes with this 
type of settler. Finally, I felt that these 
settlers were poor because they were not eligible to 
borrow from the banks since they had defaulted on 
previous loans. So I made a special arrangement to 
reschedule bad loans and give them new credit again. 
When I asked whether they needed credit, everybody 
said 'Yes'. Cultivation loans are given with 
detailed instructions on how to utilize borrowed 
monies for productive purposes,. They went away with 
the credit. At the end of the season most of the 
settlers had defaulted on their loans as they had 
done before. During my investigation almost all the 
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defaulters said that they had had irrigation water 
problems and crop diseases. Later I discovered that 
many of them had leased out their lands. No action 
could be taken against them, even though they had 
been deceptive in their claims, because there was a 
lack of evidence to prove it. Even when credit 
defaulters are detected they give various excuses 
for non-repayment of loans: a poor harvest, family 
sicknesses, maintenance of large families, which are 
usually impossible to check at the time of 
inspection. They also cooperate with each other to 
safeguard themselves by defending their members." 
Settlers are, of course, quite capable of exaggerating 
their poor living conditions in order to get the 
sympathy of officials. This includes behaving with a 
special mendicant attitude in order to obtain aid and 
assistance. The main demands listed in Table 13 also 
illustrate their attitudes towards financial and 
material aid allocated by various agencies, such as CARE, 
UNICEF, and the Department of Health. About 82 percent of 
them, for example, wanted more subsidies and mentioned 
this as the first priority. About 81 percent ofthe 
settlers demanded World Food Aid during bad seasons. 
Once the UM has failed to deal with settlers using 
coercive measures, he eventually settles for managing 
friendly relations and having sympathetic dealings with 
them. It is important to recognize, though, that these 
so-called "sympathetic dealings" represent the UM 
acknowledging his failure to impose authority, while 
defensive strategies of "powerless" farmers demonstrate 
their power to block the implementation of planned 
programmes. It remains a difficult task to detect 
mistakes and a real problem to make changes. 
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Even though the agricultural policies and settlement 
strategies adopted were formally the same in all 
settlement units, the relationship between the Unit 
Manager and farmers in Settlement Unit U111 was different 
from that in U 1 . The types j o f interaction and 
relationship that occur between tjie UM and the farmers 
in this settlement unit expose both the lack of 
coordinating power among field-level officers and their 
inability to impose on farmers the! officially-determined 
rules of the game. The UM failed to influence farmer 
behaviour with respect to timing of cultivation, 
extension, credit, and technology. Many farmers continued 
to abandon the official programme which, as I have argued 
earlier, is not easily identified by field officers, 
since it involves various strategies by the settlers 
designed to mislead, cheat or pass unnoticed. Such 
measures require a special type of interaction between 
farmers and officials. 
From the Mahaweli Authority's point of view, the UM's 
active involvement, particularly in weaker settlement 
units such as U 111, is necessary for changing farmers' 
attitudes and forcing them to follow the instructions of 
development agencies and seek assistance from the 
institutions that provide inputs and services, so that 
they eventually become "progressive farmers". Yet a 
fundamental constraint in achieving official goals is the 
contradiction between officials' assumptions regarding 
the ideal farmer, and the farmers' pwn beliefs concerning 
their future situation. Since these two parties are 
trying to achieve goals which are strikingly different, 
there develops a struggle between the officials who 
attempt to incorporate farmers iiito the mainstream of 
development and the farmers who resist incorporation. 
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While officials use their statutory powers to try to 
control farmers' independent decisions, farmers attempt 
to block the implementation of the planned programme and 
thus constantly create difficulties for officials. The 
following case study explains how this struggle takes 
place at settlement unit level. 
The Case of Siyathu Banda (reference- T12/D2/33^: The 
Forms of Power Used by a "Backward" Farmer to Control the 
Authority of Officials 
The UM's View on Siyathu Banda's Livelihood Strategies 
When I selected Siyathu Banda's family for an in-depth 
case study on farmer behavior, the UM opposed this on 
the grounds that this family was quite "inefficient" and 
"backward" in carrying out the Mahaweli agricultural 
programme. He was extremely disappointed with the 
performance of many farmers in his settlement unit 
(U111), including Siyathu Banda, mainly because his 
superior officers were likely to interpret the 
'backwardness' of these farmers as resulting from his own 
administrative incompetence. According to the UM, most 
of these farmers do not follow his instructions and they 
often evade the agricultural tasks allocated to them. 
Siyathu Banda not only leases out his land but also 
misuses bank loans and other facilities provided for him. 
Therefore he is no longer 'an ideal farmer' fit to be 
included in a study. The UM explained the difficulty as 
follows: 
"Siyathu never follows my instructions. But I cannot 
take any actions against him because he is a poor 
farmer. Since he is poor, I cannot recover the loan 
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It is quite embarassing for the UM jto face this situation 
and it is difficult for him to take coercive action. 
According to him, Siyathu Banda's life is miserable and 
because of this no legal action could realistically be 
taken. Siyathu Banda is provided health and other 
subsidies that are available for the rehabilitation of 
"weaker farmers". 
Although Siyathu creates this 'miserable' image among 
officials, his real life is different. He is one of the 
more active farmers. He is also the treasurer of the 
village Buddhist Temple Society. When I asked why he was 
adopting a dual and inconsistent role he told me that he 
is compelled to paint an incorrect picture about his real 
life when local officials come to make inquiries. 
According to him, life is not that miserable but 
deception is a strategy that can be used to avoid 
coercive action and intimidation by the UM. He simply 
ignores regulations and instructions: he is not in a 
position to bargain with the UM. 
The Official Image of the "Weaker 
for Using Siyathu Banda's Power 
Farmer": A New Space 
According to Siyathu Banda, if tie has problems with 
officials, then feigned incompetence can be used as a 
he borrowed from the bank. This farmer always has 
many explanations. When I meet him he always has 
serious problems, such as his cultivation was very 
bad due to crop diseases and water logging, his wife 
is expecting a baby, a child was seriously ill just 
before the last Maha (wet) season, or he got malaria 
fever". 
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strategy for managing them. Such feigned incompetence 
and deception creates considerable confusion and 
misunderstanding among field officials and this is 
precisely what Siyathu Banda wants to achieve. As a 
result, officials cannot go ahead with their own 
programmes and policies and it becomes necessary to 
recast policies in line with more realistic expectations 
that are more favorable to the farmers. For example, the 
UM identifies such farmers as the 'backward' or 'weaker' 
ones who should be brought under a special rehabilitation 
programme. This rehabilitation involves providing 
subsidies and community development assistance. As 
Siyathu Banda sees it: " It is better to be a so-called 
'backward' or 'weaker' farmer so that one is left out of 
the official compulsory farming system, and in order to 
receive more assistance". 
This attitude should not be viewed as an emotional 
reaction to an immediate situation. According to Siyathu 
Banda, it is the result of a long-term struggle to 
organize his family farming on the basis of his own 
experience and experimentation. Some important events in 
Siyathu Banda 1s changing livelihood situation can be 
summarized as follows: 
Siyathu Banda's Experience with Official Programmes 
Before 1981, Banda lived in his original village, sited 
in the same area as the settlement scheme. All his 
relatives who lived there had land attached to a small 
irrigation tank for the cultivation of varieties of paddy 
during the Maha (wet) season. He was able to manage his 
family's subsistence needs mainly because there was no 
restriction on chena cultivation (extensive highland 
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slash and burn cultivation) . The latter depended 
essentially upon the capacity and willingness of the 
farmer to produce under a system of collective work and 
labour sharing. He regularly cultivated five acres of 
kurakkan, chillies, ginger, green gram and vegetables. 
Together with other members of the village, he carried 
out many experiments, studying agricultural problems 
under various resource conditions, and making appropriate 
changes to his farming system. Mixed cropping of a number 
of food crops was adapted to cope with irregular rains 
and other risks. At that time, kurakkan, together with 
cowpeas were the major food crops, and not paddy. These 
products were not commercialized bjit stored for domestic 
consumption. The only crop he sold was chillies, which 
were cultivated especially for the market. The costs of 
production were very low in monetary terms and labour was 
pooled under a system of exchange labour. Nearly 
everybody in the area had cattle, including draught 
animals. Some families had as many as 20 to 30 head of 
cattle. Banda commented that he generally had no 
difficulty in getting draught animails for cultivation. 
He continued to live in this village for some 20 years, 
when, in 1981, the entire village was taken over by the 
Mahaweli Authority and resettled. His family was allotted 
2.5 acres (about one hectare) of land. Their cattle had 
to be sold, since there was no pasture land left to 
maintain them. He also lost his mixed food crop 
production for family subsistence. In the first season he 
received instructions from officials on how to use 
chemical fertilizer and recommended seed varieties. 
Following this he cultivated one c.cre with chillies and 
half an acre with paddy. He could riot clear the remaining 
half acre in time because the rains set in early. For 
that period he says he obtained a loan because officials 
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advised him to take one. He harvested 21 bushels of paddy 
from the half acre which he cultivated. He spent about 
Rs.2500.00 for chillie cultivation but harvested nothing, 
as all the plants were spoiled by too much water. 
He borrowed from banks, bought fertilizer, used new seeds 
and followed outsiders' instructions for the first time. 
But when he faced difficulties at the end of the season, 
those same officials could offer him no practical 
solution. Moreover he had to depend heavily on the market 
for the sale of his crops, for the purchase of 
agricultural inputs and for consumer goods. Because of 
the lack of food crops for household consumption he 
became tied strongly to the market. Money was needed for 
daily subsistence and when none was available, the family 
livelihood was threatened. He could not pay back the 
loan and became a defaulter; and in this way he obtained 
a bad name for the first time in his life. His plot was 
located at the end of the field canal close to a drainage 
channel. Due to the low-lying nature of the field, water 
did not drain out and, to make matters worse, water from 
the drainage canal came in. The result was that salinity 
quickly set in. Officials advised him to invest money to 
improve the quality of this land, but all suggested 
solutions were costly. New technology and new methods 
mean money and are useless without operational capital. 
When cultivation problems became serious among this group 
of Mahaweli settlers, complaints were made to the 
political authorities (i.e. to the Minister of Finance 
through Members of Parliament). And so, finally, a 
decision was made to 'reschedule' all the defaulters of 
government loans a political gesture. In this way Banda 
was able to borrow Rs. 6000.00 again from the bank. But, 
this time, he was determined not to invest in 
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cultivation until the UM had found a solution to his 
drainage problem. He made many complaints but the problem 
was ignored. Nevertheless, the officials insisted on him 
cultivating his land since he could claim crop insurance 
if the crop failed. Thus, despite all his uncertainties 
and his lack of confidence in officials, a part of the 
land was cultivated. This time he produced only 25 
bushels of paddy. Once again he complained to the UM, 
expecting to receive payment through crop insurance. Yet, 
after travelling ten times between his home and the 
project office, over a period of about two months, he 
received only Rs.60.00 for the loss of his crop, because, 
according to officials, insurance could not be paid for 
damages due to salinity. As a result, his debts to the 
bank and traders increased: by this time he had used all 
his money for consumption purchases and so, finally, he 
ended up with only one possibility: namely to adopt his 
own farming methods and organize his own programme of 
cultivation. 
In the circumstances, he decided to cultivate vegetables, 
food crops and paddy in accordance with his previous 
village experience. Soon after planting, an officer told 
him that what he was doing was illegal. According to 
Mahaweli cropping plans, he was supposed to cultivate 
only High Yielding Varieties of paddy recommended by the 
Mahaweli Authority. Siyathu Banda explained that his 
cultivation was planned only to meet his family 
requirements. He argued with the UM and asked whether it 
was illegal for him to produce food for the family. But 
before the next season, Mahaweli officials insisted that 
he attend a farmers' training class. During this 
training programme officials explained to him many 
farming methods, but he claims he did not understand any 
of them. Since, as he put it, the type of farming that 
206 
the Mahaweli officials wanted him to practice was "far 
too complicated", he decided to continue with his own 
farming. This time officials forced him to stop "illegal" 
cultivation, and took him before the Block Manager(BM). 
In answer to the BM, he explained that he had not stolen 
any thing: neither had he harmed anybody. He was just 
farming to feed his seven children. If this was illegal 
then he requested the BM to put him in jail. The BM 
decided not to take any action, but simply advised him in 
the future to follow the UM's instructions. 
The Success of Siyathu Banda's Own Strategies 
According to Siyathu Banda, this was a substantial 
achievement. His farming system required much less 
irrigation water, but the UM was ignorant of this and 
thought he could control him by denying him to access 
irrigation water. However, this strategy failed because 
Siyathu Banda retained only a little irrigated area for 
his own use and the rest of his farm he leased out. 
Siyathu Banda presented the practice of leasing out in a 
positive light, as one of the strategies of his own 
choosing. 
The relatives and friends of field officials were 
particularly interested in leasing lands from farmers. 
Farmers, on the other hand, took full advantage of this 
situation and began to lease to them their poorer lands 
(i.e.land with levelling problems, canal defects, water 
logging problems et c . ) . Such tenant cultivators were 
expected to take care of the necessary repair and 
maintenance tasks. Siyathu Banda also decided to lease 
out the fully-irrigated portion of his land for a very 
low rent to a person known to the UM. During this 
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The Development of Siyathu Banda's Own Farming System 
Based Upon His Previous Experience 
Siyathu Banda was confident that his way of organizing 
farming provided protection against various risks. During 
his life in the "traditional" village, the main threat 
had come from wild animals (particularly elephants) and 
from water shortage. Fencing, watching and protecting 
crops from wild animals had been effectively managed on 
a collective basis. Organizing agricultural activities 
against drought and water scarcity entailed the 
following types of strategies: a) mixed cropping with 
drought resistant varieties of paddy and other food 
crops, b) sharing cultivation of irrigable land according 
to the 1bethma system' ( i.ej reducing the area 
cultivated and dividing it among the farmers regardless 
of ownership), and, c) working according to the 'panau 
system'(i.e. reciprocal sharing of labour,inputs, 
particular season the UM and the tenant got together and 
utilized the Mahaweli funds to construct a drainage 
culvert. Once the problem was solved Siyathu Banda took 
back the land and leased it out to a new person for a 
higher rent. 
The officials drew the conclusion that Banda was too 
lazy to work on his land. This, in turn, influenced his 
own mistrust of them. He had realized from his own 
experience that officials' assumptions about "ideal 
farmers" were wrong. After all he himself had failed, 
f o l l o w i n g their advice, to ensure his family's 
subsistence through dependence on markets and external 
agencies. 
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production and maintenance work in accordance with the 
shares owned by each farmer). 
But, under the Mahaweli Settlement System, the threat to 
the family came in the form of unidentified risks and 
uncertainties involved in the compulsary cultivation of 
commercial crops. These new forces could not be 
eliminated as they were manipulated and controlled by 
actors associated with external agencies; and reinforced 
by various incentives aimed at encouraging farmers' 
voluntary commitment to the new commodity economy. 
Siyathu Banda needed new strategic actions and types of 
behaviour to deal with these new external forces. 
Siyathu Banda's response is to combine a number of old 
and new activities, diversify livelihood strategies, and 
to incorporate his own ideas and experience into the 
management of the household unit of production. For 
example, he leases out one acre (half of his land) for 
which he earns Rs. 1000.00 per season. Here, he plays 
the role of landlord setting the rent for his tenant. 
Although the commoditization process in the Mahaweli 
settlement makes it difficult for him to accommodate to 
this new style of commercial farming, this does not lead 
him to separate himself altogether from the means of 
production. Instead he obtains a higher return from his 
land through renting out. 
Ande (4) cultivation in the rest of his plot gives 50 to 
60 bushels of paddy as his share of production. This 
amounts to about Rs. 5000.00 per season. He also has Rs. 
4000.00 unused money borrowed from the bank which he has 
not paid back. Since he is utilizing only part of his 
family labour to cultivate only a small area of his 
land, he is also free to work for a daily wage. Thus he 
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Siyathu Banda's responses to various circumstances and 
his changing behavior during different stages of the 
Mahaweli family farming scheme must be interpreted in 
terms of his own perceptions and i experience. His case 
reveals that, despite the various! attempts to promote 
commoditization which binds farme|rs more and more to 
external markets and institutional structures, farmers 
can also use their own strategies for organizing family 
production in the face of changing socio-economic 
conditions. Thus, farmer behavior cannot be fitted into, 
and his wife work as agricultural laborers, using their 
free time. From this they earn about Rs. 2100.00. This 
daily wage is mostly used to cover daily consumption 
needs. Furthermore, since his family members are very 
keen on growing food crops and vegetables, Siyathu Banda 
has leased at a very low rent a nearby plot of nirrigated 
and abandoned land. During the Mjaha (wet) season his 
family cultivates food crops on this land in order to 
supplement food requirements. In addition to these 
various incomes, he is also entitled to receive 
subsidies and material assistance; provided to "weaker 
farmers" by the Mahaweli Authorities. 
When all these benefits are added up, Siyathu Banda's 
family lives more or less close to the level of an ideal 
Mahaweli farmer. Although he sells his labour (about 25% 
of the total income of the family), this is not 
sufficient to categorize him as a semi-proletarian. 
Secondly, his involvement in wage work fluctuates 
considerably according to many factors, such as his spare 
time available, amount of cash available for purchasing 
basic family goods, and the market for wage work within 
the area. 
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or subsumed within, an externally-assumed logic of 
development. 
Siyathu Banda has adopted multiple strategies which 
combine subsistence farming with some aspects of the 
commoditized market economy and wage work. Such forms of 
production cannot in practice be explained as a 
replacement of one mode of production by a more dominant 
one, since farmers use distinctly different and diverse 
farming methods in accordance with their own logic of 
survival. Such production relations and their combination 
are shaped by differential patterns of household 
response. 
The differences that exist between the theory and 
practical reality of the life of settlers in the Mahaweli 
settlement is further elucidated by the way Siyathu Banda 
interacted with a foreign consultant when the latter 
visited the settlement area. The consultant came to study 
farmers' health problems and to implement an educational 
programme. One day he visited Siyathu Banda's family. 
According to Siyathu, the foreign expert observed his 
living environment, took some pictures of the family, 
and then started to talk. His talk was translated into 
Sinhala by a local translator. 
First, he wanted to explain the troubles and suffering 
that a farm family would endure if Siyathu produced too 
many children. Siyathu Banda wondered why this foreigner 
was worried about his children, but he continued 
preparing his betel nut for chewing without showing any 
response. Secondly, the foreign expert wanted to 
communicate (with various explanations concerning 
dangerous diseases, malnutrition and preventive health 
care etc.) that, if he had too many children and ignored 
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the basic health requirements, this would lead to more 
diseases, more suffering for his children and would end 
in their deaths. It took about 15 minutes to explain 
these ideas to Siyathu Banda. According to Banda, all 
this was completely external to his life-world. So he 
carried on chewing betel, again making no response. 
Finally, the foreign visitor asked directly whether he 
understood the danger of neglecting the preventive 
health care of children. 
Throughout Siyatu Banda was awarej that this foreigner 
would disappear after his presentation. He reasoned 
therefore that he should extract some benefits from him. 
Since his life apparently had such serious problems he 
should at least receive some financial or material 
assistance! According to Banda, many foreign and local 
officials come and give instruction^ to do this and that. 
Then they go away and Siyathu Banda has to go back to his 
own way of living. That is mostly the end of the matter. 
According to him, many health officials have been 
employed to educate children in health care and hygiene, 
such as washing their hands before meals and dressing in 
clean clothes. But the children who learned how to clean 
their hands before meals do not have clean food. They 
are also asked to use clean clothes, and yet small 
children run naked because their parents can not afford 
to buy clothing. According to him, naked children are 
cleaner. Why should we dress and make them dirty? 
Many officials are themselves interested in agricultural 
production because they cannot afford to buy expensive 
food from the market. They often collect vegetables, 
fruits and other grains when visiting farmers in order 
to avoid high market prices. The officials themselves, 
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therefore, cannot work according to the market theory 
they want farmers to practice. Siyathu Banda believes 
that involvement in the market (or as he puts it, "in a 
buying-and-selling type of agriculture") is very 
insecure. Hence he feels he ought to make the family unit 
more sustainable by organizing farming activities around 
the subsistence needs of the family. 
Siyathu Banda's case indicates that new forms of 
resistance to imposed styles of living tied to the market 
economy do indeed arise, thus creating obstacles to the 
achievement of agricultural modernization. 
The Producers' World 
This chapter has concentrated on farmer strategies in the 
three settlement units. The first part of the chapter 
examined how intervening parties failed to integrate 
farmers vertically into the formal institutional 
structure through the establishment of Turnout Groups. I 
highlighted the essential shortcomings of attempts to 
organize farmers so that external objectives could be 
realized. Farmers were able to use the weaknesses of 
these imposed participatory structures to pursue their 
own goals. The second part of the chapter focused on the 
differential responses, strategies and outcomes in the 
three settlement units, and analyzed the contrasting 
local problematics of planned intervention in each 
settlement unit. Although farmers in U1 are in a 
favorable position regarding access to irrigation water, 
they have gained additional power through the development 
of horizontal relationships and communications which they 
mobilize in their direct negotiations with local 
officials. In this way the authority structure at local 
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Local officials and their field stations are surrounded 
and affected by these complex local social processes. 
Indeed they have been converted intb locally-rooted units 
level has gradually been transformed into a negotiated 
order. 
Farmers in U11 are faced with severe irrigation water 
problems and this creates common ground for struggle. 
This takes place through day-to-da^ encounters and face-
to-face bargaining with officials over the official 
methods of irrigation water distribution. Here I showed 
how farmers monitor and evaluate' the defects of the 
irrigation system and the role ! of officials, using 
concrete empirical examples in order to counteract the 
i m p o s i t i o n of al ready - fixed iagendas of planned 
development. Since officials have neither an answer nor a 
solution to farmers' complaints,; they are forced to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in farmers' projects, even if such 
involvements are, according to rules and formal 
procedures, considered illegal. 
Although officials labelled farmers in U111 as "backward" 
and regarded them as "powerless", the latter were able to 
acquire forms of power in the realization of their own 
goals. This group of farmers, then, became a major 
constraint on planned intervention. The officials were 
unable to influence them because ,they did not possess 
sufficient legal or political means to control farmers' 
livelihood strategies. At this point I also explored the 
d i f f e r e n t i a l r e s p o n s e s , s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n s and 
interactions among the more "powerful" farmer groups. 
Some farmer groups could identify goals and common 
interests based upon water scarcity in their struggles 
with the bureaucracy. 
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of intervention by the people who occupy and operate 
them. Thus the image of development agencies in Mahaweli 
s e t t l e m e n t s is s i g n i f i c a n t l y s h a p e d by l o c a l 
transactional processes and struggles, although these 
externally originating institutions continually attempt 
to justify themselves and their actions by reference to 
notions of planned intervention and so-called rational 
'management strategies'. Parmer strategies, on the other 
hand, are gradually transformed into a differentiated 
pattern of social and political struggle, which, in turn, 
has ramifications for broader patterns. These processes 
generate new forms of practical consciousness and social 
invention among farmers, that spread beyond the 
boundaries of the local arena and beyond the framework of 
planned settlement development. The next chapter analyses 
the significance of farmer-trader relationships under the 
emergence of intermediary structures. 
Notes 
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1. During my research among settler families in the 
t h r e e s e t t l e m e n t u n i t s , I recorded farmer 
perceptions on external factors involved in their 
livelihood problems. These problems were closely 
related to external forces, such as government 
administration, water distribution, commoditization, 
market exploitation and corruption. Almost all the 
settler families could identiify their own specific 
demands, hidden intentions anjd undiscovered goals, 
depending on the type of practical difficulties and 
constraints they faced in their everyday life. The 
following methods were adopted in the categorization 
of the main demands shown in the table: 
a) All demands mentioned by the settlers for 
negotiation with UMs were recorded. 
b) The records were compiled according to the 
priorities given by settler households. 
c) Taking these priorities into account, all the 
records were grouped into the main demands 
listed in the table. 
d) Records not on the agenda of settlers have been 
i g n o r e d s i n c e they are not considered 
important. 
2. The fact is, that although a considerable amount of 
research and training has been carried out in 
project offices and development centers, many of the 
results have been shown to be viable only within 
the walls of these institutions. Farmers often came 
to regard them as attempts tjo implement the most 
unreliable and expensive agricultural methods which 
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were not of much use for the sustainability of 
farming systems adopted by the farmers themselves. 
James Scott in his book Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, provides a 
more elaborated discussion on the vast and 
relatively unexplored middleground of peasant 
politics, ranging from passivity to open collective 
defiance. He focusses attention upon the ordinary 
weapons of subordinate groups, ranging from 
clandestine arson and sabotage, to foot dragging, 
d i s s i m u l a t i o n , f a l s e c o m p l i a n c e , pilfering, 
slander., flight and so forth. These ordinary weapons 
of relatively powerless groups are stronger than the 
organized actions of administrators, since the 
peasantry is better suited to extended guerrilla-
style campaigns of attrition which require little or 
no coordination. The settlers in UIII also use 
s i m i l a r s t r a t e g i e s , thus demonstrating the 
persistence of peasants' own organizational forms, 
frequently ignored by theoreticians who assume that 
such mechanisms are inoperative in modern societies 
(See also James Scott and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet 
in South East Asia Journal of Peasant Studies, 
Vol.13, No.2, 1986). 
Ande farming is a popular cultivation practice among 
farmers. 'Ande' means inviting another farmer or 
farming family to share inputs and the labour 
involved in the cultivation of a specific plot. This 
is also a means of re-establishing household 
cooperation among farmers who cannot adapt to new 
commercial agriculture. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MARKET INTERVENTION AND STRATEGIES OF TRADERS 
In previous chapters I analyzed hdw local officials and 
farmers behave and interact with each other to realize 
their own goals within a situation;of planned government 
intervention. The differential 'strategies of these 
individuals and social groups generate a diverse pattern 
of social and economic relationships that shape the 
structural outcomes of intervention. This process 
indicates not only the gap between macro-level planning 
and micro-level needs but also how actors (both local 
officials and farmers) modify and re-order settlement 
procedures and regulations in order to develop their own 
working principles and modus vivendi in the process of 
settlement development. 
A full understanding of the complex interplay of these 
e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and their 
implications is difficult to attain only by elaborating 
the ways in which the settlement management system 
operates in the face of settlers' strategies and modes of 
resistance. It is equally important to ask why these 
interacting parties do things quite differently from that 
expected by planners? Also what are the reasons for 
variations in attitudes and behaviour? These questions 
cannot be answered without analyzing the role and 
strategies of traders in the development of settlement 
agriculture. 
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My concern, then, in this chapter is to observe how 
traders as a group of actors develop their relationships 
with other actors through the exchange of commodities. 
Rather than assuming that the market dominates, it is 
important to understand the precise ways in which traders 
interact with others and organize their activities and 
transactions in relation to the behaviour and strategies 
of other people in the market. In this chapter I examine 
the significance of market intervention and the changing 
relationships between traders and family farmers. 
Increasing commoditization in settlement agriculture 
provided, the basis for traders, moneylenders and other 
businessmen to establish themselves in the settlement. 
They now play an important role as intermediaries, their 
s t r a t e g i e s and i n t e r e s t s c e n t e r i n g around the 
accumulation and circulation of merchant capital through 
the operation of exchange relations. 
This kind of relationship between farming households and 
t r a d e r s / m o n e y l e n d e r s , u n d e r h i g h l y commoditized 
agricultural production, is viewed by structuralists as 
consisting of a strong vertically-controlled set of 
relations, which leads to a production and reproduction 
squeeze on rural producers. Yet, contrary to this type of 
essentialist view on farmer-market relationships, 
counter-tendencies emerge at local level. For example, 
market dependency itself is a means of motivating or 
influencing farmers to re-adjust their life strategies 
against such dependency. Secondly, a large number of 
traders in the Mahaweli settlement compete with each 
other to attract settlers in order to minimize their 
business risks. As a result, the inter-dependency between 
trader and farmer becomes more crucial than farmers' 
dependency on the market. Such inter-dependency brings 
traders closer to farmers than is often assumed. 
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O r t h o d o x c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of f a r m e r - m a r k e t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s p l a c e emphasis on the structural 
characteristics of commodity producers and narrowly 
define the social relations and interactions of the 
actual participants in the process.: Hence production and 
the social relations of individual units of production 
are wholly predicated upon the principle of the market. 
Moreover, if we analyze the so-called "victimization" or 
"marginalization" of farmers as a structural process, 
then we must, at the same time, also assume that the 
process of merchant capital penetration works in favour 
of the dominant class, to the detriment of a large number 
of farming households. Such an interpretation can, 
however, be misleading if farmers' responses and 
behaviour in the face of these changing circumstances are 
not adequately taken into account and analyzed. This is 
important because a common feature of everyday activities 
in Mahaweli settlements is the presence of various 
external commercial agents and institutions, including 
traders and businessmen, who are pursuing their own 
strategies of intervention, just as the farmers 
themselves discuss and plan strategies for escaping from 
such pressures, if they judge that their own goals of 
family survival are likely to be threatened. 
Market intervention in the settlements creates a 
problematic situation in which farming households are 
forced to organize their activities according to the 
vicissitudes of the changing market situation; and 
traders also change their intervention strategies not 
only in accordance with the market but also bearing in 
mind the reactions of farmers and the increasing 
competition of other traders. .Hence settler-trader 
relationships are shaped by the on-going social 
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commitments and negotiated transactions between them. 
These relationships include patron-client relationships, 
friendship, and sometimes entail the abandoning of market 
relationships through the cultivation food crops for 
family subsistence. In this chapter I discuss how planned 
intervention has influenced the life styles of farming 
households through the expansion of market relations and 
commodity production. These forces, however, have failed 
to bind farmers strongly to the market. Instead, the 
commoditization process motivates them to engage and 
activate various social relations to resist the process 
of deepening commodity relations. Secondly, I will 
analyze the changing trade patterns in the settlement and 
the formation of intermediary structures in response to 
the changing circumstances of planned intervention. 
Finally, I will describe the emergence of the traders' 
lifeworlds based on increasing interdependency between 
them and the settlers. 
There has been a rapid expansion of cash-crop farming and 
marketing in Mahaweli settlements. As a result of the 
m o n e t i z a t i o n of the production process, farming 
households became involved in a struggle for cash. This 
"hunger for cash" implies a lack of purchasing power 
among settlers. If farmers cannot at least maintain a 
certain level of cash income and purchasing capacity then 
traders simply cannot extract profit. In such a situation 
both parties must develop strategies and explore 
alternatives. As I discuss in the following sections, the 
so-called commoditization process in Mahaweli settlements 
creates a situation of interdependency among farmers and 
traders who develop social relations and share problems 
within of their lifeworlds. 
shift in government 
open-market policies. 
221 
S e p a r a t i o n of F a r m i n g Households from Mahaweli 
Construction and Commercial Activities 
Rapid expansion of trading, monjeylending and other 
commercial activities in the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme 
resulted basically from the major 
policy from inward-looking to more 
In 19 78, the government decided to relax import 
restrictions and so duties on imports and exports were 
drastically reduced. The private sector was provided full 
freedom under this liberalization of market policy. 
Leading public organizations such as the Electricity 
Board, the Transport Board, the Milk Board, and the banks 
were privatized. The placing of market liberalization and 
privatization on the agenda of government was, it seems, 
largely due to external pressures from international 
donors and banking agencies. When the government required 
foreign exchange and capital of various kinds for the 
implementation of the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme 
(AMP), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered its 
favorite packages, namely, the devaluation of the Sri 
Lankan currency and an open economy and privatization. 
These were the main lines followed by government. 
By 1985, the 1977 estimate of Rs. 12 billion for the full 
Mahaweli Programme, had become Rs.40 billion for a 
reduced programme, irrigating 120,000 hectares of land, 
much less than was originally planned (Economic Review, 
1985). With massive public investment and the support and 
encouragement given to the private sector, the economic 
interests, attitudes and business techniques of private 
entrepreneurs began to change. They began to realize that 
trading, moneylending and construction work within the 
Mahaweli Project area was more profitable than investing 
directly in agricultural or industrial production. With 
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changes in Sri Lanka's economy and political environment, 
various groups of entrepreneurs quickly adapted to the 
commoditization process by taking advantage of these new 
commercial opportunities emerging in such leading 
development projects as the Mahaweli. 
During the first stage of settlement development, 
starting in 19 79, commercial entrepreneurs from the urban 
areas established themselves as contractors for small-
and large-scale construction work such as canals, roads, 
official residences and land development. Some of them 
became supply agents for consumer durables and household 
equipment to the large number of engineering, technical 
and administrative staff and other personnel involved in 
the design and supervision of settlement construction. 
The success of their businesses was, of course, largely 
dependent upon their capacity to influence settlement 
officials. The engineering staff took decisions on the 
allocation of construction work to private contractors. 
The technical staff supervised their work and the 
administrative staff made the required payments. Thus at 
each level of the construction business an entrepreneur 
had to satisfy a different set of Mahaweli officials for 
the clearance of formalities and to demonstrate that he 
was abiding by regulations. If bureaucratic procedures 
become a barrier to the smooth operation and maximization 
of profit, then the entrepreneur had to spend a 
considerable amount of his commercial capital and time on 
pursuing the operation by covert means. This involved 
bribing, paying a share of the profit as a commission, 
offering valuable gifts or using political connections. 
In this chain of activities, linking contractors and the 
management bureaucracy, many officials were able, with 
the help of commercial entrepreneurs, to earn extra 
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Planned intervention in the Mahaweli has a set of rules 
and procedures which are designed to protect family farm 
settlers. These rules become a barrier to other groups 
(such as traders, contractors and officials) from 
entering the sphere of production and production 
relations. For example, the cultivation of a settler's 
land by an outsider is illegal and only owners of the 
land are legally entitled to use agricultural resources. 
On the other hand, settlers themselves are supposed to be 
involved only in agriculture; ind the construction 
business and trading are the maid economic activities 
open to outsiders. Taking advantage of this provision, 
local officials, traders and contractors within the 
settlement region, have developed their own modes of 
income. Although some commentators have advocated the 
superiority of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946) over other forms 
of social organization, in this cojntext it becomes less 
and less significant because bure&ucratic behaviour in 
the business environment clearly deviates from a strict 
adherence to impersonal rules* On the contrary, 
impersonal rules are often manipulated by the officials 
for their own personal ends. Hence personal economic 
gain, which becomes possible through an alliance with 
merchant capital, offers a popular; source of income for 
officials because of its low risk end short-run returns. 
Such gains are achieved through) the development of 
economic transactions shaped by the working procedures 
and relationships that evolve between local officials and 
entrepreneurs. Therefore merchant capital penetration is 
not simply an automatic process with its own law of 
motion. It consists of an intermediate structure that 
emerges to make it possible for capital to penetrate and 
serve the interests of the various actors involved in its 
operation. 
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extracting maximum benefit from the construction and 
trading. Hence it is these groups that operate as the 
local "penetrative mechanism," and they have their own 
networks developed for the achievement of this goal. The 
most important feature of the collective and individual 
strategies of these actors is that the "entry points" 
available for the outside world (in this case people from 
outside the settlement region) are either closed off or 
controlled by these local groups who now occupy this 
particular economic terrain. 
The policy makers of the Accelerated Mahaweli Scheme 
designed a programme to incorporate outside commercial 
entrepreneurs, settlers and settlement officials into a 
'combined group' for settlement construction and 
development. This was known as the Worker Settler 
Programme whose objective was to provide a better 
opportunity for settlers to participate in irrigation 
construction as medium- and small-scale contractors, so 
that not only the quality of irrigation construction 
would be improved but also a considerable amount of 
Mahaweli funds would be channelled into the hands of 
settlers who could then invest in agriculture. This was 
regarded as a sound solution to the livelihood problem of 
settlers during the 'transitional period'. 
The aim was not only to stimulate various kinds of infra-
structural development. There was obviously also an 
intention to stimulate settlers and other inhabitants of 
the area to engage in trade and other ventures rather 
than simply letting outsiders take over. This was a 
meritorious idea since it implied that linkages within 
the regional economy would be stimulated, which would 
counteract linkages to established areas and centers 
outside the system. In this way it would generate extra 
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income-earning opportunities especially for the second 
and third generations of sett lors within the area 
(Lundqvist, 1986). 
Although this concept was valuable, both Mahaweli 
officials and entrepreneurs manifested a negative 
attitude towards the Worker Settler Programme from its 
inception. A coalition of entrepreneurs and officials 
backed by merchant capital began to operate 'underground 
mechanisms'. As a result, commerciail entrepreneurs gained 
access to the more profitable part of the construction 
business, while the entrepreneur settlers were given only 
very difficult and low-profit! construction work. 
Secondly, the approval and payment for irrigation 
construction carried out by the settlers was frequently 
delayed, making it impossible for many of them to survive 
and continue their construction work. Finally, therefore, 
the programme became a total failure. 
There was a close link between merchant capital and the 
government investment programme at various levels. The 
relationship between management officials and local 
contractors was strongest in the construction sector. The 
most striking feature of this relationship was the 
separation of the settler community from these 
activities, which effectively left {them out of the entire 
operation. Public funds, including foreign assistance for 
the development of the Mahaweli Settlement Scheme, were 
channeled through the settlement authorities to approved 
contractors, thus keeping the flow of public resources to 
the settlers at a very minimum level. In the circulation 
of merchant capital, profits were extracted and drained 
out of the settlement into the hands of the bigger 
traders and businessmen based in urban centers. This set 
of commercial entrepreneurs were not involved in 
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plundering the assets of family farmers but instead they 
entered into different forms of plundering project 
resources. For example, when private businessmen were 
given jungle clearing contracts in the System 1 C area, 
they destroyed the forest cover of the Maduru Oya 
Reservoir and other reserve forests, in order to extract 
valuable timber. Later a large amount of government funds 
had to be invested in afforestation, thereby generating 
even more commercial opportunities for the same traders. 
But, as I described in Chapter 3, most irrigation 
construction undertaken by private contractors was far 
below expected quality. Moreover such activities were not 
only environmentally destructive but also led to 
unsustainable forms of commodity agriculture. 
However, the construction business in the settlement 
scheme was limited to the initial stage of the project. 
Those large-scale contractors who had political clout 
later shifted to new areas, while the medium- and small-
scale contractors, who had already developed good 
relationships with the local officials, remained in the 
settlement area and established themselves as leading 
traders in the townships and village centers. It was 
this new group of traders who eventually destroyed the 
existing small-scale retail trading activities of the 
settlers. 
Increasing Uncertainties and Risks of Market-Dependent 
Household Survival 
In order to utilize new irrigation technology and to 
impose new administrative machinery, all the settler 
families and resources in the area were brought under the 
control of the Mahaweli Authority. The settlers were then 
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forced through a state-organized programme to cultivate 
cash crops for the market. This intensive cultivation 
required new technology as well as new inputs. Thus 
independent peasant agriculture was replaced by a new 
commoditized system whereby families competed in the 
market for the sale of their output as well as for the 
purchase of agricultural inputs and consumer goods. The 
rapid growth of the internal market and the expansion of 
commercial transactions between the settlements and urban 
centers, and the growth of ctonsumer goods (both 
manufactured and imported) and agricultural products 
exchangeable in the market for | money, thus became 
dominant features of settlement development. 
Extensive methods of cultivation, involving the rotation 
of plots, were replaced by the intensive cultivation of 
one plot on a regularly basis, requiring new inputs such 
as chemical fertilizer, weed killers, pesticides, credit, 
machine power, etc. Animal draught original was a 'free' 
input available in the villages but it could not be used 
under the new settlement scheme because of the lack of 
pasturage. The settlers, therefore, had to depend on the 
machine markets and especially on traders who hired out 
tractors. 
Due to the lack of food crops available for consumption, 
there was a regular demand for wheat flour and bread; and 
the clearing of the jungle destroyed important herbs and 
indigenous medicines, leaving the settlers dependent on 
western medicine, thus increasing the demand for 
manufactured drugs. Because of such changes there was a 
sudden increase in the costs of production and 
consumption. A new demand for consumer items was created 
which had to be satisfied on a commercial basis. The 
settlers were provided with plots of 2.5 acres but were 
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Table 16 Average Daily Expenditure on Basic Consumer 
Items for an Average Family of 5 Members (1980 
prices as base)* Three Settlement Units (25% 
sample). (Aggregated data). 
Item During village life 
before moving to 
the Settlement Under the New Settlement 
1 980 1983 1985 
Rs. Rs. Rs. 
Breakfast meal 1 .00 3 . 00 6.00 
Coconut 0.75 2. 00 4.50 
Fish 1 .00 1 . 50 6.00 
Vegetables - 1 . 00 3.00 
Onion - 0. 75 1 .00 
Chillies - 1 . 00 2.00 
Spices 0.75 1 . 00 3 .50 
Sugar 0.60 2 . 00 6.00 
Tea 0.20 1 . 00 3.00 
Betel 0.50 1 . 50 3 .00 
Tobacco 0.80 1 . 75 3 .00 
Soap 1 .00 2 . 50 3 .50 
Kerosene oil 0.35 1 . 00 2.00 
Coconut oil 0.50 1 . 00 2.00 
Medicines 0.75 2 . 00 4.00 
Total 8.20 23 . 00 52.50 
Source: Family Budget Survey: 1983!Yala (dry) season and 
1985 Maha (Wet)season. * Prices! for each year were 
calculated discounting inflation and also making 
provision for new members added to families during this 
period. 
The introduction of High Yielding Varieties of paddy, the 
major component of what is termed the "Green Revolution", 
has undoubtedly had a crucial impact on the process of 
social differentiation. But the mojst significant impact 
of paddy monoculture in Mahaweli settlements was not the 
emergence of a dynamic class structure among family 
cultivate paddy, even during the Yala (dry) season, by 
controlling the supply of water. Therefore settlers had 
to devise their own strategies for dealing with this 
situation. 
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farmers, but the expansion of trade and commerce 
r e s u l t i n g from the increased sales of chemical 
fertilizer, agro-chemicals and other related products. 
High Yielding Varieties of paddy require a higher 
quantity of fertilizer than other crops. Thus the import 
and distribution of fertilizer became a major activity 
for traders. Average annual sales of chemical fertilizer 
in the settlement was about 1500 Metric tonnes in 1958 
(M.E.A, 1985). Paddy was an important crop, too, for 
political authorities who stressed their role in leading 
the country towards self-sufficiency in rice. The 
management bureaucracy also paid special attention to 
paddy farming because most agricultural extension 
officers had received their training in HYVs of paddy 
(particularly at international institutions such as IRRI 
in the Philippine) and because water management officials 
saw the provision of water for paddy farming as their 
main responsibility. 
A belief persists that farmers can always keep paddy for 
consumption. But, in reality, if they have any paddy 
left, they sell it during the off-season, in small 
quantities and often at very low prices. Therefore paddy 
has become a cash crop that favors the circulation of 
merchant capital in the marketing system. This accounts 
for the increase in the relative importance of commerce, 
transport and credit, and in the position of those who 
manage and control these. But settlers, it seems, 
continue to be compelled to cultivate paddy for the 
market, even though it gives them a very low net return. 
A large proportion of the surplus is then transferred to 
traders or middlemen who control the most profitable 
commercial functions (such as the farm machine market, 
the purchasing of farm crops, the consumer market, and 
the investment of merchant capital in moneylending). And 
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the expansion of cash-crop cultivation has created a 
seasonal marketable surplus which is attractive to 
traders. 
Hence an increasing number of traders from the urban 
centers have established shops within the settlement 
area. The new policy of allowing them to settle in the 
area on "commercial plots", has promoted the separation 
of retail trading in the settlement area from the 
settlers themselves. Since these commercial plots were 
s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o c a t e d for e n t e r p r i s e s outside 
agriculture, this became the way: for shopkeepers and 
other traders to enter the Mahaweli settlements. As 
revealed in my studies of the trade sector, although 
about 90 per cent of the shops were owned by settlers in 
Zone 11 of System ' C in 1983, (see Siriwardena, 1983), 
by 1985 about 75 per cent of them belonged to 'outside' 
professional traders. This marked an important change in 
the relationship between local village traders and 
settlers, as well as in the relationship between the 
village trader and urban wholesaler. The change was 
initially favorable to settler traders because, being 
people from within the settlement, they were aware of 
settlers market behaviour and needs, whereas the in-
coming traders had to establish contacts with farmers and 
learn about their situation. Their success depended upon 
their developing stable business relations with farmers. 
This led to a competitive market environment which tended 
to reduce the use of highly exploitative methods of 
trade. At an early stage these new traders involved 
themselves in promoting sales rather than aiming for 
maximization. Daily turnover in the shops of this area, 
estimated at Rs.15,000/- in 1983, had increased to about 
Rs.30,000/- by 1985. This 100% increase indicates the 
g r o w i n g dependence of households on the market 
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(Siriwardena, 1985). In fact the behaviour of settlers 
has now become very similar to that of consumers in urban 
areas. Their market dependency is such that, although 
they produce paddy, they must also buy rice during the 
cultivation season. Field investigation of the trade 
sector in 1985 revealed that each shop in the region sold 
about 50 kgs. of rice per day and that the price was 
higher than that in Colombo consumer markets. 
Increasing market dependency, expansion of commodity 
production and specialization of tasks through state 
intervention gave rise to open market competition, 
reducing the gap between the market price for 
agricultural products and the prices for consumer goods, 
thus minimizing the producers' profit accumulation 
through the exchange of commodities. When the market was 
unprotected in this way, there was high competition among 
traders who sought to make their businesses attractive to 
settlers. Thus the settlers provided the basis upon which 
traders could take control of the means of exchange 
rather than an opportunity for well-to-do farmers to take 
control of the means of production. This implies that, at 
the regional level, merchant capital generates its own 
local networks wherein traders must protect their own 
survival. Although they may be considered as occupying 
particular structural locations, traders, the other 
actors, give their own meanings to the various social 
relations in which they involved. These processes form 
part of the larger social system to which local actors 
respond and mediate political and economic forces. The 
outcomes, of course can be quite different from those 
expected by planners and policy makers. The building of 
the traders' own lifeworlds results this partly from the 
responses and resistance of farmers to the newly-
established market economy of the Mahaweli settlement. 
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Structural Discontinuity Under the Merchant-Family Farmer 
Relationship 
During the initial stage of settlement in System ' C , the 
'transitional period', most of the settlers could not 
earn sufficient income from agriculture due to the poor 
levelling of land, lack of irrigation water and difficult 
living conditions in the new area. Farmers therefore had 
to seek out their own alternatives, since external 
agencies could not offer them suitable options. In fact 
the programme of settlement development was specifically 
a i m e d at l i m i t i n g f a r m e r s ' own diversification 
possibilities. And even private contractors involved in 
irrigation and building construction were reluctant to 
give secondary employment to settlers, because they 
w a n t e d to p r o t e c t t h e i r b u s i n e s s secrets and 
'underground' operations from them. Despite this a 
considerable number of settlers managed to combine 
agriculture with small-scale enterprise, which helped 
them to adapt to the changes in household economy in the 
new environment. Table 17 lists the various types of 
small-scale business activities: undertaken by the 
settlers in Zone ii of System ' C , in 1983. 
During this construction stage a marketable surplus from 
agriculture was uncertain, and the condition of the roads 
in the settlement area was very poor. 
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Table 17. Business activities of the settlers in Zone 
11- 1983 
Type of activity No. of Average i 
settlers Turnover 
Bicycle repair centers 12 15 
Hairdressers 05 30 
Grocery businesses 
and Marketing 42 40 
Hardware and building 
materials 22 75 
Rice milling 05 120 
Tea shops 12 50 
Total No. of traders 
in the Block 98 
Source: Own Survey, 19 83 (* Rs= #2 7.5) 
Therefore, neither outside entrepreneurs, nor the big 
traders in the township were keen on entering into 
trading with these family-based, small-scale settler 
businesses. So during this period there were no wholesale 
agents within the region, and none in nearby towns. 
Almost all the small retail shops in the settlement area 
had to purchase their goods from outside the area and 
bring them to their shops themselves by bicycle, tractor 
or bus. Special wholesale prices or other favors, such as 
goods on credit, were not offered to settlers. Of 92 
commercial settler units in System 'C', about 78 were 
first-time businesses. 
Soon after the completion of road construction, these 
businesses gradually declined. There were various reasons 
for this. In the first place, those who had started 
small-scale retail trading as a supplementary source of 
income during the transitional phase later became tied up 
with regular cultivation of their plots following a tight 
timetable imposed by the settlement management. Regular 
involvement in agriculture demanded most of the settlers' 
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time, necessitating their abandoning trading activities. 
Secondly, it seems that settlers' aspirations towards 
business were comparatively low. They were, it seems, not 
interested in business innovation and profit-maximizing 
strategies aimed at placing their trading on a 
competitive basis. Thirdly, they were isolated from the 
circuit of ideas current in trading circles. Finally, 
their financial capacity to engage in trading or other 
similar businesses was lower than that of the 
professional traders who entered the settlement. After 
1977, the policies of the government had changed in favor 
of the private commercial sector. Under a liberalized 
market policy, traders were allowed to compete with 
formal marketing bodies such as the Cooperatives, the 
Marketing Department and the Cooperative Wholesale 
Establishment (CWE). Selected large-scale traders were 
given special permission to undertake marketing in the 
Mahaweli Settlement on the recommendation (based on their 
experience in trading and their financial capacity) of 
the Mahaweli Authority. They also received land legally 
from the settlement area on which to establish their 
businesses. 
The improvement of infrastructure, especially the 
building of new highways through the settlement area, 
brought city traders, retail traders and their agents 
into closer contact. With the introduction of a private 
passenger transport system, breaking down the existing 
state monopoly - under the Ceylon Transport Board-
newly- established traders in the settlement area 
developed transport services as a complement to their 
commercial interests. Transporting of passengers and 
goods between the settlements and the outside became a 
popular activity of such traders. Table 18 shows the 
share of transport businesses controlled by these 
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Table 18 Ownership of Transport Businesses in the 
Settlement Area. 
Ownership Number of Buses Total % 
Small Medium Large 
Traders in the 
settlement area 8 5 - 13 68.5 
Government Officials 2 - - 02 10.5 
Settlers 2 - - 02 10.5 
Ceylon Transport Board - - 2 02 10.5 
Total 12 5 2 19 100.0 
Source: Own Survey, 19 85. 
sales in this form were gradually reduced. The new 
traders discovered that settlers had difficulties in 
generating sufficient surplus to cover the costs of 
production and consumption, and were slow at settling 
both institutional and non-institutional debts. But 
because these new traders were not knowledgeable about or 
familiar with the settler community, an effective debt 
recovery system could not quickly be developed. They 
required some method of integrating with the settler 
community. In order to solve this, they introduced 
traders in the settlement. This provided an additional 
opportunity for investment. 
In 1983, a main feature of small-scale settler trading 
was that credit sales were higher in volume than cash 
sales. About 90% of such trading units sold consumer 
goods on credit, a necessary condition for the existence 
of such local enterprise. However, with the expansion of 
outside professional traders' trade networks, credit 
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business methods that were geared to transforming 
unprofitable credit transactions into other forms of 
lending. For example, they realized that overburdening 
farmers with heavy debts was simply counter-productive. 
Small-scale loans for harvesting (offered just before the 
harvest starts) were considered more reliable since 
farmers could repay immediately after their crops had 
been harvested. Then, with the expansion of the commodity 
economy, private traders already established in the 
settlement found that they faced fierce competition with 
each other for the purchase of farmers' crops, and so 
many of them combined the purchasing of commodities with 
the sales of farm inputs and consumer goods. This enabled 
them to build up a regular clientele among settler 
households. Sales of consumer goods on credit to the 
settlers who did not sell their produce to the trader as 
part of the combined transaction were discouraged. For 
example, pre-harvesting credit was provided at a very 
nominal rate of interest, or was even free of interest, 
but farmers had to agree that they would sell a part of 
their harvest to the shop in settlement of their debt. In 
this way the trader could collect a sufficient marketable 
surplus to sell in the wholesale market and thus make a 
good profit. 
Consumer credit transactions, however, continued to a 
limited extent. During the 1985 Maha (wet) season, about 
64% of the traders were selling goods on a short-term 
credit basis, while paddy purchasing was operated under 
varying arrangements with the settlers. About 36% of the 
traders organized their transactions on a purely cash 
basis. (See Table 19 below). The majority of settlers 
were compelled to use various strategies for re-adjusting 
their family budgets in response the highly seasonal flow 
of cash and the fluctuations i\i their patterns of 
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Table 19. Sales of consumer items and paddy purchases for 









credit less than 253 
sales 
Sales on credit up to 50% of 
total sales 
Sales on credit above 50% of 
total sales 
Cash sales only 
by traders in the Mahaweli 









Purchasing of paddy under 
agreed terms 48 64.0% 
Purchasing of paddy on 
direct cash payment 27 36.0% 
Source: Own Survey, 1985. 
For some cash crops, such as chillies, the pre-harvesting 
loan system was not commonly practised. This was mainly 
because the traders could not arrive at profitable 
purchasing contracts before the harvest due to high 
fluctuations in price. Secondly, the demand for 
pre-harvesting advances for such crops was lower than 
paddy since the area cultivated by an average settler was 
less than one acre. Thirdly, cash crops, like chillies, 
cannot be stored for long periods by traders until the 
time prices rise. The traders therefore dispose of them 
immediately after purchasing. 
expenditure. Their entire income and loans would normally 
be spent on cultivation and consumption during the early 
stages of cultivation, but during the harvesting period 
they would have to struggle with a family budget deficit 
and a desperate need for cash. Figure 3 gives the earning 
and expenditure patterns for an average settler 
household. 
Activity of the merchants in per the Settlement Scheme. 
Activity °f the Settlers 
od 
'sales-Fertilizer.Agro chemical flHHuind preparation and sowing 
Hiring tractors, ii^ lements GjHH transplanting Plaha and Yala 
(Absorb Bank Borrowing) • • ^ • ( B o r r o w from State Banks) 
tors on Crop Mortgage System-
Purchasing farm produce " " 
• Harvesting Plaha and Yala 
«••••• seasons. 
Recovery of Settler's debts-
Sales of luxury and semi-luxury 
goods.Organising liquor and 
Gambling units. 
Peak season of spending cash 
Income. 
Diminish transaction on credit. 
'Reduce relationship. 
Inter-household cooperation 
and infra-household relation 
for survival. 
(1) = Mahaweli Time Table 
(2) = Farmer's Actual Cultivation Calendar 
(3) = Farmer's Expenditure Pattern & 
Trader's Business Pattern 
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To overcome this problem traders divert their attention 
to other lines of marketing, such as the appointment of 
local agents, whom they finance to purchase or act as 
agents with outside wholesalers in the towns. This helps 
to spread risk. But, at the same time, adds more 
middlemen to the marketing chain who make their profit 
through underweighing and underpricing. In response to 
this, settlers react by mixing bad quality paddy or sand 
in the middle of the bags, changing buyers, and 
intensively overviewing the traders' buying techniques. 
Once settlers' living standards are reduced to the level 
of subsistence, they become more and more aware of the 
risks and market exploitation associated with totally 
m a r k e t - d e p e n d e n t crops like chillies (since the 
subsistence value of this crop is much lower). 
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e a s s o c i a t e d with the 
diversification of trade is the increasing dependence of 
traders on outside labour for their business activities. 
For example, the number of full-time workers employed by 
them, in 1 985, was estimated to be about 290 in total, 
that is an average of four workers per trader. These 
workers were transferred by their employers from centres 
where their original businesses were located. No work of 
this kind was provided for the younger unemployed 
generation of the Mahaweli settlements. This contrasts 
with the situation in 1 983 when all settlers' retail 
trading businesses employed either family or community 
members. 
From the inception of the settlement programme, 
particular attention was given to the establishment of 
national institutions, such as the Co-operatives, the 
Paddy Marketing Board (PMB), the Marketing Department 
etc., for agricultural marketing. The aim of these 
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government - sponsored marketing linstitutions was to 
protect settlers from the exploitation of private sector 
traders and middlemen. The Co-operative Societies, for 
instance, were involved in the distribution of basic 
consumer goods and in the purchasing of paddy on behalf 
of the PMB through its branches, the People's Bank, on 
the other hand, played a leading role in lending money to 
settlers as well as to the C o - o p e r a t i v e Societies. There 
were Rural Bank branches under the Co-operatives 
disbursing credit to settlers operating as agents of the 
People's Bank. However, the prestige of the Co-operative 
Societies diminished when open market and privatization 
policies began to be implemented. As a result, not only 
did settlers lose their confidence in institutional 
marketing but they also began to; rely heavily on the 
private sector. 
In keeping with the ideology of fr^e market competition, 
the formal sector did not receive any special concessions 
in the form of policies or incentives. In fact, the 
regulations protecting the Co-operatives were removed, 
and the People's Bank was allowed to operate direct 
l e n d i n g without channelling finance through the 
Co-operative Rural Banks. This resulted in a drop in the 
income of rural banks as well as a disintegration of 
banking operations among the Co-operatives. As compared 
to the private traders, the purchasing of the Co-
operatives had decreased due tj° t h e reduction of 
overdraft facilities offered by the People's Bank. Within 
this changing environment, some institutions, such as 
the PMB (Paddy Marketing Board), had most of its 
activities incorporated within the activities of private 
traders. For example, the PMBi's paddy purchasing 
decreased because the Co-operative that acted as the sole 
purchasing agent did not function, efficiently. The PMB 
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therefore appointed private agents for purchasing paddy 
on a commission basis. These agents were traders in the 
area who had political influence. They purchased paddy 
without utilizing their own capital, and developed close 
relationships with the PMB officials who regulated PMB 
funds in favor of them. Since part of the commission was 
paid to the officials by the agents, the purchasing of 
paddy directly from settlers was often discouraged in 
order that paddy would come to the PMB through its 
agents. 
In a recent debate, Long identifies some important issues 
concerning the impact of commoditization. Empirically, 
studies have demonstrated the ways in which rural 
e c o n o m i e s are i n c r e a s i n g l y a f f e c t e d by market 
incorporation and the process of capital subsumption, 
leading to the increasing dependence of peasant 
households on cash income and on purchased goods. 
However, although integration into markets and external 
institutional structures may reduce the range of economic 
alternatives available to farmers, the availability of 
non-wage household/family labour and resources, coupled 
with the maintenance of local networks based on kinship, 
friendship and patronage, allow farmers to continue to 
resolve certain of their livelihood and consumption 
problems outside the market (Long,1986). Following this 
argument, and based on what I have observed in the 
Mahaweli settlement, I would argue that massive 
intervention and commoditization in the Mahaweli 
Settlement Scheme provided an ideal situation for farmers 
to resist and struggle against the assumed tendencies of 
commoditization, showing how farmers make full use of 
their own knowledge and capabilities. 
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Table 20. Agricultural Activities 
Settlement Units 
Total number of traders 
Number of taders cultivating land on a 
leased basis 
Rent for the land per season 
Total rent payable to settlers 
Total ares cultivated 
Average area cultivated by 
traders 
Duration of cultivation 
of Traders in the 
Less than one season 
More than one to two seasons 
More than two to three seasons 


















Source: Own Survey, 1985. 
Clearly the Mahaweli situation cannot be explained by 
focussing upon any single set of factors because 
p e n e t r a t i o n of m e r c h a n t capital in the Scheme 
demonstrates the co-existence of various contradictory 
elements and a mixture of many tendencies. Although 
merchant capital is concentrated in the sphere of market 
circulation, when local retail traders intensify their 
interaction with local groups, the logic of market 
penetration works rather differently than assumed. 
A c c o r d i n g to the traders, their involvement in 
agriculture under hidden tenancy arrangements is not due 
to their interest in cultivation perse, but because they 
are compelled to do so when some settlers mortgage their 
land to settle their debts with them. Once the land is 
leased in, traders must then cultivate them in order to 
extract some benefit. However, after two or three 
seasons, the land is returned to the settler, once the 
debts have been cancelled by the r£nt owed the settlers. 
Table 20 gives details on the cultivation of land by 
traders. 
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* Calculated on the basis of the standard rent charged by 
settlers in the three settlement units. 
As I have discussed in Chapter 4, each family has its own 
way of organizing its livelihood strategy in the face of 
external contingencies and intervening actors. Indeed 
there is a great diversity in the ways in which settler 
families interact with outside parties. In adjusting 
their business styles to these varied local responses, 
the role played by retail traders demonstrates not only 
the settlers' dependence on the trader but also latters' 
dependence on the settlers. For example, a considerable 
part of a trader's profit is invested in the development 
of appropriate social relations necessary for stabilizing 
his business. In the settlements, government banks 
provide cultivation loans to settlers. But the rate of 
default has increased. During the 1983 Yala(dry) and 1984 
Maha(wet) seasons, about 80 percent of the settlers who 
had defaulted on institutional credit demanded from 
government that they be allowed to re-schedule their 
debts, due to crop failure (People's Bank,1985). During 
both occasions many traders played an active role in 
organizing settler demonstrations aimed at applying 
pressure on government. Settlers pressed to have their 
loans re-scheduled in order to obtain new credit. When I 
met those traders who were leading these settler 
demonstrations, a question arose as to why they organized 
settlers when they had nothing directly to do with the 
institutional credit problem. The answer was that if 
settlers were given new loans by the Bank, then traders 
would help to recover their debts from the settlers as 
well. On both occasions, in fact, they succeeded in 
recovering these debts from the new loans granted by the 
government banks. But, after a few seasons, settlers once 
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Pathiraja, owner of the Pathiraja 
U1 
Stores, Settlement Unit 
settlement During my field work in the s 
my consumption requirements from P 
several visits to this shop, Pathi 
with me various problems in the se 
ra 
area, I purchased 
thiraja Stores. After 
ja started to discuss 
ttlement. One day, he 
more defaulted on government loans. So, once again, the 
traders helped settlers to press for their case. In the 
end government was compelled, for political reasons, to 
write off the debts. In this way, the development of 
antagonism between settlers and the,state was temporarily 
controlled. 
Relationships and interactions between traders and 
settlers are not restricted therefore simply to monetary 
or material transactions, but involve various social 
negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of 
particular commercial transactions. The outcome of such 
negotiations depend not only on the leverage exercised by 
the settlers, but also on the traders who devise their 
strategies vis-a-vis the interests and resources of other 
actors-clients and competitors. The transactions that 
result can best be described in terms of a 'Theory of 
Games' model wherein the interests and social welfare of 
the respective actors constitute a critical element of 
the game, although it is important not to treat the 
activities of traders simply as a set of transactions 
with some kind of abstract environment. 
These points can be further illustrated by the following 
account given by Pathiraja, a trader in the Mahaweli 
settlement. 
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wanted to know my involvement in the settlement. After I 
explained to him that I was doing a study about Mahaweli 
farmers, he laughed and said: 
"you will never be able to study them. Be careful, 
they will tell you one thing but do something 
completely different from what they preach. After 
many years of business in this village even I still 
cannot understand them. Their behaviour is like the 
waves of the sea which rise suddenly and merge 
unexpectedly" 
According to him, trading in the Mahaweli settlements is 
a difficult game which requires a knowledge of how to 
organize activities according to the "unpredictable" 
behaviour of settlers. 
Pathiraja started trading with his father in Kandy (the 
main town of the Central Province) about 20 years ago. 
After his father's death, the shop was inherited by him 
and his brother. They did well with their business. In 
1980, a friend of Pathiraja, who was working in a foreign 
construction company of the Mahaweli Project, came up 
with an the idea of opening a shop in System C of the 
Mahaweli Scheme. Within two months Pathiraja decided to 
open a shop in the settlement because there was already 
high competition among businessmen to enter the Mahaweli 
settlement. So he approached the Political Authority (the 
local Member of Parliament) and obtained some land (a 
commercial plot) with a good location. 
The shop was established in 1981 at the time when first 
settlers were moving into the settlement. From its 
inception, the Mahaweli officials helped him with setting 
up the business and within six months he had developed 
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close relationships with them. They suggested that he 
invest in the Mahaweli construction business before 
entering trading and explained the slecrets of how to make 
a profit out of irrigation construction. They used him to 
register his business before outside contractors "come 
and take over". Their intention was to allocate approved 
contract work to 'known people' and to get a share of the 
profit for themselves. As far as the construction 
business was concerned, there were rules and procedures 
to be followed. All this was in the hands of project 
officials. However outside contractors who came from 
Colombo possessed their own political leverage and were 
also by-pass procedures. Project officials did not like 
this, since external political manipulation in the 
construction business damaged established relationships 
with local contractors. Hence wherever possible, 
officials devised their own strategies for manipulating 
procedures of allocating construction contracts. 
Pathiraja decided to move into both the construction and 
trading. He asked his wife and brother-in-law to look 
after the shop. This was a very good period for him. He 
brought a tractor and, with the help of the officials, 
started Mahaweli construction, building canals and roads. 
The officials explained him how he could make a profit, 
prepared over-inflated cost estimates, got them approved 
and handdled all the paper work. He had to expend only 
half the estimated costs and the profit was shared 
between him and those officials who had helped him. 
Unfortunately, however, this prosperous period came to an 
end in 1 983 with the completion of the Mahaweli 
constructions, thought his friendship with officials did 
not end. They used to turn up at his shop every evening, 
eat together, play cards, drink liquor and enjoy 
themselves. They also started to ta.ke various goods from 
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the shop on a "pay later" basis. Because of friendship, 
he did not ask them for the money they owed, nor did they 
show much interest in paying it back, although when the 
amount became fairly large they did agree to pay some of 
it off. And so his shop was finally running at a loss. 
By this time, he had come to realize that settlers did 
not buy goods from his shop because he lacked close 
contacts with them. In order to improve his trade and to 
cover his losses it was crucially necessary to develop 
trading strategies aimed at attracting farmers. At the 
time, the number of shops in the area was increasing and 
the traders were in fierce competition with each other. 
He had also begun to get involved in various welfare 
activities in the settlement, attending funerals, 
weddings and the other religious activities of settlers. 
He offered donations for settlers' social and cultural 
activities above the usual contribution of other traders. 
In addition, the prices in his shop were kept to a 
minimum in order to attract more customers, even if this 
meant accepting lower profits. 
By the end of August 1 984, he achieved a very good 
turnover. More and more settlers were coming to his shop. 
So he decided to make more profit by increasing the 
prices of selected items and reducing his contributions 
to welfare activities. He also stocked the shop with new 
items and reduced purchases on credit to settlers. Yet, 
by the end of 1984, his business was in decline. The 
reason for this, he concluded was that the number of 
items purchased by settlers was dropping due to the 
decreasing purchasing power of settlers. Some farmers had 
even begun to cultivate food crops instead of cash crops, 
thus reducing the market transactions of settlers and the 
daily turnover in most of the shops of the area. In order 
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Pathiraja, then, makes a profit but 
certain limit. His brother (the 
father's shop in Kandy town) always 
business tricks. For example, he \|?as told to move into 
money lending. So, when the business was on a downward 
he cannot go beyond a 
present owner of his 
advises him to deploy 
to maintain a minimum profit margin traders were forced 
into open competition with each other. In this situation, 
Pathiraja chose to reduce on items with a slow turnover 
and to stock only the more popular items. 
He again made an effort to consolidate his relationships 
with local farmers. This time isettlers offered him 
chairmanship of their Buddhist Temple Society, an 
involvement which proved very costly due to the need to 
donate money and materials for the construction of a new 
temple. Nevertheless he was forced to adjust his 
strategies to the situation. During this period traders 
were struggling to maintain a minimum profit level. 
Settlers, it seems, had not only reduced their 
transactions with traders but had also changed their 
market behaviour. Pathiraja explained: 
"Nowadays they have the bad habit of changing their 
transactions from one shop to another. There is no 
good reason for this type of decision. When I asked 
a settler (a good customer) why he left me 
unexpectedly, he simply laughed and said "if it is 
my car and my petrol, I can go any where I like". 
This was an insult because he; was aware that I had 
reduced sales on credit. He was indirectly asking me 
to sell on credit again which I don't like doing. 
Making business with this type of settler is a 
struggle. Not only does our trade depend up on them 
but also we have to take more knd more risks." 
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trend, Pathiraja decided to lend money to his customers 
in order to keep them indebted to him. His intention was 
to use this capital as a weapon for stabilizing the flow 
of business. During the initial stage this strategy was 
successful. Many farmers began to borrow from him and 
purchase goods on credit. However, during the repayment 
stage the amount he received back was far below that of 
the total loaned, although he reasoned that he would 
eventually be able to pressure those owing money to 
h o n o u r their obligation. Yet, despite all this 
strategizing, they continued to owe the shop a lot of 
money. Finally the income he lost from bad debts 
gradually exceeded the income he received from daily cash 
sales. And this was a disaster. 
He immediately stopped lending and began to visit his 
debtors in an attempt to recover his debts. Pathiraja 
explained his problem in the following manner: 
"During the day time I kept my shop open and during 
the night I went to ask for my money from the 
farmers who borrowed from me. But I was never able 
to recover the full amount. In most cases I had to 
agree to their terms and conditions of repayment. 
Like a beggar I had to stand at the front door 
asking for money. I realized that I was no longer a 
powerful person. Those indebted farmers were more 
powerful than me because I feared that if I pressed 
them too hard they might not pay back at all. The 
only possibility available was legal action but I 
was aware that such action would be even more 
dangerous because my image among other settlers 
would be bad. Secondly, I calculated that the cost 
on filing individual cases through expensive lawyers 
and going through all those complicated legal 
251 
procedures would exceed the total amount of the 
outstanding debts. Therefore I did not have any 
alternative other than to accept farmers' own 
decisions on repayment." 
According to the experience of Pathiraja, a trader in 
Mahaweli settlement area is not a powerful outsider who 
can simply apply exploitative trading tactics when 
dealing with small-scale family farmers. If such weapons 
are used, then they can rebound back upon the trader, 
causing untold disaster. According to Pathiraja, external 
market forces affect not only farmers but also local 
traders. Even price mechanisms can have a serious 
influence on local traders because farmers' negative 
responses to marginal price increases have their 
cumulative impact on traders who are dependent on settler 
households for keeping their businesses afloat: 
"My brother in Kandy town gaye me 'dead rope'(the 
wrong advice) based upon his experience with urban 
customers. Such urban trading methods cannot simply 
be applied in the settlement area. We deal with 
customers internal to our area of business. They are 
not monthly wage earners. Neither do they respond as 
we wish." 
Therefore Pathiraja realized, given his experience in the 
Mahaweli area, that business relations are much more 
important than business transactions. Commoditization 
processes in fact often generate market competition and 
risks rather than more favorable market opportunities. 
Pathiraja is thereby forced to beaome an "insider" tied 
to various local social commitments and suffer the 
consequences of this on the rate of profit-making. 
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According to settlers' opinions, traders in the 
settlement area usually take a leading part in religious 
ceremonies, contributing high cash donations. They also 
offer the use of their vehicles and donate consumer goods 
when there is a funeral or a wedding. As one settler put 
it: 
"We can knock at the trader's door, even at 
midnight, and ask assistance when a member of our 
family falls sick. Sometimes many lives are saved 
because these traders immediately provide their 
vehicles to take patients to hospital." 
In many Buddhist temples traders' names appear at the top 
of the list of donations and every time settlers 
participate in religious activities they publicly 
acknowledge the piety of traders. It may be that traders' 
social costs of various kinds appear as an economic loss 
in the balance sheet, but such involvement is a necessary 
part of their profit-making approach. It is through this 
that vital intangible gains are made: this gives power, 
rank and goodwill. Such gains are essential elements in 
the achievement of traders' personal goals. 
Traders who articulate with the bureaucratic management 
of the settlement are brokers. They experience the 
dilemma of every intermediary: that is they face 
simultaneously both the bureaucracy and the settlers. 
Their methods of making usury profit apply to settlers in 
fragile and paradoxical ways: traders take advantage of 
the "hunger for cash" in the survival of peasant 
households, whilst at the same time they themselves are 
dependent upon settlers for their own economic survival. 
A significant number of poor families, rather than being 
tied intimately to the market, try to break off such ties 
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and maintain a day-to-day subsistence through growing, 
for example, their own vegetables and other food crops. 
This undermines the livelihood of traders whose 
strategies are fundamentally based upon increasing 
settler dependence upon commodity market and upon the 
certainty of the trader being able to achieve profit from 
this. Most farmers coming from; subsistence farming 
communities have been able to re-establish their previous 
farming methods much more easily than make a success of 
intensive cash-crop farming. 
These various complex processes of adaptation have meant 
that, in many ways, commoditization in the Mahaweli case 
has reinforced processes of peasantization rather than 
depeasantization. Farmers use their knowledge and social 
experience to devise their own livelihood strategies. In 
this way, the so-called "market-led" commodity economy, 
promoted by the penetration of merchant capital, has been 
re-shaped into a "farmer-led" economy, whereby farmers 
have incorporated traders and their activities into their 




In the introductory chapter I highlighted some conceptual 
problems concerning the explanation of social change in 
Mahaweli irrigation settlements. The issues that were 
raised led me to argue that theoretical solutions cast in 
institutional terms fail to provide an understanding of 
the unintended variations in the outcomes of such 
programmes of planned intervention. In order to resolve 
this problem I suggested that we adopt an actor and 
interface perspective on rural development. Such an 
approach offers a useful theoretical instrument and 
methodological device for the study of divergent 
interests, conflicting relationships and contrasting 
local images of local officials, farmers and traders-
that is, of those who are actually involved in 
intervention practices at the settlement level. My 
argument was based on the assumption that people's 
actions and their ways of constructing the social meaning 
of development intervention are more important than the 
problems defined by the settlement programme itself. The 
emphasis in this thesis, then, has been on the patterns 
of interaction, discrepancies of social interest, and 
interlocking strategies of the above three groups of key 
actors involved in the process of settlement development. 
Chapter 2 provided historical background to state-
sponsored irrigation settlement in Sri Lanka. State 
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intervention in irrigation dates back to the colonial 
period, but begins in earnest in the early years of the 
20th century. The argument advanced was that, during the 
last 50 years of state-organized irrigation settlement, 
there has been a gap between the intentions and the 
o u t c o m e s of p l a n n e d p r o g r a m m e s of i r r i g a t i o n 
development. From time to time various governments were 
compelled to modify their programmes in the face of the 
diverse responses and strategies o;: the many small-scale 
farming households involved. Despite the attempts to 
establish more effective institutional and participatory 
structures, this dichotomy between strategies of planned 
intervention and actual farming and social practice has 
continued. Although the state attempted to legitimize 
centrally-controlled government programmes through the 
promotion of more welfare-oriented services, farmers have 
responded by turning these various interventions to their 
own advantage, thus adding to the complexities of planned 
change. A further important element has been that every 
political party coming to power! has been forced to 
formulate policies with the intbntion, or at least 
rhetoric, of solving major national problems, such as 
rising unemployment and political instability. 
In chapter 3 it was argued that Mahaweli settlement 
policy, based as it is on the management and 
administration of small-scale uniform family farms, has 
failed to recognize and tackle the local diversity of 
family farming, nor has it come 
complexities of the settlement 
ideological presentation of top-down management of family 
farming, which policy makers evidently were committed to, 
in fact tended to obstruct the ability of local officials 
to relate to the actual social ahd economic processes 
taking place at local level. Consequently in each 





settlement unit they have modified the procedures and the 
operation of the official model in order to cope with the 
multifarious problems they have encountered. In this 
chapter, a comparison was made of the different socio-
economic, cultural and practical problems of settler 
households in three settlement units. I also elaborated 
upon the various reasons for the emergence of local 
lobbies and social groups with different images and 
strategies, and related these differences to their 
contrasting social settings and backgrounds. The conflict 
between farmers' ways of perceiving and organizing their 
lifeworlds, on one hand, and officials' ways of labelling 
and interpreting their actions and depicting particular 
groups of farmers, on the other, was also explored. This 
provided an approach to understanding the reality of 
planned intervention practices. 
Chapters 4 to 6 examined the social relations and 
transactional processes among the three contrasting 
groups of actors, namely local officials, farmers and 
local traders. Chapter 4 focused on the situation of 
local officials (settlement Unit Managers). In this, I 
argued that, although Unit Managers were employed to 
implement specific settlement rules, procedures and 
tasks, which were backed up by statutory powers, the 
implementation of their programmes was obstructed by 
resource constraints, inter-agency conflicts between 
t e c h n i c a l and n o n - t e c h n i c a l personnel, lack of 
coordination, and conflicting interests between them and 
their superiors. While demoralized by their role as local 
'change agents', their own financial problems, family 
responsibilities, and the discrepancy between their 
workloads and the wages they received were the more 
influential factors in pressing them to actively organize 
their own lifeworlds and to develop strategies for 
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resolving local problems and for dealing with day-to-day-
situations. Since they lived within their settlement 
units, Unit Managers were constantly involved in everyday 
interactions, and sometimes confrontations, with farmers 
and in this way they were drawn into their ongoing 
livelihood struggles. They could not remain "outsiders" 
to this process. Instead, they were compelled to modify 
the procedures, reinterpret their designated authority, 
reshape top-down policy discourse, and look to their own 
interests. Being full participants in the local arena, 
they could not stand back from the dilemmas of the 
settlement population. 
In Chapter 5 I showed how different farmer groups in 
three settlement units interacted, negotiated and 
developed relationships with local officials in order to 
realize their own goals. These farmers were not passive 
p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h i n the o f f i c i a l programme of 
implementation but strategic actors who used their 
k n o w l e d g e and capabilities to pursue their own 
interests. External control, administration, influence or 
power within the local setting were often blocked or 
neutralized by farmers who took advantage of the defects, 
constraints and problems of the organizational structure. 
Moreover, although settlement management sought to 
i n c r e a s e the d e p e n d e n c y of farmers on outside 
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , s o m e w h a t 
paradoxically, these forms of dependency at the same time 
created the space and motivation for farmers to organize 
t h e m s e l v e s t h r o u g h i n t e r - h o u S e h o I d cooperation, 
friendship and kinship relations. £ocal officials could 
not control such tendencies because they lacked the 
organizational means and resources to provide a better 
solution to the living problems of farmers. Instead, 
farmer strategies were more effective in influencing 
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officials to relax regulations and control. In this way 
the top-down authority structure became transformed, into 
a negotiated and locally-adjusted set of relationships 
among local officials and farmers. Hence the outcomes of 
planned intervention in Mahaweli settlements were shaped 
by local processes that reflected the responses, 
interests and practical problems of both local officials 
and farmers, even though external institutions might 
still seek to interpret these tendencies as correctable 
deviations from the main project. 
Chapter 6 dealt with local traders and their links with 
both settlers and officials. In the first part of this 
chapter, it was argued that commoditization and 
increasing market dependency of settler households were 
not such dominant external forces tying farmers into 
agricultural markets, as is often assumed. On the 
contrary, there were points at which "the logic of the 
market" was blocked by counter-tendencies that emerged 
from farmers' strategies aimed at market avoidance. The 
"hunger for cash" to meet basic consumption needs was a 
strong factor influencing many farmers to abandon the 
almost impossible struggle to make a living out of small-
scale commercial agriculture and to devise their own 
alternative livelihood strategies. Because of this, 
settler behaviour vis-a-vis the market was highly 
unpredictable and fluctuating. 
In the second part of the chapter, it was shown that 
local traders were severely affected by this type of 
farmer behavior. Commoditization acted in the first place 
to attract more and more traders, eventually leading to 
fierce competition among them, only later to be 
exacerbated by a stagnating demand for their goods. I 
also showed how local traders modified their business 
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tactics in response to this increasingly problematic 
situation. Thus, within this local setting, traders did 
not manifest themselves as a powerful external group 
exploiting settlers. On the contrary, they were knitted 
into the fabric of local life; establishing close 
relationships with individual farmer households and 
adjusting their goals in accordance with the exigencies 
of local committments. 
How Actors Create a Middle Ground of Development Practice 
The central aim of this thesis, then, was to analyze the 
interactions, interlinkages and negotiations of farmers, 
local officials, and traders in the Mahaweli irrigation 
settlements. This triangle of relationships constituted 
the social arena marking out the actual locale of 
development, or what we might call "the middle ground". 
The middle ground refers to the totally of social 
processes and fields within which different groups of 
actors attempt to establish common ground for their 
negotiations over resources and development alternatives. 
My intention was to open windows onto these social 
realities and to observe how the strategic actions and 
interactions of the various participants shaped the 
outcomes of planned intervention. This is a highly-
complex zone of intervention practice where actors meet 
each other, test out their practical concepts, evolve 
interdependencies for survival, and;develop various types 
of relationships based upon these encounters. As I 
explored in this thesis, what a c t u a l l y happens in this 
middle ground cannot simply be explained within the 
framework of pre-defined t h e o r e t i c a l or planning models, 
since there often arise confrontations involving 
bargaining and negotiation between the respective social 
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actors that go beyond the expectations of such models. 
Such face-to-face engagements constitute, as it were, 
"the battle grounds" of development. There are also 
struggles that may be depicted as "underground" actions 
where so-called "powerless" groups develop alternative 
forms of power for realizing their own goals. These 
relatively invisible processes, which frequently go 
unnoticed in the sociological analysis of state-peasant 
relations, often constitute the beginnings of peasant 
empowerment. In the same way, various strategies used by 
local officials for realizing their hidden agendas, which 
may be regarded as "unofficial" or "illegal", also 
contribute to these complex processes by which external 
intervention is "internalized" by the participants. 
Again, there are various forms of farmer - trader 
relationships which are not externally imposed but the 
result of negotiation. 
Exploring empirical situations in this way makes it 
important to offer some remarks in this on chapter 
concerning the dichotomy that exists between macro-
theoretical models of planned intervention (the Mahaweli 
project side of the development) and the middle ground of 
intervention practice as analyzed in this thesis. 
Contrasting Worlds of Development 
The project side of Mahaweli development consists of a 
separate world of development professionals involved in 
formulating planned intervention programmes built upon 
assumptions about the universal features of small-scale 
family farmers and their generally passive participation 
in agrarian development. Officials of the Mahaweli 
p r o j e c t h a v e t h e i r own l a n g u a g e , s p e c i a l i z e d 
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terminologies, interpretations, meanings and interests 
concerning the notion of "the project" and its 
d e v e l o p m e n t . In contrast, the! middle ground of 
intervention practice of the settlement scheme is made up 
of its own distinctive sets of social relations and 
social encounters, through which actors process their 
knowledge, images and understandings, and pursue their 
own practical ends. 
If, therefore, social change and development are viewed 
simply from the perspective of thejimplementing agencies 
or that of the policy model, then one arrives at a one-
sided and distorted picture of the social reality of 
development intervention. This i|s because, as Long 
argues, "specific patterns and paths of agrarian change 
cannot simply be explained by the intervention of public 
authorities or powerful outsiders, nor by the uncovering 
of some inexorable structural logic. In a fundamental 
sense, they can only result from the interactions, 
negotiations, and social and cognitive struggles that 
take place between specific social actors" (Long, 
1988:222). Hence, by addressing our analysis to critical 
points of linkage and to key interactional settings, we 
come to understand the ways in which discrepancies of 
social interest, knowledge and power, and rules and 
procedures are mediated or reproduced in situations of 
planned intervention. The present; thesis hight lights 
how, in this process of intervention, the following 
dichotomies are reflected and reproduced. 
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Dichotomy Between Project Image of Farmer Participation 
and the People's Model of Participation 
The attitudes and strategies of project officials 
representing the Mahaweli project are such that their own 
discourse and technical expertise contribute to the 
creation of their own world ("the project"), which 
involves realizing their own goals and hidden agendas. 
Officials hardly ever study the social and cultural 
foundations of the middle ground from the point of view 
of the client population and its ability to adjust itself 
to planned intervention. For example, development 
agencies of the Mahaweli Scheme use participation ideals 
which assume that all farm families will be willing to 
participate in their programmes in accordance with a 
'rational' model of participation. Such concepts, 
however, belong to the international vernacular of 
development professionals, which are used to create 
images of how farmers should or could behave, and to 
justify the channelling of material and services to 
large-scale development projects and to legitimize the 
distribution of these through local agents. 
In response to such planned intervention, farmers develop 
their own models of participation, drawing upon their own 
philosophies and applying their own meanings to the issue 
of sustainable household living. This practical use of 
'indigenous' concepts involves the internalization of 
planned intervention through the various struggles, 
m a n i p u l a t i o n s and building of new vertical and 
horizontal relations that take place in the middle 
ground. A central problem of settlement development, as 
understood by development planners, is the general lack 
of farmer participation. Most Board Room discussions, 
evaluations, circulars and training programmes give major 
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Dichotomy Between Prolect Language: and the Language of 
Local Actors 
Such "irregularities", or what are sometimes called 
"failures", provide the l e g i t i m a t i o n for the continuance 
of development projects. Failures must be corrected 
through carrying out "evaluation" studies and proposing 
"improved" interventions. This, in turn, means more and 
more projects and programmes, at a cost of millions and 
millions of dollars. As long as funds are available, 
project documents continue to point to the need for 
"feasibility" studies for new or modified policies. Here 
feasibility is based primarily upon a cost-benefit 
analysis which uses a machine language that talks about 
the "internal rate of return", " d i s c o u n t i n g factors" and 
"projected income". This mechanistic approach creates an 
o v e r s i m p l i f i e d i m a g e of d e v e l o p m e n t w i t h its 
"projections" and "forecasting'! exercises. It is 
precisely because the development problems of the 
Mahaweli Settlement Scheme, like most other large-scale 
attention to farmer participation in programmes of 
implementation. However offical support to promote 
participation is often manipulated by local officials 
who, on one hand, try to show compliance with official 
policy, whilst, on the other hand, ackowledging farmers' 
notions of participation. For example, Unit Managers can 
indicate a number of very active farmer leaders who 
participate in water management. Yet, at the same time, 
they can provide no solution to the illegal water tapping 
by farmers who construct their own water outlets from the 
irrigation system, something they have had to accept as 
an essential part of farmer participation in irrigation 
water use. 
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interventions, are represented in this way that "the 
project", and its own brand of rationality, becomes 
separated off from the struggles of local actors. 
The specialized technocratic discourse used by the 
M a h a w e l i Settlement Authority in which top-down 
instructions and procedures are communicated contains no 
reference to the actual behaviour of specific actors. 
These instructions, as argued in Chapters 4 and 5, which 
may be legitimate within the bureaucratic setting, lose 
their social meaning in the middle ground. In comparison, 
the types of discourse that emerge from below, through 
the everyday struggles of farmers, local officials and 
traders for solving practical problems, are much more 
dynamic, and such discourses, in fact, became viable 
alternatives to the formal communication system. Hence, 
the process of change cannot simply be explained as an 
outcome of intervention practices initiated by the state 
or by o t h e r p o w e r f u l o u t s i d e r s , s i n c e t h e s e 
interventions are reshaped in the middle ground and 
accorded social meaning by the local actors in accordance 
w i t h t h e i r own s p e c i f i c l o c a l i n t e r e s t s and 
circumstances. 
Dichotomy Between the Simplicity of the Project model and 
the Complexity of the Middle Ground 
The middle ground of development intervention reflects 
various patterns of change at the settlement level. These 
can only be understood by analyzing in detail the 
behaviour of the actors involved. In Chapter 5 it was 
shown how farmers influenced local officials and 
gradually incorporated them into their lifeworld. Unit 
Managers, as the single intervening agent at local level, 
265 
were unable, using formal methods of communication and 
authority, to deal effectively with the actions and 
lobbies of farmers. This was compounded by the problem of 
having to monitor the activities of a large number of 
farmers. In contrast, the 200 to 250 farmers represented 
a formidable collective force for monitoring the 
behaviour and identifying the weaknesses of their Unit 
Manager. Although not all farmers possessed the same 
detailed knowledge of their local official, information 
and critical commentary easily flowed within existing 
family and neighbourhood networks. This pool of 
information gave them the edge on; government officials 
and bureaucratic knowledge. Furthermore, farmers were 
more powerful in their discourse with officials, 
supporting their arguments with concrete empirical 
evidence, than officials were vis-a-vis farmers. 
Officials quickly resorted to a f o r m a l and rigid type of 
argumentation, using difficult t e c h n i c a l terms and making 
hardly any empirical reference, j In the end, local 
officials were driven to modify ! formal communication 
channels and to ignore regulations, if they wished to 
have any impact at all. As one farmer put it, 'officials 
c a n n o t e v e r p r a c t i c e w h a t they p r e a c h ' . This 
disillusionment with external agencies and their 
representatives, however, was not only characteristic of 
farmers but also infected those local officials who 
finally faced up to the local problems of intervention. 
Another problem affecting the relations of officials and 
clients was discussed in Chapter 4. Here it was argued 
that local officials were underpaid and enjoyed only low 
privileges as compared to their immediate superiors. This 
led them to search for additional sources of income 
within the local environment. Since these opportunities 
were known to be unofficial or illegal, farmers were 
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quick to accuse officials of "corruption", creating in 
them a sense of fear or guilt. Scared of the negative 
reactions of farmers, officials often adopted protective 
measures. These included modifying the scope of their 
authority, thus avoiding the use of coercive means, and 
where possible pleasing farmers so as to maintain both 
their and the farmers' means of survival. In response, 
farmers were able to use this situation, which revealed 
the fundamental weakness of Unit Managers, strategically 
to create new space for binding officials to their own 
lifeworld and for bringing moral pressure to bear on 
them. These dialectical processes are not easily 
explained within the framework of interventionist models 
of settlement development. 
Dichotomy Between Theoretical Models and Practical Models 
The Mahaweli Irrigation Settlement Scheme is one of the 
l a r g e s t planned development programmes involving 
integration of farming households into a wider technical 
and administrative structure, where farmers are required 
to engage in intensive cash-crop production. Many aspects 
of farming resources (such as irrigation water, land, and 
credit) are under the control of external agencies. Under 
these conditions of vertical integration, some doubt may 
arise as to the likely success of peasant forms of 
r e s i s t a n c e . O n e m a y also question the general 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of an actor-oriented approach for 
understanding these problems in the wider context of 
settlement development. 
As I indicated earlier, there are difficulties in 
understanding processes of social differentiation in the 
Mahaweli Settlement Scheme solely within a structural 
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practice and actor 
tend to view the 
the close-up analysis of social 
strategies. Structuralist models 
processes of social life from an externalist point of 
view, which in the context of the present study has meant 
looking at settlement development from the point of view 
of the "official project", or at least from the 
perspective of structural determinants and linear 
change. In contradistinction to this, an actor approach 
requires understanding problems and processes from "the 
inside" and in terms of their emergent forms. 
The researcher must make his entry point those situations 
and arenas where intervention processes impinge upon and 
enter the lifeworlds of the key social actors. Throughout 
this thesis it has been argued that, despite the 
existence of various external linkages and the interests 
and power of intervening parties, when these enter the 
middle ground (local arenas) they are compelled to 
confront and accomodate to the specificities of local 
everyday conditions. In so doing, intervening actors have 
to solve their practical problems from the inside. For 
example, it was revealed in the analysis of the behaviour 
of local traders (see chapter 6) that they were forced by 
local circumstances to alter many of their pre-existing 
b u s i n e s s techniques. In this way, trader-farmer 
framework of analysis. For example, when in 1981 I began 
my research among Mahaweli farmers, I assumed that they 
had lost control over their means of production, since 
many claimed they did not cultivate their own land. 
Later, however, after adopting an actor and interface 
approach to the problem, I discovered that large parts of 
the land not cultivated by the farmers themselves had 
been allocated to members of their extended families or 
were jointly cultivated with friends. This emphasizes the 
need to explore resource and development problems through 
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relationships were shaped by various non-market social 
encounters and inter-dependencies at local level. Hence, 
traders have a limited capacity to compel farmers to 
integrate into the market. The greater the power they 
deploy to eliminate market risks, the more uncertainty 
they face in the development of reliable trade relations 
with the farming population. 
Within this complex set of problems involving development 
models and development practice, the identification and 
explanation of development processes is, I believe, only 
possible if sociological and anthropological research 
addresses itself to, what I have called, the middle 
ground of development and intervention practice. As I 
have insisted, this requires giving serious attention to 
the perceptions, aspirations and strategies of those 
social actors involved. A better understanding and 
conceptualization of these issues depends also upon the 
development of appropriate research methodologies, and 
not upon the application of outdated frameworks which 
contain within them many interventionist assumptions. 
The complex social interactions and human behaviour 
implicit in planned development activities and in the 
expansion of capitalist interests cannot be reduced to 
some universal logic of development. Thus the researcher 
must open up the problems for analysis through a 
detailed understanding of the problematics of the middle 
ground, where the action takes place. Only by doing so 
can he or she open the window on social reality and, at 
the same time, close the door on interventionist thinking 
and analysis. 
269 
APPENDIX 1: Observation and Recorjnmendation - 'Feasibi-
lity Study for Stage II, Volume VII-
Settlement Planning and Development.'No-
vember 1972. 
1 . Social and Organizational Framework of the Project 
Area. 
The social set-up of the project ar^a is characterized by 
four distinct types of settlement: 
a) The 'Purana' villages inhabited by the original 
settlers with a traditional-bond long standing 
history. 
b) The Colonization Schemes which are of comparatively 
recent origin which are state-sponsored agricultural 
settlements. 
c) The 'new' villages also of recent origin, usually 
found along the majority highways of the area 
inhabited by voluntary settlers - the overflow 
population of Colonization Schemes. 
d) The urban areas, few in number, serving as the main 
shopping centres of this area. 
The differences are as much ecological as historical and 
social. The ecological integration of the "Purana" 
villages and the new villages is underway but at a very 
slow pace, while the social integration is almost non 
existent. 
270 
2. Purana Villages 
The term 'purana' means 'old' or 'traditional'. The 
important components of a 'purana' village are the 
village tanks, the 'Gamgodella' or residential area, 'vel 
yaya' or paddy fields and 'Goda Idam' or high land and 
'Hena" or chena land. Usually the 'vel yaya' - the paddy 
fields, the 'gamgodella' - the residential part of the 
village and the village tank are one composite unit. The 
highland and the chena lands are way from the main 
village. About 50% to 60% of the villages in the Project 
area are Purana villages. 
The number of families living in a Purana village range 
from a low 15-20 up to a high 100-120. On the average 
there are 50-60 families with a total population of 300-
400. Closely linked to many Purana villages are the 
'Olagama". The Olagama is usually an uninhabited village 
where people from a neighboring village own land, and 
p e a s a n t s come from the traditional village for 
cultivation of paddy land, highland and chena. Sometimes 
the peasants would live in temporary huts in the Olagama 
during the sowing and harvesting seasons. It is possible 
that the Olagamas were once inhabited and when the 
village tanks were damaged and when no water was 
available for irrigation the peasant migrated to another 
village. When the peasants were able to repair the tank 
and cultivate the paddy land it become an olagama of the 
village that repair the tank. In recent years many 
Olagamas came to be inhabited and were included in the 
category of Purana villages. It is estimated that about 
5% of the Olagamas are presently inhabited. It can now be 
observed that on the fringes of many Purana villages, 
outsiders have encroached on crown land to cultivate 
highland and chena. Ecologically not integrated into the 
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village territory, these new-comers are also not 
integrated and their social integration with the Purana 
villages is at a minimum. 
3. New area: Colonization Schemes 
There are several major colonization schemes in this 
area. These huge settlements with a high concentration of 
the population offer an absolute contrast to "purana" 
villages. Generally the colonization schemes were 
organized in several tracts. The other major difference 
is the composition character of the population of almost 
all the colonization schemes. The land tenure system in 
the Purana village is much more complicated. There is 
ancestral and after referred to as 'Paraveni' land and 
ownership is governed by the traditional laws of 
inheritance, while 'dejure' ownership passed down among 
related kinsmen, each 'heir' is the 'de facto' owner of 
the land and there is no restriction to disposing of land 
either by gift, bequest or sale. Usually disposal of the 
land to outsiders is frowned upon by the kinsmen, it is 
permissable to do so among kinsmen. 
The ownership of land resulting from a purchase is 
usually referred to as 'Sinnakkara'. Prior to the Land 
Development Ordinance 1935 and subsequent amendments to 
the Ordinance in 1961 and 1969, allocation of land was 
governed by a series of 'Land Orde|rs' . The government 
allocated land to the Purana villagers on grant under 
'Land Orders'. Such allocations of lajnd granted ownership 
rights for the allottee and w^s also considered 
"Sinnakkara" land. 
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After the enactment of the Land Development Ordinance the 
Government allocated land to peasants for village 
expansion. These lands usually referred to as 'Badu Idam' 
(Rented land) or 'Anduwe Idam' (government land) bestowed 
on the allottee the ownership of the land similar to that 
in the Colonization Schemes. It is obligatory on the part 
of the allottee to pay 'Badu' (rent) to the government. 
Usually the rent payable was nominal and occupation was 
guaranteed. 
4. Land Tenure 
Since the World War 11 the government allocated land to 
peasant under short term leases, and food production 
permits. These short term leases had to be renewed every 
year and the lease holders held the land at the "will and 
pleasure of the crown". However often the land developed 
by a peasant was allocated to him outright under the Land 
Development Ordinance after sometime. 
The right of cultivation of state (jungle) land was 
granted to peasant under the "Chena Permit System". The 
permit had to be renewed every year, and there is no 
security of tenure. It is therefore possible for a Purana 
villager to own land under "Paraveni" (inherited 
ownership), sinnakkara (ownership of outright purchase or 
land under government lease), land under LDO permits and 
short term leases. 
Another important component in the land tenure system is 
the existence of 'Nindagam' - land gifted by the ancient 
Sinhala kings and by British rulers in colonial times to 
chieftains for loyal and faithful services rendered. 
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In the Purana villages tenurial problems constitute a 
major source of conflict. The land under the 'Paraveni' 
or the "Sinnakkara' ownership would be passed down from 
the parents to children. Each person would inherent a 
'Pangu' or share of the land. There is no physical 
partitioning of the land and demarcation of boundaries 
would be by mutual agreement. After several generation 
the share becomes a small fraction of the original 
estate. A person in a Purana village would own several 
small parcels of land scattered in different parts of the 
village. The cultivation of such small parcels of land is 
often not economically profitable nor feasible. 
Another pattern of land tenure is the "Thattumaru" 
system. Under this system each of the shareholder would 
take turns in cultivating the whole extent of land. If a 
shareholder for some reason does not cultivate the land 
when it is his turn, he has to wait for several years for 
his turn again. The system of i "Thattumaru" is an 
ingenious method to enable a share-holder to cultivate a 
lager extent of land at least once in a number of seasons 
rather than to cultivate a small extent every season. 
Another system of land tenure which has often been 
confused with the 'Thattumaru' system is the "Kattimaru: 
system. Although many authorities consider the two 
systems identical yet there are subtle differences. In 
the "Kattimaru" system each of the shareholder would 
demarcate parcels of land, and eixercise an ownership 
right to that parcel of land. However, all the parcels 
are not equal in fertility soil cjuality and therefore 
productivity. To maintain an equitable distribution both 
fertile, and infertile or barren land each of the owner 
would change their cultivation rights from one parcel to 
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another every season on a rotational basis so that all 
shareholders would have a turn on all parcels. 
The operation of the "Thattumaru: and "Kattimaru" systems 
forced small shareholders to work as "ande" cultivators 
(share croppers) during the period when the land (of 
which he is a shareholder) was cultivated by other co-
shareholders. Most of the peasants are "de Jure" 
landowners - though of small shares of land. Therefore 
chena cultivation became an important aspect of the 
economic life of rural peasants. A peasant would 
'encroach' on a few acres of state jungle and do chena 
cultivation. His right to the chena is represented by 
other peasants and intrusion into another chena is 
represented a 'disgraceful act'. Even if the chena 
without the consent of the original cultivator. 
The system of 'ande' cultivation has led to the creation 
of social imbalance even in the 'purana' villages. The 
paddy land was held at a premium and the tenancy was at 
the wish of the owner. The land owners used to exploit 
the cultivators who had neither the security of tenure 
nor the guarantee of a fixed or a reasonable return for 
their labour in the development of the land. Moreover, 
the quality of agriculture in the tenanted lands often 
suffered due to the insecurity of the farmer and often 
due to absentee land-lordism. 
It is in the context of this system of land tenure 
regarding the paddy lands the Paddy Land Act (No 1 of 
1 958) has to be viewed. The act sought to redress the 
social imbalance existing in village society particulary 
that between the owner of paddy lands and the tenant-
cultivators. The act attempted to safeguard and ensure 
the security of tenure to the tenant cultivator to 
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determine the rent or shares due to the landlord and to 
deal with other matters affected paddy cultivation. An 
important component of this Act was the creation of 
statutory Farmer Organizations. The Cultivation Committee 
with responsibilities to safeguard the interests of the 
cultivator to manage the efficient distribution of 
irrigation water to collect the acreage taxes and to 
channel agricultural services and ihputs. 
However, it has be mentioned that the Paddy Land Act 
failed to be an effective force in agricultural 
development as it was expected to be. The major reasons 
for its ineffectiveness can be summarized as follows: 
a) The Act endeavoured to ensure security of tenure to 
the t e n a n t c u l t i v a t o r w i t h o u t taking into 
consideration the close and intimate social and 
economic ties that bound the landlord and the 
tenant. It is doubtful if the tenant cultivator 
would openly flout the authority of the landlord who 
is often his own kith and kin or who provided him 
with credit and other help in times of needs. 
b) The Act took into consideration only the paddy lands 
and not highland. The highland too constitute an 
important factor in the economic life of people. 
Even if the landlord "gave in" to the tenant with 
regards to paddy land he could always have a hold on 
him by depriving him of the use of highland for 
cultivation. 
c) The Act attempted to bring about changes in the 
pattern of tenancy without effecting basis reforms 
on land tenure. The wealthy landowners with their 
power and authority were able to "manipulate" most 
of the cultivation committee members to serve their 
own ends. Most committee members became 'pawns' in 
the hands of the wealthy landlords. 
Nepotism and corruption weakened considerably the 
power and authority of the Act. Partisan politics 
and sometimes the considerations such as caste, area 
of origin and other factors caused disunity and 
disharmony in the Cultivation Committee. 
Under the 'Vel Vidane' system, prior to the Paddy 
Land Act, the services rendered by the 'Vel Vidane' 
as irrigation water manager were well accepted and 
payment for his services was in kind. With the paddy 
Land Act an acreage tax had to be paid in cash. Non-
payment resulted in protracted legal action and much 
expenditure of time and money. It therefore became 
very unpopular with the cultivators. 
The cultivators did not take an interest in the 
election of office bearers and committee members as 
the elections were often manipulated by a few 
cultivators who were already in leadership potions 
in other voluntary organizations at the village 
level. 
The average tenant farmer and the owner cultivator 
did not understand the provisions of the Paddy Lands 
Act or did not make a conscious attempt to 
understand the intricacies of this legal document. 
With this lack of understanding came doubt and 
skepticism of the value of the Act as an instrument 
safe - g u a r d i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the tenant 
cultivator. 
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5. Condition of Crown Alienation and the Problem of 
Encroachments 
Legal provision regarding the alienation of state land 
are included in the Land Development Ordinance of 1935 as 
amended by Act No. 60 of 1961 and 16 of 1 969. The more 
important of these provisions are: 
- delivery of a permit authorized t n e occupation of the 
land on the payment of an annual rent. The duration of 
the lease is 99 years. 
- When the permit holder has paid ! all sums which he is 
required to pay and has complied: with all the other 
conditions specified in the permit, he becomes "the owner 
of the land of which he is in occupation" and is 
"entitled to receive a grant of that land. 
Sales, leases and mortgages are practically prohibited 
except in circumstances very rigidly defined. Succession 
is limited to a single successor. . In the village areas 
(contrary to the Colonization Schemes) these occupying 
state land without a permit or grant outnumbers those who 
legally 'own' land under the provisions of L.D.O. This 
statement raises the matter of state land encroachments 
included in this report, for they have more relevance to 
the future settlement in Mahaweli Area than to the 
present situation in the undeveloped lands of the Project 
area. 
Two sets of explanation can be put forward to justify the 
important of the phenomenon related to encroachments of 
state land. On the one hand their is the overflow of the 
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colonization schemes and to a lesser degree at the 
existing Purana villages, and on the other hand there are 
the migrants from the over populated areas of the Wet 
Zone. Due to the scarcity of marketable land in the 
Purana villages and the strict rules prohibiting the 
sales of alienated state land, these people find it 
convenient to encroach on the state land. 
On the other hand during the past few years, the 
g o v e r n m e n t has closed eyes to the problem by 
regularization of encroachments and giving them legal 
status or by neglecting totally. This policy of 
indifference or active neutrality contributed strongly to 
a rapid spread of encroachments in the area. It is 
obvious that encroachments will seriously interfere with 
project activities. With regards to engineering works, 
encroachments would interfere with channel-traces, land 
l e v e l l i n g , irrigation structures and reservoirs, 
resulting in ejectment producers and consequent delays in 
the construction schedules. Encroachment also would be a 
major obstacle to the proper implementation of a planned 
settlement programme. They would also cause unnecessary 
t e n s i o n s between colonists, encroachers and the 
government authorities. As the settlement commence in 
1975/76 encroachments can take place to a point where 
there would be no land for bona fide setter-selectees. 
The problems is severe and the risk not be under-
estimated . 
6. Fragmentation of Holdings 
Another salient feature of land tenure in the Project 
area is the extreme fragmentation of holdings, specially 
paddy land. Although no accurate data readily available 
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7. Farming activities 
Subsistence farming is essentially the lot of Purana 
villagers. In the Purana village^ the main source of 
income are paddy cultivation and qhena cultivation. Due 
to lack of water most paddy fields are cultivated only in 
the Maha (wet) season. In the Yala(dry) season the income 
is from the chena produce such as chillies, gingelly and 
vegetables. They have to preserve the paddy to last them 
throughout the year. Therefore very few farmers sell 
paddy. Other agricultural produce is sold to private 
trader at low prices. The farmer find it difficult to 
dispose of his vegetable due to lack of an efficient 
marketing system. The village fair (Pola) provides very 
restricted opportunity to sell his agricultural produce. 
Although it is not possible to make a generalization, the 
following estimate can be made of the way in which paddy 
is disposed of during any one year. 
10% for seed paddy. 10% as payment for buffaloes. 
20% transformed into cash-barter, 20% sold, 40% 
consumption. 
From the above observations it is seen that subsistence 
farming in paddy is linked with the ownership of paddy 
land under the customary low. Villagers' concept of cash-
crop farming is based on the operation of chena land 
for the Project area, it can be assumed that the 
incidence of fragmentation of cultivated land is very-
high, as indicated by the results of several studies 
conducted by the MDB in representative villages. In fact, 
the fragmentation is quite typical of paddy lands. There 
is little fragmentation of the highlands. 
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generally without a permit. It is therefore not difficult 
to understand the high degree of sentimental value which 
purana villagers attach to the ownership of paddy-lands. 
8. Cash crop farming 
Although substantial income is derived from the sale of 
paddy it is considered by most farmers as a non cash crop 
and chena cultivation is considered more important 
farming. Throughout the project area Purana villagers, 
colonists and 'new' villagers engage themselves in chena 
cultivation. Almost all chena plots are encroachments oh 
state forests and reservations. Chena cultivation depends 
solely on rain water from the Northern Eastern Monsoon. 
Chenas are cultivated with certain varieties of paddy, 
grains such as 'kurakkan', meneri, gingelly - pulses such 
as green grams and dhal and vegetables, yams, bananas, 
onions, chillies and tobacco. The chena produce is sold 
in small quantities at the local fair, and to private 
traders. There is no organized marketing system for chena 
produce. 
Almost all Purana villagers and colonists have small 
plots of coconut cultivation in their homestead, and they 
derive a small income from the sale of coconuts. There 
are only very few large scale coconut plantation owned by 
landowners. From an economic point of view the colonists 
in the major colonization schemes (now organizes as 
Special Projects) is much better off than the traditional 
Purana villager. He is assured of adequate irrigation 
water for cultivation often for two seasons of paddy. The 
supply of credit, inputs, extension services, education 
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9. Animal husbandry 
Purana villager attaches great social value to the 
possession of cattle. Usually a cattle owner is referred 
to as one who has the "Gava Sampatha" - one of the five 
treasures a man can possess. Such a person usually own a 
small herd of cattle and buffaloes. The ox is used as a 
drought animal in bullock carts and the cow which is 
treated as a sacred animal is used for milk only. The 
buffalo is used for ploughing and for threshing paddy and 
greater care is taken of it. Very often the buffaloes are 
rented for ploughing and threshing and payment which is 
prompt is made usually in kind. The;attitude with regards 
to other animals is different. Poultry, rearing of pigs 
and goats are generally considered |as sinful acts and if 
left to those who are non-Buddhistsi The attitude appears 
to have discouraged the promotion and development of 
animal husbandry in the area. 
and marketing of paddy and other produce are better 
organized 
Disposal of paddy in Special Projects follow a pattern 
different to that of the Purana villages, viz: 10% kept 
for seed, 50% for consumption and 40% sold. 
The peasants in the new villagers are the worst off. As 
they are outsiders they do not own any paddy land, and 
are ande cultivators (share croppers). Their income is 
mostly from the sale of chena produce. The problem of 
encroachments is most widespread in the new villages. 
Both from a social and economic point of view the 
peasants in the new villagers are marginal men. 
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10. Irrigation practices 
At the village level it is the responsibility of the 
Cultivation Committee to attend to matters connected with 
irrigation. According to the Paddy Land Act No. 1 of 19 58 
and subsequent amendments, the cultivation works in such 
a manner as may be approved by the Commissioner of 
Agrarian Services, and to exercise and perform, within 
that area the power and duties of irrigation headmen (Vel 
Vidane) under the Irrigation Ordinance or under any other 
written law. 
Before the enactment of the Paddy Land Act and the 
formation of the Cultivation Committees these matters 
were attended to by the "Vel Vidane". Unlike the "Vel 
Vidane" the Cultivation Committee had to encounter many 
difficulties. Members of the Cultivation Committee who 
are dependent on the popular vote of the cultivators for 
their position, did not adequately enforce the regulation 
regarding the obligations of offenders and defaulters was 
a cumbersome and costly procedure. Due to these 
difficulties the duties regarding repair and maintenance 
of irrigation works and irrigation channels went by 
default, and the Cultivation Committees became unpopular. 
In addition partisan interests and village conflicts 
hampered the functioning and the effects of the 
Cultivation Committee on the peasant community. 
11. Calendar and pattern of cultivation 
Due to the brake down of the irrigation discipline and 
the inadequacy of the machinery to enforce the rules and 
regulations the problems of untimely cultivation and the 
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inability to "catch" the season have become very acute 
and is the basis cause for the neglect of maintenance and 
repairs of the irrigation system. Several attempts have 
been made in the past to prevail on farmers to conform to 
agreed dates of cultivation. But these attempts have had 
only limited results. This is due to first instance due 
to the lack of pressure of work during the dry months of 
the year, the peasants get down to the task of clearing 
chena. This involves no investment} as such except that 
of labour. As the period available for clearing is fairly 
long, it is expected in this chena. No outside labour is 
hired. Once the chenas have been cleared it is natural 
for the cultivation of these to be complete before the 
villagers think of any other from of cultivation. It the 
chenas are not sown in time, they would revert to 
secondary jungle, or at these chenas are sown early, the 
crops grown on them are likely to die for want of water 
when the rains taper off towards January. Therefore, 
priority is naturally given to the completion of 
cultivation in the chena, before the paddy cultivation is 
undertaken. 
After the cultivation of chena, farmers turn their 
attention to cultivation of land which they have 
"encroached" on. In fact this has turned out to be 
another land class. Because of their insecure title in 
regard to this land, they attempt to safeguard their 
rights by the timely cultivation of these. By this 
process they think that they coi}ld be successful in 
keeping the lands they have encroached. 
It is only after these operations, the farmers work the 
lands under the village tanks. This appears to be a legal 
approach because the philosophy is to make maximum 
advantage of the rainfall that accrue during the season. 
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The reason for this pattern of cultivation is obviously 
the need to spend the available labour over a larger 
period of time in the Maha. 
11. Officials and Peasants 
Relationship between officials and peasants is a crucial 
matter since no innovation can be implemented at grass-
root levels, without a minimum of confidence and sympathy 
from one to the other. It is generally observed that the 
pattern of relationship between these two groups is far 
from being one of close, confident and faithful 
cooperation. The officials tend to consider farmers as an 
inferior category of persons from whom they expect 
submissive stereotyped behaviour. The peasants on the 
other hand distrust the bulk of officers especially those 
at middle grade and field levels. 
Most officers at middle and field levels do not link to 
deal with peasants as equal partners with freedom of 
expression. The officials generally suffer from a complex 
that they alone can find solutions to the problems 
confronted by peasants. Any explanation by peasants is 
considered by officials as a criticism of the 
administration. Most officials are sensitive to this and 
react strongly. 
In the Purana villages, most village level officials 
except the Grama Sevakas lack knowledge of local 
conditions and are unaware of the conflicting situations 
underlying the village life. They have their own 
favorites among peasants and try to work through them. 
These favorite peasants are considered by officials as 
the most informed on village affairs. The tendency of the 
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12. Peasants' view of the officials. 
To a Purana villager a government official(even a petty 
official) is one who cannot be a p p r o a c h e d without playing 
a stereotype role. Being considered) as a superior person 
and also as one who expects to tie considered so, the 
officer needs to be propitiated. The sentiments expressed 
in many statements made by peasants regarding officials 
are obviously stereotyped and partly unfair because of 
their inclination to generalize. 
Distrust and contempt are the logical consequences of the 
submissive patterns of behavioujr that farmers are 
compelled to assume when dealing with officials. This 
type of relationship makes any j cooperation between 
o f f i c i a l s and peasant difficult to achieve and 
constitutes a bottleneck in introducing innovations and 
change. With this type of attitude it is difficult to 
expect most these officials to be 
catalyst-agents of agricultural and 
genuine initiators or 
rural development. 
officials to distrust peasants in general is strengthened 
by the type of humble and submissive behaviour they 
expect from them. The officials are well aware that this 
'submission' is just 'playing a role' and this awareness 
makes them be very different towards the peasants. On the 
whole the officials seem to be trapped in a vicious 
system of relationship.The submissive behaviour of the 
peasant enhances their superior status, and even though 
the officials are aware that this submission is not 
genuine, they are skeptical on what the peasants have to 
say on various matters concerning village affairs. 
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13. Linkages Between Administrators and Village 
Organizations 
As d i s c u s s e d in the p r o c e e d i n g s e c t i o n s , the 
reorganization of the existing organizations would not go 
a long way to achieve the objectives of popular 
participation in administration and the promotion of 
social and economic development in the Project area. 
Viability can be achieved only by enlarging the 
geographic area of operation and by expanding the 
activities to cover all the social, economic and 
institutional life of a specific area. The remedy 
t h e r e f o r e , is to create a single multi-purpose 
organization at the village level within a reasonable 
reach of the farmer in the geographical as well as 
social, economic and institutional sense. To achieve 
this, it is necessary that the basic structure of the 
existing organizations should be subjected to a complete 
over-haul. In such an attempt, there is a need to find 
new mechanisms by which the administrative machinery 
c o u l d be h a r m o n i o u s l y liked with the people's 
organizations at the grass roots level. The past officers 
in this sphere have been merely confined to the creation 
of new organizations to exist side by side with the old 
ones or by reorganization of the old ones to meet crisis 
situations as and when they arose. The promotion and 
development of an efficient structure of farmers' 
organizations has to be based essentially on long-term 
policies with clearly defined objectives. 
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The Five Year Plan makes provisions for an effective 
linkage of the network of government agencies with the 
local community and its representative institutions 
through the Divisional Development Councils. These three 
c o u n c i l s c o n s i s t of g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s and 
representatives of institutions such as the Cooperative 
Societies, Cultivation committees, People's Committees 
and Village Councils. The functions of these Councils 
include the formulation of development projects and 
preparation of development programmes for their areas. 
They will also assist in the coordination of development 
activities and the review of plan implementation in their 
areas. The Divisional Development Councils were set up at 
the beginning of 1 972 and have been functioning for 
sometime. A large number of small-scale agricultural, 
industrial and infra-structural projects have been 
implemented. According to the Five Year Plan the 
indications are that they can go a long way to secure 
popular participation and public interests in the 
development effort. 
15. Principles Underlying the Colonization Policy 
There is general agreement that the functioning of the 
existing colonization schemes is unsatisfactory with many 
defects and shortcomings. Some of these are discussed 
below: 
14. The Five Year Plan strategy - Divisional Development 
Councils 
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Recruitment of Colonists 
The recruitment of colonists for major colonization 
schemes is normally done through interviews by officials 
and this is normally known as 'Land Kachcheries" where 
applications from the prospective settlers are processed 
and their suitability determined. In the 'Land Kachcheri" 
system much emphasis is given to the selection of 
colonists only within a given criteria. 
The allottees should be persons who are capable of making 
the best use of the facilities available in a 
colonization schemes to obtain the maximum return from 
their farms and thereby contributing not only to their 
own betterment, but also to that of the country. At the 
early stages of colonization, weightage was given to the 
social welfare in the selection of farmers where those 
w h o are landless and with large families were 
p r e f e r e n t i a l l y treated. The assumption was that 
a p p l i c a t i o n s w i t h large families would have a 
sufficiently large labour force to assist them in the 
farm. 
As mentioned above, for a long period, that is up to 
about 1968, the selection of colonists at the Land 
Kachcheries was more or less governed by welfare 
considerations where the landlessness and the large size 
of the family was perhaps the main criteria of selection. 
Since 1968, emphasis was shifted to economic criteria 
where preference was given to agricultural knowledge, 
experience, capacity and initiative. The results are 
encouraging and a proper evaluation could be made only 
after some time. 
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Presently, some of the unsatisfactory results of the 
previous methods of selection have demonstrated. It seems 
that in very numerous cases, the selection was based on 
the recommendations of the local officers such as the 
Village Headmen and Grama Sevaka. Often this was also 
made use of to get rid of some • of the 'undesirable 
characters' from the village. Colonization schemes 
therefore became at least in part the dumping ground of 
some of the unwanted and marginal men. Some of these 
selectees did not own any agricultural land and had 
little experience in farming activities. 
Finally as no attention was ever paid to the homogeneity 
of the settlers on caste, geo-cultural origin, or any 
o t h e r b a s i s , the opportunity to foster social 
cohesiveness and community feeling was lost. On the 
contrary, a fair level of social heterogeneity was 
noticed which contributed to the social disruption which 
is presently observed in several colonization schemes. 
Illicit brewing of kassippu and gambling are not uncommon 
behaviour in the major schemes though the Purana villages 
are not free of them either. 
16. Administration and Servicers: supervision and 
management 
There is a considerable differences in the administrative 
set up in the colonization schemes when compared with 
that of the other rural areas. In the Purana villages for 
instance the only government officer the people had close 
contact with is the Grama Sevaka and sometimes the K.V.S. 
In colonization schemes the Colonisation Officer of the 
Land Commissioner's Department assisted by several Land 
Development Overseers exercised! a more intensive 
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supervision of the colonist, and had a control over them. 
In addition to these officers other departments such as 
Irrigation, Co-operative Department, Marketing had their 
own field staff to attend to the relevant aspects of the 
development work. 
Special Projects have imposed on the Colonization Schemes 
a different organization which is headed by a Special 
Project Manager theoretically given sufficient power to 
co-ordinate the activities of all the officers from 
various departments working in the special project area. 
This system was expected to provide the vital co-
ordination required at the scheme level. 
Generally speaking, colonization schemes show the same 
s h o r t c o m i n g s and administrative defects observed 
elsewhere in the non-colonization rural areas. However it 
seems that the effect of these shortcoming is more 
noticeable in the colonization schemes than in the Purana 
Village areas. As was indicated earlier when we discussed 
the social stratification and the social mobility in the 
Colonization Schemes, the well-to-do colonists occupy an 
intermediate position between the peasants - farmer class 
and the lower strata of the middle class, membership of 
which they aspire to acquire. 
To achieve this upward social mobility either for 
themselves or for their offspring, they seek the support 
from village or middle rank officers. As these officers 
themselves often come from well-to-do rural families, 
they tend to react very favorably to the need for the 
support solicited by the upper ladder of colonists. As 
indicated earlier identity of interests between two 
social categories leads to the monopolization of the 
limited services and benefits of the administration by a 
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'cash in' on it, by 
17. Appraisal of the Colonization Pplicv 
The functioning of the colonization schemes from their 
inception has been throwing up various defects and 
shortcomings which became the subject of study by several 
study groups and committees. Observations and comments of 
these different study groups can be generally summarized 
under seven major aspects as follows: 
I The very high cost involved in the provision of 
i r r i g a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e , 
h o u s i n g , c r e d i t and m a r k e t i n g facilities by 
government has been out of proportions to economic 
returns. The income realized has been very low in 
relation to the investment reisulting in an overall 
capital output ratio of 12.1 
II The method of selection of settlers is also often 
criticized. It has been pointed out that the quality 
of human material in colonization schemes has been 
poor. Lack of training and the organization of the 
new settlers is a common drawback in almost all the 
colonization schemes. There is; no preparation of the 
new colonist. It is also cleajr that no attempt has 
been made to train the setterjs to manage their own 
affairs. 
previledged minority. What is worse is that some of the 
officers, once they realize the Crucial position they 
hold between farmers and the higher ladders of the 
administrative machinery, try to 
resorting to bribery corruption. 
III The government paternal attitude has led to the 
colonist developing a pattern of submissive 
behaviour. There is a surplus of government 
authority and officials have usurped the community 
leadership positions. The colonist is not involved 
in any stage of planning, implementation and 
evaluation of programmes. 
IV Traditional peasant agriculture with all its 
a t t e n d a n t defects has been transplanted in 
colonization schemes. It has often been pointed out 
t h a t the planning and organization of the 
c o l o n i z a t i o n s c h e m e s h a s b e e n g e a r e d 
unintentionally towards the perpetuation of the 
traditional subsistence farming and has given paddy 
cultivation preference over other crops. 
V Un-employment and under-employment in colonization 
schemes are another area of common criticism. It has 
been pointed out that due to the emphasis on paddy 
cultivation to the exclusion of other crops, labour 
available on the farm is under utilized. 
V11 The present layout of village centres, the physical 
planning and layout of colonization scheme has not 
received much attention. The highland lots being 
earlier 2 to 3 acres in extent were spread long 
distances and the provision of infra-structure 
services and facilities have been difficult. Often 
the distance from the homestead to the paddy land 
was anything between 1 to 3 miles. It was pointed 
out that individual holdings were widely dispersed 
causing difficulties in social and organizational 
integration. 
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18. What model for Mahaweli? 
The existing colonization schemes in many respects will 
not satisfy the needs and scope of Mahaweli Development 
Programme, and cannot therefore be considered as the 
model for its settlement pattern. The defects and 
shortcomings of the peasant system of Colonization tends 
to overweight its achievements. In designing colonization 
schemes, special projects and even the pilot farms it has 
often been forgotten that farmers $.re human beings, with 
specific and conflicting interests, motivations and 
values and not just items of farm machinery. It has also 
been forgotten that when a man leaves his traditional 
habitat to settle down in a new environment, he is liable 
to feel more insecure. The basic psychological 
characteristic of any new colonist or allottee is a 
general state of insecurity, suspicion and mental 
weakness. A new colonist is a transient, loaded with all 
his individual and social past. But uncertainty of the 
future weight heavily on him. If this man is of the 
pioneer type, he will be able to cope up with the new 
challenge mixed with fears and hops. Human expectations 
cannot be managed in the same manner as materials and 
machines. If a material or a machine is wasted, it costs 
only money to replace it. On the other hand, if a man's 
confidence is eroded, it becomes nearly impossible to 
create a new confidence in him. Human factors are 
generally not so flexible as material factors. 
As it is almost late, immediate steps have to be taken to 
remove the gap between the two worlds, the world of the 
peasants and that of the officials. iHowever, it has to be 
empathetically stated that better results cannot be 
achieved in this exercise, the previous models even with 
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improvements. Therefore we propose a new model for the 
Mahaweli Project settlement, a model which integrates 
several institutions and organizations already existing 
and some to be introduced anew. This model as a pivotal 
and a dynamic feature will contain a hierarchy of farmers 
organizations with well defined authority, and a 
comprehensive range of functions. Increasing agricultural 
production through a network of farmers' settlement based 
on family-farms which are planned, executed and managed 
by farmers themselves through a network of farmers' 
organizations. 
20. Basic Principles and Objectives of the Project 
The basic principles guiding the implementation of new 
s e t t l e m e n t s in M a h a w e l i Development find their 
inspiration from the first in a unique settlement 
programme based on the principles of community 
development. As regards agricultural development the 
project has special objectives based on its programme of 
implementation. A successful settlement programme will 
have to have positive effects on the agricultural 
development of the Project. Only such a well combined 
effort will have its impact on the success of the 
Mahaweli Development Programme. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the Project are: 
a) increase of production 
b) increase of productivity 
c) increase of peasant income and standard of livind 
d) promotion of the initiative of the peasants 
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e) integration of population from different areas and 
various cultural backgrounds and 
f) generation and generalization of social change 
Promotion of the peasants' initiative and to instil a 
spirit of innovation in him are some of the important 
objectives of the Project since they are vital for 
creating a dynamic and progressive society. The peasants' 
i n i t i a t i v e w h e n c h a n n e l l e d e f f e c t i v e l y w o u l d 
substantially relieve the administrative machinery of a 
costly burden. The numerous shortcoming and failures of 
settlement schemes are due to the inability and 
leadership of the rural people. 
It is envisaged that, when the peasants' initiative is 
recognized and when he is given confidence, it will 
result in the full participation of the people in all 
facets of the Project including planning implementation 
and evaluation of the Project Programme. This will pave 
the way for ultimate self management and self government, 
t h r o u g h s t r o n g and w e l l c o o r d i n a t e d p e o p l e s ' 
organizations. 
Some of the existing old settlements which can be up 
graded with the proposed physical patterns of new 
settlement will be allowed to remain in the present 
locations subject to their being upgraded. However, where 
the unit of homestead allotment is much below the 
accepted size, the new settlement programme will have to 
be re-planned and sometimes consolidated to conform to 
the proposed new pattern of settlement. Some of the 
present homesteads which will bdcome irrigable, and 
therefore could be converted to good farm lands, will 
have to be shifted to new homestead areas. 
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Introducing several thousands of families from outside 
the area to be settled along with the existing population 
mean that a wide variety of people from different geo-
cultural backgrounds and different social and religious 
groups will have to live together harmoniously not only 
without hampering the achievement of the Project but more 
positively by contributing towards its development 
socially, culturally and economically. As the successful 
social integration of these people is a crucial condition 
to the success of the project, it becomes a major 
objective to achieve within the shortest period possible. 
21. Generation of Social Change 
Any development project will not be able to achieve the 
desired results, if it does not generate a very wide 
range of social changes, many of which are not included 
within the narrow definition of project objectives. It is 
also necessary that the changes so generated become well 
established so that they become part and parcel of the 
community life, and a dynamic process for more positive 
innovation. 
A project like the Mahaweli encompassing so many 
objectives is expected to contribute significantly to 
shifting the values of a traditional society to those of 
a modern but healthy one. Such a general expectation 
implies changes in many fields such as: 
-technical know-how and use of modern agricultural inputs 
-better investment and consumption pattern, farmers' 
budgeting and saving habits 
- p a t t e r n s of n e w r e l a t i o n s h i p s , n e w s o c i a l 
stratification and rational grouping patterns, providing 
social mobility. 
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- level of literacy knowledge and civic consciousness, 
attitudes and values 
- sense of duties, responsibility and participation in 
public affairs 
- economic and national integration, etc. 
22. Basic Principals 
It is our contention that five basic principles must be 
followed in order to achieve the above stated objectives; 
a) social cohesiveness b) effective leadership c) self-
management d) contractual economy and e) community 
development 
By social cohesiveness, it is meant that settlers are 
grouped together according to bases of their choice, such 
geographical origin, cultural patterns, race, religion, 
caste or on any other factors. Social cohesiveness once 
achieved will enable the people to have a larger share in 
common in the social affairs, more than when they are 
opposed to one another due to tensions and conflicts. It 
does not means that conflicts cannot occur within such a 
society, but when they occur it is within the control of 
the community to contain, control and settle them. 
It is assumed that social cohesiveness will bring about a 
higher degree of self - identification, solidarity and 
participation in rural institutions resulting in 
increased agricultural productivity jand a better and more 
efficient functioning of the cooperative, credit and 
marketing system. 
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23. Effective Leadership 
The authorities should give up the present practice of 
recognizing and favouring people masquerading as farmer 
leaders who monopolize the leadership positions in the 
rural institutions. New leaders should be systematically 
identified, selected and carefully trained so as to 
increase their efficiency. On the other hand, officials 
should give up the idea that peasant leaders constitute 
the inferior bottom rung of the ladder of the 
administration to channel their instructions and orders 
to the bulk of farmers. 
Officials should appreciate that peasants' leaders are 
primarily there to represent the farmers themselves and 
that any disagreements between the officials and the 
peasants' leaders are quite appreciable even desirable in 
certain instances. Indeed, such disagreements it any 
should lead officials to re-think on their own ideas and 
attitudes in dealing with the farmers and thus encourage 
them to be more sensitive to the felt needs of rural 
society. 
24. Self-management 
It is quite impossible to arouse peasants' initiative and 
to relieve the administration of its present burden of 
heavy costs, defects and delay if cognizance is not given 
to the fact that peasants have a right to manage their 
own affairs. They should be made to realize that they are 
well equipped to run their own activities in a manner 
they consider the most appropriate in keeping with their 
requirements and aspirations provided they meet with the 
objectives of the state. 
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Self-management means that farmers are fully responsible 
for the running of their affairs and that the role of 
officials should be to grant technical assistance, 
guidance and advice only and should no more be in a 
position of dominance. Self-management implies that 
farmers govern themselves by means of selected 
committees, operated according to the dispositions and 
procedures they would determine for|themselves. Officials 
should not even be ex-officio members of these committees 
but could sit on the committee only in an advisory 
capacity if and when requested by the farmers. 
25. Contractual Economy 
Contractual economy means that the efforts of government 
on one side be directed towards: the achievement of 
villagers' project and that reversely peasants must be 
aware of their reciprocal responsibilities to the state 
and realize that even a welfare st^te has not unlimited 
resources. If they require State assistance, they must 
know that this assistance entails their obligations 
towards the government. Farmers must know that the 
concomitance of self government are self-reliance and 
self-respect. The self-government of settlers' committee 
should be implemented only with the guarantees firstly of 
the right to organize and govern themselves and they 
should be made aware that this right implies greater 
responsibilities stretching even beyond the boundaries of 
their own community. It is implied 
obligation towards the Project 
responsible for the economic development of the country 
based on the success of the Project 
that farmers have an 
and that they are 
programme. Therefore, 
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a self-government formula should be closely linked with a 
contractual type of economy. 
O n c e e a c h y e a r or m o r e f r e q u e n t l y f a r m e r s ' 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and officials from the various 
departments associated with the project should meet to 
d i s c u s s the p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m m e of irrigation, 
cultivation, supply of inputs, credit and marketing 
requirements and improvements to public facilities etc; 
the final objective being to reach an agreement on the 
reciprocal commitments of each side while making 
provisions to accommodate possible shortcomings or 
delays. Farmers and officials are then in a position to 
engage in active partnership, which can transform a 
dependent economy into a contractual type of economy. 
26. Community Development 
It is evident that the introduction of self-government 
and contractual economy in the new settlements would not 
proceed without difficulties and problems and therefore, 
such a system needs the permanent support of a good 
community development programme. By community development 
it is meant that a set of combined development techniques 
of their social forces, their needs and the advantages in 
directing them constructively towards common goals having 
in mind the necessity forth improvement of their standard 
of living individually and communally. 
27. SETTLEMENTS 
When recommendation are made regarding agricultural 
settlements, it is customary to begin with those on the 
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28. Type of Settlement 
It is recommended that the new farmers be settled in 
c l u s t e r e d s e t t l e m e n t s , one cluster - corresponding 
approximately to an irrigation block. Each cluster should 
consist of not more that four ojr five sub-units or 
hamlets. As an alternative, it is proposed that a single 
cluster without separate sub-units (hamlets) be organized 
only when compelled to do so by t[he topography of the 
land and the requirements of the irrigation layout. 
Otherwise the clustered type with separated sub-units 
will be the normal pattern. It is possible to locate two 
clustered settlements, each with its four or five sub-
units within a single irrigation block when topography 
makes it necessary to do so. 
recruitment of settlers. We have darted from this pattern 
and some brief explanations are therefore necessary. 
It is considered that the proposed criteria for the 
recruitment and selection of settlers will not be fully 
explained without a prior understanding of the lay-out of 
the new settlements, their management conditions of 
settlement of the farmers, the pattern of the farmers' 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s and the p r o g r a m m e s of community 
development. Criteria for recruitment and selection 
cannot be discussed without explaining the objectives of 
settlement. As indicated before these objectives are not 
only efficient farming and proper use of irrigation 
facilities but also the promotion of social cohesiveness, 
leadership, capacity for self-management and community 
development. 
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The settlement patterns most suitable for the project are 
clustered farms or villages. Up to now, scattered farms 
or semi-scattered villages have been the pattern of 
settlements in colonization schemes. Much inconvenience 
resulted from this pattern, such as long distances 
separating the homesteads and the irrigation farm lands 
within the same settlement, difficulty in the provision 
and the utilization of public facilities, problems in 
fostering better relationships and solidarity among the 
inhabitants and the lack of self - identification by the 
settlers. The small neighboring units in the scattered 
settlements were not in a position to play a dynamic role 
in the collective life of the settlers. 
It is recommended that existing settlements within the 
Project area which conform to the proposed patterns 
should be allowed to remain to upgrading. In upgrading 
existing settlements and in integrating them with the new 
settlements, it is necessary for each village to be 
considered separately as each one has its own features. 
Such a task should be undertaken with the least possible 
dislocation of the social and cultural life of the 
people. Some of the existing villages which would fall 
within the new irrigation farmland area to be shifted to 
new sites, and the people have to be resettled in the new 
settlements. 
29. Size of Settlements 
It is reaccommodate that the size of each cluster should 
not be more than four to five hundred families. This 
means that the size of each sub-unit or hamlet should be 
about one hundred families. It can be observed that in 
the existing major colonization schemes numerous 
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inconveniences exist due to inadequacy of such services, 
which lead to the creation of a frustrated community. 
In a rural context where solidarity ties are of great 
importance for everyday life, a settlement of several 
thousands of people constitutes a milieu unfavorable to 
the development of any social cohesiveness, solidarity 
and complementality. reversely, its anonymous character 
and the fact that it favours impersonal relationships 
between people are propitious to Social anemic. Such a 
situation pave the way for an indifferent bureaucracy to 
assume control, and the authorities responsible for the 
settlement will then e~Gresort to organizational patterns 
too alien to the rural mentality. Moreover such a device 
implies a very costly administrative and police control 
and more or less stifles the potential initiative of the 
colonists they have, when they arrive in the new 
settlement. 
The size of about one hundred families for each hamlet a 
unit of a wider cluster or four or five hamlet 
corresponding to that of a typical Dry Zone village and 
constituting a type close to the traditional village 
environment, to which a great majority of its inhabitants 
are used to. This size of one hundred families for each 
h a m l e t corresponding generally to the peasants' 
conception of a manageable and comfortable social unit. 
For villagers and for old colonists such a dimension is 
the ideal to permit the managing of a new village by its 
own leaders, their control of social order and the 
correct operation of cultivatidn schedules without 
depending on the external authorities. 
In such an environment, the collective social pressure 
for the repayment of loans among would be stronger. It 
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would strengthen face to face relationships among the 
people. Even if people may not be related, they would be 
able to know and observe each other very closely and 
thereby will contribute to the weakening and the ultimate 
break up of caste, and other social barriers. 
30. Social composition of the proposed settlements 
It is recommended that the new settlements should be 
established with the objective of fostering social 
homogeneity and cohesiveness. The achievement of this 
objective implies the following recommendation: 
1. That each hamlet unit (approximately 100-150 
families) should be composed of people having the 
same geo-cultural background and same social status 
and whenever practicable having the same caste 
affiliations. 
It is proposed that when the new hamlets are planned and 
whenever possible, the selected farmers to be given an 
opportunity to; 
a) to select the particular hamlet they wish to live 
in, 
b) to get the farmers to group among themselves as 
the future settlers in a particular hamlet. The 
number will be 100-150 depending on the physical 
size and the number of land allotments in it. Given 
this opportunity, it is expected that the settlers 
will group themselves together on any basis 
acceptable to themselves, and it may be on geo-
c u l t u r a l o r i g i n , c a s t e , long acquaintance, 
profession etc. This would enable the creation of a 
dynamic community of the basic hamlet level and the 
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harmonious blending of a number of social groups. 
The need of a blacksmith craftsmen on earthenware, 
jewellery etc. an astrologer, drummer etc. in a 
rural community is a long establish one. 
31. Disposal of village tanks 
I . It is recommended that some of the village tanks 
should be retained even though these tanks may not 
be specifically required for irrigation, drainage, 
water storage etc. ' 
II . Even where the village tanks are not required 
for irrigation, a few of the village tanks should be 
retained for purposes such as domestic water supply 
and recreation. 
111. The removal of small uneconomical village tanks 
should be implemented in stages according to 
priorities. for example high priority for the 
removal of tanks are not connected with the existing 
settlements. 
While due consideration should given to economic and 
technical requirements, one must not ignore the 
multifarious social functions of the village tanks in the 
dry zone. Generally speaking a village tank plays its 
role in the annual rituals associated with cultivation. 
The tank is also the social centre iof the village, where 
the womenfolk gather to exchange village gossip. For the 
menfolks too, it is their usual meeting place, where they 
bathe after a hard day's work in the field of the chena, 
and discuss village affairs and farming activities. The 
village become synonymous with the tank and is often 
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named after it. Therefore it is relevant that the removal 
of village tanks to make way for irrigation canals etc., 
has to be viewed in a wider perspective. The removal of 
this important symbol of village life in the dry zone 
should not be measured only from the economic benefits 
and engineering feasibility. Social and psychological 
considerations are especially important at a time when it 
is envisaged to integrate Purana villagers with 
outsiders. Such an integrating process must be made more 
difficult by taking hastily and inconsiderate measures. 
32. Community belongingness, cohesiveness and solidarity 
In order to create and strengthen a feeling of community 
interest among the members of each new settlement, it is 
recommended that steps be taken to encourage and promote 
the development of a sense of belongingness, community 
cohesiveness and solidarity. 
1 .to promote group cohesiveness and self identity 
each new settlement should be identified by a name 
as has been done in the Uda Walawe Project. 
'11.there should be in each village, a 'Village 
Farmers Committees'. Representatives of these 
committees should from a Cluster Farmers' Committee 
should from the 'Sub Area Farmers' committee and 
f i n a l l y the ' F a r m e r s U n i o n c o n s t i t u t e of 
representatives of the 'Sub Area Committee' at the 
Project level. Elected representatives of these 
C o m m i t t e e s at the various levels would be 
responsible for the administration and management of 
most of the activities in the settlements, for 
example; 
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a) Water management, social welfare and social 
service aspects and settlement of minor 
disputes etc.,could be entrusted to the 'Sub 
Committees' to be formed in the Farmers' 
Committees at the various levels. 
b) Religious and cultural activates such as 'Sil' 
campaigns, harvest festivals, folk drama, folk 
dancing, poet assembly etc., should be 
promoted. The organization of these campaigns 
and festivals should be the responsibility of 
the Farmers' Committees at the various levels. 
c) Inter-village or inter-settlement competitions 
may be organized and conducted by the Farmers 
Committees at the various jlevels. 
A review of the existing colonization settlements in the 
areas show a relative weakness of the community structure 
and framework when compared with the Purana villages. 
People do not identify themselves with the settlement and 
most settlers even after two decades do not consider the 
settlement as their real home. Usually the settler would 
name his birth-village as his home. This lack of 
belongingness is due to many reasons such as cultural and 
social heterogeneity, which promotes individuality rather 
than identification with a social group, lack of 
interdependency, lack of clear patterns of genuine 
leadership which leads to extreiAe dependence on the 
officials. 
33. Service Centres 
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It is recommended that each cluster should have a service 
centre. This service centre should preferably be located 
centrally in the area to be serviced. 
The maximum distance from any homestead to the service 
centre should be about three miles. The service centre 
should not be an isolated unit but would be located 
within the most central sub-unit (hamlet) of the cluster. 
This centre should decentralized the supply of all the 
facilities, services, materials and equipment necessary 
for production, transport, storage, marketing of produce 
and those required in the day to day life of the farmer. 
The village sub unit of each cluster should as much as 
possible be around the service centre. A suitable network 
of roads should link each of the hamlets and the villages 
to the service centre. 
At sub-area level a 'urban' centre should function as a 
service centre to cater for several clusters with 
services, facilities and amenities of a higher level. 
This centre should also service cluster service centres. 
This lay-out pattern is shown in Chart 2. 
34.OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Existing institutions 
It is recommended that the functions now performed by 
various rural institutions such as the cultivation 
committees, rural development societies, community 
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centres, cooperative societies etc., should come within 
the propose Farmers' Committees. 
In order to strengthen the farmers' organizations and to 
promote the initiative and leadership among farmers, the 
proposed farmer' organizations at the various level have 
necessarily to be given an increasing measure of 
authority and responsibility. It is envisaged that after 
a few years it would be possible for the farmers' 
organizations to take over the full management of all 
matters connected with the development activities. 
35. New Farmers' Organization 
It is recommended that the functional principle to be 
observed with regards to new settlements should be the 
promotion of self reliance and leadership for self 
management. This implies that at each level, i.e. 
village, cluster, sub-area and the project, the farmers 
will manage their own affairs by means of Hamlet Farmers' 
Committees, Cluster Farmers' Union operated at the 
Project level. 
Election procedure and internal set-up - Each hamlet of 
100-125 families will elect its own Farmers' Committee. 
The head of each family will be entitled to a single vote 
and election will be y secret ballot. It is envisaged 
that each hamlet Farmers' Committee will have about 10 
representatives. The committee could form several sub-
committee with each sub-committee being responsible for 
different aspects of development, siich as the cooperative 
depot, water management, social welfare etc. There would 
be approximately 180-200 such committees operating in the 
project area. 
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Pour or five village Farmers' Committees constituting a 
cluster will elect representatives to form the Cluster 
Farmers' Committee. It is envisaged that each Village 
F a r m e r s ' C o m m i t t e e will nominate two or three 
representatives, it is possible for the 400 to 500 
settlers to elect representatives to the Cluster Farmers' 
Committee; In the alternative, it is possible for the 400 
to 500 settlers to elect representatives to the Cluster 
Farmers' Committee; All elections will be by secret 
ballot. The decision however should be left to the 
settlers. It is envisaged that the Cluster Farmers' 
C o m m i t t e e w i l l be c o m p o s e d of 10-15 e l e c t e d 
representatives. 
There will be 9 sub-areas in the Project and each will 
consist of five or six clusters. Each Cluster Farmers' 
Organization will elect two or three representatives to 
form the sub-area Farmers' Committees. 
An important point is that provision should be made to 
prevent few interested exercising any possible monopoly 
of the leadership in the Farmers' Committees. It should 
be possible to limit a representative's mandate either to 
a few years or to a specific period necessary to lapse 
between the assumption of another arm of office. 
Field of activities and responsibilities- It is felt the 
network of Farmers' Committees, with proper leadership 
will be competent to handle all aspects of development 
activities in the settlements in accordance with the 
Project administration. The major responsibilities of the 
Farmers' Committee, will be as follows: 
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36. Principles of functioning of Färbers' Organizations 
It would not be advisable to impose too rigid a pattern 
regarding the organization and functioning of Farmers' 
I. Production Services. 
a) channeling of extension services b) irrigation 
and water management c) enforcement of settlement 
and tenurial regulations d) preparation and 
implementation of cultivation Calendar e) any other 
functions attended to by the Cultivation Committees 
at present. 
II. Economic Services. 
a) organization and management of the Cooperative 
Depot. Branch Cooperative, Primaries and the Rural 
Banks. The Farmers' Union at the Project level will 
work in close coordination with the Marketing and 
Credit division of the Project administration, b) 
sale and distribution of the input including 
agricultural machinery and implements c) collection, 
storage and marketing of agricultural produce, d) 
implementation of the credit schemes e) all other 
functions attached to by the cooperatives at 
present. 
III. Community Development SErvices. 
a) assist the Grama Sevaka and other Project 
Officers in maintaining law and order, Settlement of 
minor disputes amicably among farmers, b) assist the 
authorities in the maintenance of health and 
s a n i t a t i o n , high levels qf nutrition,health 
programmes including family planning programme, c) 
organization of and participation in the various 
t r a i n i n g programmes f) any other functions 
pertaining to the community as a whole. 
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institutions and it is assumed that a clearer pattern 
will gradually evolve once the organization commence to 
operate on the basis of the recommendations discussed 
above. It will then be the responsibility of the 
Settlement Planning Development Division with the help of 
the Socio-Economic Research Union of the Project 
administration to work out the details in collaboration 
with Farmers' Committees and to draw up guide lines and 
procedures to be reviewed and changed if necessary on the 
experience gained. 
It must be emphasized that all our recommendations 
concerning farmers' organizations are directed to a 
system which can operate with the minimum direction and 
control by Project personnel. It is one of our main 
objectives to assess the capacity of villagers to 
conceive and elaborate the organizational patterns for 
the future settlement schemes. For this purpose we 
designed a kind of productive test to evaluate the degree 
of creativity and potential initiative among villagers. 
This test showed that a very wide range of people ( 
elders, young men, farmers, village traders, office 
bearers of rural institutions) are fully aware of the 
problems encountered by the rural institutions at grass-
roots level. As such most of our recommendations are 
based on the views expressed by the villagers. 
37. Organization and Adminstration 
It is recommended that the linkage between the farmers' 
organizations and the administration should essentially 
be o basis of guidance and technical assistance. 
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At present relationships between officials and the 
existing farmers' organizations are either very weak or 
non-existent whenever it exists it does on the lines of 
domination and authority. The officials endeavour to 
implement the government's policies and programmes on 
a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , technical improvements, 
repayment of loans, marketing etc. in an authoritative 
manner and this has failed to achieve results. In the new 
settlements it is strongly stressed that this pattern of 
relationship be completely changed in order to achieve 
optimum results. 
This means that the officials would not be ex-officio 
members of the proposed committees but would sit on the 
committee only when requested to do by the farmers and 
even then they will act only in an advisory capacity. The 
officers at various levels will act,not as the superiors 
of the farmers but as a decentralized link of the 
management of the Project. 
It is assumed that once farmers realize that officials' 
role will not be to dominate but to demonstrate and guide 
them, they will respond better to the officials' advise 
and will promote enthusiastic participants in all the 
programmes of the Project. 
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APPENDIX II: Settlement Strategy under the Accelerated 
Mahaweli Programme - 'Mahaweli Ganga 
D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m I m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
Strategy Study'. Main Report.September 
1979. 
1. Implementation Strategy and Scenarios 
The Mahaweli Programme is an undertaking of unprecedented 
scale and it is complicated to a degree that would test 
the organizational skill in any country of the world. It 
is therefore imperative that its execution is based on 
careful planning and well- conceived strategies. 
There are many possibilities with regard to sequence, 
i.e. the order to which the many sub-projects are carried 
out, and it is necessary to compare various scenarios 
based on different sequences. 
But apart from sequence, the scenarios may also differ 
with regard to the many whole of The Accelerated 
Programme by 1984, i.e. the construction of the Victoria, 
Randenigala, Maduru Oya, Moragahakanda and Kotmale 
reservoirs, as well as the development and selling of 
about 120,000 hectares of land. It has already been said 
that the high priority accorded to the Mahaweli Programme 
is fully understandable. 
With regard to the irrigation systems other constraints 
emerge. Developing and settling 120,000 hectares in 5 or 
6 years, implies an annual implementation speed of more 
then 20,000 hectares and a settlement of 140,000 persons 
per year. This is a very high rate and in fact it is 
impossible to find examples from other countries in the 
world, where such rates of land development and 
settlement have been achieved over sustained period. 
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Progress on the downstream works has been slower than was 
envisaged as it took more effort then expected to 
mobilize the construction capacity needed for the high 
targets set. In system H, where most of the construction 
activity took place in the past two years most of the 
pre-construction activates were finalized at the start of 
the accelerated development in that system. In the new 
systems surveys and feasibility studies are still going 
on. Donors are considering financial assistance for the 
new systems, but this assistance! cannot be finalized 
until the feasibility studies are Completed and reviewed 
by the donors. In view of these and other factors there 
is clearly a need for a redefinition of implementation 
targets on the downstream work. 
2. Constraints 
It has been observed above that the lack of construction 
capacity was one of the major constraints at the onset of 
the Accelerated Programme. In the coming years another 
constraint will become important, the pre - construction 
activities such as surveys, studies finalizing foreign-
aid assistance, detailed designs, tendering etc. Assuming 
that this and the construction capacity constraint can be 
overcome settlement and post-construction activates such 
as the provision of a social infrastructure, agricultural 
supporting services etc. may become a major constraint. 
In a well - conceived strategy all activates (pre-
construction, construction and post - construction) have to 
be attuned. 
3. Pre-construction constraints 
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Surveys, studies, preparing foreign-aid agreements, 
preparing designs and tender document, reviewing tenders, 
etc. do require time and highly qualified manpower. Some 
of these activates can be speeded up by calling in 
foreign consultants but a large part of the activities 
cannot be undertaken but by Sri Lankan and there is a 
shortage already of the highly qualified staff needed for 
these activities. The time needed to finalize foreign 
financial assistance. 
4. Construction constraints 
Heavy construction activity throughout the country and on 
the Mahaweli projects resulted in a strained construction 
sector in Sri Lanka in 1979. Extensive foreign 
contracting and design assistance had to be called in 
that year already. In the period 1980-1985 three or four 
major dams will be under construction at the same time. 
Since the local construction sector is already strained 
it will evidently be difficult to maintain progress on 
the downstream work. This the more so because the 
downstream work requires a large number of construction 
labour. On the basis of traditional local construction 
practices, it will be hard to keep the downstream work 
moving at the pace achieved in the recent past. 
A large input of foreign constructing and design 
assistance for the main dams, transbaisin canals and main 
and branch canals, including expatriate manpower for 
skills that are very short supply is at present envisaged 
for the construction of the project. Taking this into 
account and assuming the same construction practice, as 
in system H for work beyond the branch canal but executed 
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much more efficiently, a rather fast progress on 
downstream works appear possible. 
5. Post-construction constraints 
Construction is not an aim in itself but a necessary 
activity for creation of permanent employment in 
agriculture for the large number of landless and to 
create additional employment in the agricultural service 
sectors. To reach this goal a social infrastructure with 
h e a l t h , education, public transport and general 
administrative facilities has to be created. To have 
these available in time requires an extraordinary effort 
especially in the organizational field since it requires 
the cooperation of various branches of the Government. 
But then still actual farming has to start, and in this 
study it has been assumed that immediately after 
settlement the first agricultural 
benefits will be realized, which implies the availability 
of agricultural service organizations to provide 
extension, seeds, fertilizers, marketing facilities, etc. 
If this cannot be realized, the project may be with 
regard to its social aims, i.e. the creation of a 
satisfied and reasonable prosperous rural community. 
6. Macro-economic constraints 
A very high speed of downstream development will cause 
serious macro-economic constraints. Inflation rates of 
15% over world levels can then be expected and this 
together with increasing labour cost to attract 
sufficient manpower to the project area will increase the 
cost of the Programme considerably over present 
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8. Cost of Irrigation Systems 
estimates, with further negative consequences for the 
government budget as well as the balance of payments, 
even if it is assumed that foreign finance would shoulder 
at least a major share of the burden of cost increases. 
Programmes, that have similar goals, can be expected to 
have roughly the same macro-economic effects. 
7. Outline of Consultant's Scenario 
Considering all constraints involved, Consultants have 
attempted to draw up a scenario, which is ambitious, but 
nevertheless may be considered realistic, in that it 
would seem to be feasible to implement it given a high 
degree of dedication and efficiency in all sectors. 
Moreover, foreign assistance at different levels, 
financially as well as in terms of project preparation 
and implementation, is required. The development scenario 
could not be tested against all constraints noted above, 
only a check has been made regarding availability of 
manpower. A scenario assuming a general increase irt 
construction starting from 6,000 ha/year in 1980 to 
10,000 ha/year in 1984 appears possible though ambitious 
on account of pre - construction, construction and post-
construction constraints. Beyond 19 84 projections become 
highly speculative, but given a sustained policy of 
priority for the project further increases are possible. 
No doubt in a few year time a better schedule can be 
drawn up for the later part of the eighties taking into 
account the actual performance in the first years of the 
Accelerated Programme. 
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Available areas and soil qualities have been estimated 
for all irrigation systems. In order to assess the 
economic potential of each system, benefits from farming, 
fisheries and forestry were compared with the cost of 
development. Of course, there are a number of cost items 
that must be considered as joint cost elements for more 
than one system. This is true for the main storage 
reservoirs as well as for the transbasin canals. In first 
instance only the costs of system-specific facilities 
have been estimated. 
9. Benefits from Irrigation Systems 
With regards to benefits, farm benefits are by far the 
most important. Based on soil characteristics, agronomic 
considerations, climatological factors and market 
limitations, cropping patterns were selected for all 
irrigation systems. As already mentioned, all poorly-
drained lowlands were selected for paddy in Maha and 
Yala, intermediate lands for paddy in Maha and upland 
crops in Yala. Well-drained upland were considered for 
upland crops only, especially in order to avoid excessive 
water use. Crop budgets, based on cropping intensities of 
98% in Maha and 80% in Yala were determined. Table (I) 
shows the main assumptions about agricultural yields. 
The yields shows are targets expected to be reached after 
a number of years. For paddy is expected in the 5th year 
and for all other crops in the 8th year. After that a 1% 
annual increase is assumed until the 35th year. 
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Table (I) 
Crop Good quality soil Poorer quality s< 
Maha Yala Maha Yala 
Paddy 4.3 4.5 3.4 3.6 
Sugarcane 67 
Cotton 1 .6 
Tobacco 1 . 1 
Groundnuts 1 .6 1 .8 1 .6 1 .8 
Pulses 1 .4 1 .6 1 .1 1 .3 
Soyabeans 1 .5 2.0 1 .2 1 .7 
Chillies 1 .5 
Onions 11.0 
Vegetables 10.0 
Bananas 1200 bunches/ha 
For paddy the assumed sequence of yields per ha on good 
soils is as follow: 
Year % of target yield tons per ha 
Maha Yala 
1 60 2.58 2.70 
2 70 3.01 3.15 
3 80 3.44 3.60 
4 90 3 . 87 4 . 05 
5 1 00 4.30 4.50 
15 110 4.75 4 .97 
25 122 5.25 5.49 
35 and later 1 35 5.80 6.07 
Comparison of Costs and Benefits per System 
These farm benefits, together with benefits from 
fisheries and forestry, can then for each system be 
compared with the cost of development. In this way an 
insight into the relative merits of each system is 
obtained, which may play a role in the selection of the 
sequence of execution, next to other factors like the 
necessity to construct major dams or transbasin canals, 
the extent to which detailed surveys and studies have 
advanced, etc. The comparison is based on the factious 
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FOREIGN CONTRACTORS 
Nearly 70 percent of the funding on the headworks was coming in 
through foreign sources and in terms of the conditions of the 
foreign assistance received on the Mahaweli Project; the 
contractors were generally from the country which provided the 
funds. The level of funding and inflow of funds had never 
occurred before on so large a scale on any other project in Sri 
Lanka's history. In the case of Maduru Oya Project, for instance, 
the consortium of four Canadian firms was awarded contracts in 
April 1980 to the value of Rs. 1.3 billion and inflation took 
this sum up further. 
In the case of the Victoria Project Balfour Beatty Nuttal of rJK 
was awarded the tender for constructing the dam in March 1980 at 
a value of Rs. 1.5 billion and also the contract for constructing 
the tunnel at a value of Rs. 645 million. The contract for 
building the power Station was awarded to Costain International 
of UK in October 1980 at a value of Rs.250 million. 
At Kotmale the construction contracts covering initial, 
Underground and Reservoir Works costing about Rs. 6.2 billion 
were awarded in 1979 to Messrs. Skanska Cementgiuteriet; and 
contracts for the Electrical and Mechanical Works costing Rs. 1.2 
billion were awarded in 1981 to ASEA, both of Sweden. 
With such enormous sums of money being expended on these projects 
the issue of wastage or misuse of funds was raised in certain 
quarters. One official view point on charges of such wastage and 
misuse of funds was that once the contracts were awarded 
utilization of funds were the responsibility of the contractor 
firms and if there were instances of "leakages", in accounting 
terms provision had been made in their budgets for a small 
percentage of wastage. 
There were numerous contractor firms involved in projects both 
after the start of the Accelerated Programme as well as before, 
as the following lists indicate. (It is possible that the lists 
do not include the names of some contracting firms, which were 
not available). 
FOREIGN CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS 
Firms and Function 
Victoria 
1. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners 
2. Preece Cardew & Rider 
3. Hydraulic Research Station 
4. Balfour Beatty Nuttal Joint (Comprising Balfour Beatty 
Construction Ltd. & Edmund Nuttal Ltd.) 
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KOTMALE 
1. The Water and Power Development Consultancy Services 
(WAPCOS), Feasibility Studies 
2. Sir William Halcrow and Partners; UK Consultancy Services 
3. Kennedy & Donkin and Westbrook Mills, UK 
Consultancy Services 
4. SKANSKA of Sweden 
Civil Engineering Works 
5. ASEA of Sweden 
Electro Mechanical Equipment 
6. NEY/RPIC of France 
Supplying of steel gates for the spillway 
Consulting Engineers in association with Specialised advice from 
Main civil contractors for Dam and Tunnel. 
5. Costain International Ltd. Power Station. 
6. Whessoe Boving Joint Venture (Comprising Whessoe Heavy 
Engineering Ltd., Boving & Co. Ltd.) 
Hydraulic Equipment 
7. Balfour Kilpatrick Ltd. 
Dam Electrical Distribution System 
8. Boving & Co. Ltd. 
Turbines and Associated plant 
9. GEC Large Machines Ltd. 
Generators and Associated Plant 
10. Hawker Siddeley Power Transformers Ltd. 
Transformers and Associated equipment. 
11. NEI Reyrolle Ltd. 
High Voltage Switchgear 
12. BICC Supertension Cables Ltd 
High and Low Voltage Cables 
13. GEC Electrical Projects Ltd. 
Station Miscellaneous Plant 
14. Herbert Morris Ltd. 
Cranes and Lifting Equipment 
15. Eve Construction Ltd. 
High Voltage Transmission Lines 
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RANDENIGALA 
1. Joint-venture Randenigala Mills Salzgitter Agrarund 
Electrowatt 
Feasibility Studies 
2. Kreditanstalt für Wideraufbau - 'KPW' Dam Construction 
3. Joint Venture of M/s Dyckerheff and Widman, Bilfinger and 
berger and Alfred Kunz, of West Germany Joint Venture 
Randenigala Civil Contractors 
4. Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nueraberg A.G. (M.A.N.) of West 
Germany Randenigala Hydromechanical Contractors 
5. Brown Boveri and CIE Aktiengesellschaft (BBC) of West 
Germany 
Randenigala Electric Equipment Contractors 
MADÜRU-OYA 
1. Grippen International Ltd Canadian Consultants 
2. The Foundation Company of Canada Ltd., Atlas-Gest, 
International Ltd., Fitzpatrick Construction Ltd & Janin 
Construction Ltd., Joint Venture Dam Construction 
3. ACRES 
Consultants (Maduru Oya Dam and System B) 
4. SOGREAH 
French Consultants (Maduru Oya Dam design) 
5. Hydraulic Engineering Corporation of China (HECC) 
Manufacturer of all hydro-mechanical works for Maduru Oya 
project 
DOWNSTREAM DEVELOPMENT 
1. Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation, Australia 
Construction and upgrading of 134 kilometres of roadway in 
Systems B & C 
2. Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy-Stration (TAMS) of USA 
Environmental assessment study and plan of action in System 
B & C 
3. Vianini Italy 
Contractor The R.B. Transbasin Channel, Minipe 
4. Hazama Gumi Toda & C. ITOH of Japan (Joint Venture) 
Contractor - R.B. Transbasin, Channel No.2 Ratkinda 
5. Nippon Koel Jec & Chue Koihatsu, Corporation Japan 
Consultants (Moragaha Kanda Feasibility Report) 
6. NEDECO - The Netherlands Consultants - (Implementation 
Strategy of the Accelerated Mahaweli Programme) 
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SOIL Mechanics Ltd. of UK Consultants (Special Geological 
Survey) 
Zachny - Diltinghara USA (Construction of Left Bank Main 
Canal) 
Louis Berger International Inc. USA 
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APPENDIX IV Characteristics of the Mahaweli Studies 
1. Characteristics of the Mahaweli Documents 
The literature on the Mahaweli is characterized by its 
variety of document types, in contrast to the 
bibliographic output of other areas of study. The 
document categories were classified as follows: 
a Surveys - these include socio-economic surveys, 
geologic, soil and hydrology surveys. It 
excluded the topographical surveys which had 
been carried out for the preparation of maps by 
the Survey Department and the surveys carried 
out by the c o n s u l t a n t s w h o c o n d u c t e d 
feasibility studies. 
b Review documents - in this category are 
included monographs, articles, position papers 
etc. which are usually restatements of existing 
information. 
c Feasibility studies - reconnaissance reports, 
briefing documents, pre - feasibility studies and 
feasibility studies fall within this category. 
d Plans, Programmes - includes plans, work 
p r o g r a m m e s , implementation schedules, in 
respect of construction of headworks and to 
downstream development. 
e Progress Reports - only the first issue of a 
series has been counted. The frequency of these 
reports vary from fortnightly, monthly to 
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quarterly. Project completion reports have also 
been included. 
f Technical and Engineering - Documents relating 
to construction of headworks, their operation 
and maintenance and technical documents 
concerned with the physical implementation of 
the project. 
g Research studies - includes studies on 
evaluation of project impact, case studies, and 
critiques of the project. 
Table 1 Types of Documents 
Document Category Number % of Total 
A. Surveys 99 10 
B. Review documents 226 24 
C. Feasibility studies 50 04 
D. Plans, Programmes 79 09 
E. Progress reports 65 07 
F. Technical and Engineering 357 08 
Total 948 100 
It is observed that 38% of the documents comprise those 
that pertain to construction and engineering aspects of 
the project. This percentage would probably increase if 
the documents generated by the foreign consultants and 
contractors had been enumerated. 24% of the documents are 
classified as review documents. A 10% of the literature 
comprise those documents that cofltain the results of 
surveys - socio-economic, geologic, soil, - that had been 
undertaken from the 1960s. 9% of the documents related to 
planes, programmes and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n schedules in rspect 
of construction of headworks and downstream development. 
Thus as much as 92% of the literature documents the 
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operational aspects of the project. Evaluation, case 
studies and research studies account for only 8%, 
indicating perhaps the relatively little attention paid 
to assessing the impact of the project on different 
sectors. 
Authorship 
The implementation of the Mahaweli Programme involved the 
work of a host of specialists - economists, sociologists, 
agriculturalists, environmentalists, engineers, health 
professionals, administrators, planners etc. drawn from 
both Sri Lanka and abroad. 
The international dimension of the Mahaweli Programme is 
nowhere more apparent then in the bibliographic output on 
the Mahaweli. USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Australia, India, China, 
Switzerland, France, Italy and the European Economic 
Community, either provided financial assistance and/or 
consultants and contractors for the construction of 
headwork and downstream development. Recently, USSR 
expressed interest n financing the development of System 
A. 
The Table below indicates the number of local and foreign 
personnel under whose authorship the documents have been 
issued. It sould be noted that feasibility studies 
carried out by foreign consortia of consultants have been 
contracted according to the number of consultancy firms 
involved, whereas a large number of individuals were 
responsible for the actual study. However, as their names 
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Table 2 Authorship of Documents 
Authorship No % of Total 
Local 450 55 
Foreign 360 45 
&TÖ Tol) 
usually do not appear in the documents, there was no way 
of obtaining an accurate figure of!the number of persons 
involved in such studies. Thus the figure does not reveal 
the actual number of foreign personnel involved, though 
it relates to available information and provides an 
indicator to the type of authorship. 
The literature comments on the commissioning of foreign 
consultancy firms to carry out studies and the 
employments of a large number of foreign personnel, 
especially with regard to increasing the technical 
capacity of Sri Lankans. In 1970, a! Commission of Inquiry 
appointed by the Ministry of irrigation, Power and 
Highways examined the question of local capability for 
undertaking project work assisted by foreign consultants 
where necessary. More recently a contributor to the 
Economic Review stated that " in the Accelerated Mahaweli 
Programme, a number of large and complicated engineering 
structures have been constructed. The design and 
construction of these structures would have increased and 
developed the technical capabilities of the personnel 
associated with these projects. In the case of the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Programme we io not believe that a 
transfer of technology took place which increase the 
technological capabilities of our personnel. We doubt 
whether our technical people gained the valuable 
experience from these projects. One feels that what took 
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Table 3 Official and Unofficial Documents 
place was the transfer of engineering structures rather 
than the transfer of technology." 
The foreign consultants those engaged in construction and 
worked in collaboration with local institutions such as 
the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau, the 
Irrigation Department, Survey Department etc. but the 
exclusion of certain key institutions such as the 
Engineering Faculty of the University and the State 
Engineering Cooperation is also noted in the literature. 
The comparatively low participation of Sri Lankan 
engineering and technical personnel is to an extent 
reflected in the paucity of technical papers presented 
at professional fora. However, two other factors that may 
be r e s p o n s i b l e for this position are (a) the 
disinclination of these personnel to write and (b) their 
reluctance to discuss official data and policy. On the 
other hand, social scientists have a tendency to regard 
the project as a laboratory, but they are generally 
discouraged from research in the project area. 
'Official' and 'Unofficial' Documents 
Studies commissioned by officials sources and those 
undertaken by individuals and institutions are indicated 
in the table below. Documents which have been issued by 
the Ministry of Mahaweli Development, Mahaweli Authority 
of Sri Lanka and any of its agents, and those 
commissioned by them have been classified as official. 







Un-official 235 33 
695 1 00 
Official documents account for 67% of the bibliographic 
output while independent studies account for 33%. The 
predominance of official documents! assumes significance 
in view of the following: 
a) The distrust of official data in some quarters. 
b) The use of this same data by planners and their 
general reluctance to accept independent point of 
views. 
c) The large number of studies which have ben based on 
e c o n o m i c projections and tentative data of 
feasibility studies. 
Fugitive Nature of Documents 
Another distinct characteristics of the documentation 
relating to the Mahaweli is its 'fugitive' nature that is 
a large number of documents are unpublished or are 
available for limited circulation only. Some documents 
are of a confidential nature. Published documents have 
ben classified as those that appear in journals, in 
monograph form, seminars, workshops and conferences and 
those which are accessible to those outside the Project 
and who require them. The un-published category is as 
high as 80% of the total bibliographic output, and this 
figure would probably increase if the confidential 
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documents mainly of donor and international aid agencies 
are included. 
Sectoral Classification of Documents 
Multipurpose development of the Mahaweli Ganga, which 
necessitated the adoption of an integrated approach ha,s 
generated literature of a multi-disciplinary nature. The 
l i t e r a t u r e reflects the multifaceted nature and 
c o m p l e x i t y of this very large scheme and the 
interdisciplinary characteristics of the project. 
Once again it is observed that documents relating to 
construction and engineering dominate the bibliographic 
output. This category is followed by literature on 
s e t t l e m e n t s , a g r i c u l t u r e , i r r i g a t i o n and water 
management. Socio-economic surveys also account for a 
substantial number of documents. It the bibliographic 
output is taken as na indicator of the emphasis laid on 
specific areas of activity, these statistics indicate 
that the main focus of the Project has, been on 
construction aspects and that downstream development has 
proceeded at a slower pace than the completion of 
headwork. Several factors have contributed to the 
predominance of the literature on engineering and 
construction aspects of the project. Construction of 
h e a d w o r k s constituted a major component of the 
Accelerated Programme. This necessitated the generation 
of a large number of reports and reviews because of the 
emphasis on the completion of headworks on schedule and 
also to the several adjustments that had to be 
incorporated during the construction of headworks. 
A phenomenal increase in the bibliographic output is 
recorded in the period after 1977, with the decision of 
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Table 4 Sectoral Classification of Documents 
the Government to accelerate the project and is 
indicative of the increased activity associated with the 
a c c e l e r a t e d p r o g r a m m e . The slow growth of the 
bibliographic output of the pre 19 77 period reflecting 
the slow pace of development gave way to a period of 
rapid growth after 1977, peaking in the years 1977-1983. 
The bibliographic output reveals a phasing off 
thereafter, coinciding with the completion of the 
feasibility studies. 
Sectoral Growth of Literature 
Sectoral bibliographic output is discussed in relation to 
environment and downstream development focussing on 
settlement. The imperatives of acceleration were, in 
addition to hydropower development,; the increase in food 
production and creation of additional employment 
opportunities. But the achievement of project objectives 
depend not only on the construction and physical 
maintenance of the irrigation network, but also on 
settler satisfaction and their physical well-being. Table 
1, indicated that literature on engineering and 
construction aspects dominated the literature while 
documents on the social aspects of the project ware 
relatively few. The documents relating to settlement, 
agriculture, irrigation and water management were 
classified to determine those that deals with plans, 
programmes etc. which may be termed documents relating to 
inputs or delivery services and those studies that 
e v a l u a t e and i d e n t i f y p r o b l e m s . The s e c t o r a l 
classification of documents is given in the table below. 
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Construction, engineering and 
Technical Studies 38 
Settlement 11 
Planning, Project Formulation 09 
Agriculture 09 
Socio-economic Surveys 07 
Environment 05 
Feasibility Studies 04 
Hydropower 3.5 
Employment Productivity 03 
Social infrastructure 03 
Land use 1 .5 
Marketing and Credit 01 
Cost Studies 01 
Business Development 01 
Women 01 
Transport 0.7 
Cultural Aspects 0.6 
Archeology 0.6 
Environment 
Environmentalists and ecologists have expressed concern 
o v e r the e c o l o g i c a l destruction caused by the 
construction of dams. The loss of irreproducible assets, 
they claim, for outweigh the benefits to be derived from 
the project. Deforestation, effect on wild life habitats, 
environmental pollution consequent to the widespread use 
of agrochemicals in intensive farming and soil erosion 
are some of the negative impacts that have been 
enumerated. 50 documents have been issued relating to the 
environmental effects of the Mahaweli DEvelopment 
Programme, during the period 1969-83. Recommendations 
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S e t t l e m e n t 
The literature records that land settlement schemes 
although popular in most Third World countries have not 
been particularly successful. Even in Sri Lanka, the 
previous land settlement sachems such as Gal Oya had 
limited results and anthers have shown the need to 
examine settlement schemes in its boarder context of 
economic and social processes, as well as in their 
social, economic and political environments. This 
analysis, they state should be considered vital if past 
shortcomings are to be avoided. A total 89 references on 
settlements and settlement planning were located, of 
which 14 were published before 1977 and the balance 75 
after 1975. 675 of the documents were concerned with 
settlement panning, location of toWnships etc. while 33% 
w e r e r e s e a r c h s t u d i e s highlighting the growing 
have been made from 1969 with regard to the adoption of 
measures that will ameliorate potential environmental 
problems. The UNDP/FAO Master Plan made recommendation 
regarding land use an soil conservation measures, new 
forest reserves and wild life reserves. In 1977 the 
Government commissioned an American consulting firm to 
conduct an environmental assessment study and the 4 
v o l u m e r e p o r t h i g h l i g h t e d some of the adverse 
environmental effect that may occur with the construction 
of dams. Following this report an environmental plan of 
action was formulated and issued, with the objective of 
ameliorating potential environmental problems. Another 
Project, the Man and Biosphere Programme of the UNESCO 
was engaged in a 5 year project in evaluating the socio-
economic studies, monitoring of the biotic environment 
and monitoring of the physical environment. 
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inequalities and alienation, social differentiation, the 
emergence of dominant groups and increasing income 
inequalities and poverty. The papers stress the need for 
closer attention to be paid to the economic and social 
structures than are emerging in the settlement schemes. 
Agriculture 
One of the main objective of the Mahaweli Project is the 
benefits to be driven from increased agricultural 
production from small farms. Cropping patterns were 
proposed to obtain a high net farm income per unit of 
water, while the emphasis from the inception has been on 
paddy farming. The documents reveal the problems of the 
development model of family farms, resulting in low 
incomes. 
Irrigation and Water Management 
As the availability of water is crucial in irrigated 
agriculture, the literature contains not only documents 
on methods of meeting irrigation water requirements but 
also documents on the causes of unequal and insufficient 
availability of water for cultivation, and the result of 
such unequal distribution. The documents were therefore 
separated into two categories to identify the literature 
available on these two areas. It is observed that the 
majority of documents relates to the first group and 
theses have been generated from the feasibility studies 
and from special water management projects such as the 
Demand irrigation Pipeline Project, Irrigation System 
Trials and Micro Model studies and the Mahaweli Water 
Resources Management Project. The Water Management Panel 
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is also responsible for a number of studies. Several 
studies have also identified problems and constraints to 
efficient water management. A smaller number of specific 
studies have surfaced the social problems, settler 
conflicts, community and the irrigation bureaucracy and 
the organization of turnout groups. 
(Extracted from the a bibliographic overview on the 
Mahaweli prepared by Leelangi Wanasundera, Documentation 
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339 
Overview of environmental problems, related to the Accele-
rated Mahaweli Ganga Project 
Settlements area H 
- aquatic veado 
- firewood and timber 
scarcely 




- social conflict* 
- eroalon and sediment.. 
- waterrelated diseases 
Estuarine ecoiysten 
- Impact on production and 
energy cyclus riak on 
destruction of: 
• mangroves 
. coral reeft 
. coaatal flsherlea 
Somawathle Wationil Park 
- lota of 2 , 2 ^ 0 ba of high 
quality habitete 
Hahaweli C»nt» floodplajns 
- Ion of at -least 6 , 4 0 0 ha of 
rich habitats for wildlife, 
wildfowl, grazing and local 
flsherlea due to flood 
reduction 
Haduru Oyi river 
- losa of riverrinc foreat 
wildlife habitat and corri-
dor to SoBjwathic National 
Park 
Haduru Oya floodplajns 
- lots of rich habitats 
Northern part of C 
- loss of 6 , 0 0 0 ha high 
quality forest and wildlife 
habitat 
- loss of corridor for animal 
migration 
ettlementi irtn A, B, C 
- crop losses due to weeds 
- petts and animal Migration 
- firewood and timber 
- scarcely 
- encroachment of reserved 
are** 
- underdeveloped bornegardens 
- social conflicts 
- eroalon and sedimentation 
* water quality problems 
- waterrelated diseases 
Haduru Oya rescjrvoir 
- loss of 5 , 0 0 0 ha of high 
quality wildlife habitat 
- 1 3 , 0 0 0 people displaced 
- 2 , 0 0 0 ha paddy and highland 
lost 
- risk on earth slides 
- siltation, reduced life 
storage within 3 0 - 5 0 years. 
Victoria, Randenif|ala and Rantcwbe rriervoiri 
- displacement of 1 2 , 0 0 0 people 
• loaa of 4 , 9 0 0 ha of Sri Lanka's mosl fer-
tile valley bottoms, highly developed with 
agricultural crops and homegardens 
- loss of most Important rivcrrinc forest* 
and wildlife areas, valuablr medical herbs 
and trees 
- lost of endemic ifish species 
- siltallon, reducjed life storage within 
3 0 - 5 0 years. 
Surrounding hills ; 
- increasing man/l|and ratio 




Layout Plan of a settlement unit 
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Accelerated liahaweli Programme! -'Cost ZHstinates 
(Rs. Million). 
Actual Expenditure 
up to end 1985 
Estimates for 
1986 - 1992 Total 
Victoria 7,619 994 8,613 
Kotmalo 8,210 671 8,881 
Maduru Oya 2,646 - 2,646 
Randenigala 3,962 1,530 5,492 
Stage I 514 - 514 
Stage 11 2,457 7 2,464 
System B (LB) 3,652 2,956 6,608 
System B (RB) 396 *t, 278 4,674 
System C 2,608 2,300 4,908 
System G 195 154 349 
Access Roads 176 318 494 
Udawalawe 225 605 830 
Minipe T.B.C. 1,197 11 1,208 
Others 47 - 4? 
Total 33,904 13,824 47,728 
Source: Mahawoli Authority of Sri Lanka. 
flahavreli Authority of Sri Lanka 
A.fi.P. Currently Estimated Cost to Completion 
Rs.Kn. 
Upto 1984 1985 1986 1S87 1988 1989 19SC 1S91 1992 Total 
Victoria 7015 604 595 268 85 46 - - _ 8613 
Kotmale 75B7 623 521 150 - - - - - 8881 
Maduru Oya 2640 6 - - • - - - - - 2646 
iiandenigala 2420 1542 1061 465 4 - - - - 5492 
Stage I 514 - - - - - - - - 514 
Stsg,e II 2362 95 - 7 - - - - - 2464 
System-B (LB) 2185 1467 1159 833 457 314 131 S2 - 6608 
System B (RB) 370 . 26 16 30 683 1259 1579 569 142 4674 
System C 1919 689 849 860 490 101 - - - 4908 
System G 93 102 101 53 - - - - - 349 
i.cccss Roads 62 114 59 228 31 - - - - 494 
Udawalawe 164 61 117 192 171 125 - - - 830 
linipe T.B.C. 1173 24 3 12 (4) - - - - 1208 
Others 47 - - - - - - - - 47 
Total 28551 5353 4481 3CG8 1917 1845 1710 631 142 47728 
f- aintenence - 188 322 337 411 563 631 - - 2452 
Source$ Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, Review of Progress. 
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•Work in progress. 
Sou/re: Mahaweli Projects and Programme - 1979, 1983, 1984. Victoria and 
velopment Sri Lanka fSummary Report on Project) — 1977. 
Hydro Electrical Scheme — 1984, Mahaweli Gange De-
Accelerated Mahaweli Programme — Targets and Achievements of Downstream Development and Settlement (Hectares) 
Target of Accelerated Programme 
between 1977 - 1983 Achievements as at 31 . 05.1985. 
(1) (2) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) (5I (6) (7) 
Systems Irrigatable Number of Total Area 4 as a % Total number 6asa% 




of 2 of families 
settled 
of 3 
A 36,000 _ 
B 48.000 1,700 3.54 7,515 
C 24,000 140,000 5,658 23 .58 9,781 12.96 
D 19,000 - - -E 2.800 450 16.07 854 
Total 129,800 140,000* 7 . 8 0 8 ' 6.02 18,150 12.96 
"Area fully developed upto level of irrigated farming. 
Source: Mahaweli Projects and Programme 1979 - 1984 Progress Reports, Mahaweli Development Authority, Department 
of Census and Statistics Studies. 
Size of Mahaweli Investment in the Economy — I 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
1. Total Government Expenditure (Rs.Mn.) 20,339 28,532 29,486 35,287 41,790 51,364 67,103. 
2. Capital Expenditure (Rs. Mn.) 7,809 12,044 11,765 16,056 16,708 19,521 24,623 
3. Expenditure on the AMP (Rs Mn.) 1,603 2,991 3,991 5,469 7,302 7,195 5,541 
4. Mahavcli/Capital Expenditure (Ratio) 0.21 0.25 0.34 0.34 0.44 0.37 0.23 
5. Hahawoli/Total Expenditure (Ratio) 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.08 
6. Capital Expenditure/Total Expenditure 
(Ratio) 0.38 0.42 0.40 0.46 o.4o 0.38 0.37 
7. Mahawoli/GDP Ratio 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06* 0.06* 0 .04' 0.03* 
8. Capital Expenditure/GDP Ratio 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.15 
9. Total Expenditure/GDP Ratio 0.39 0.43 0.35 O.36* 0.34* 0.33* 0.42* 
10. Mahawcli/Imports Ratio 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.10 
11. Mahaweli/Exports Ratio 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.26 6.28 0.18 0.16 
2. Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka, Review of Prorrenc. 
* Based on Provisional Data. 
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